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The housing market in several countries is facing major challenges concerning the supply of 
new housing and in particular the provision in the affordable and social sector. This has been 
accentuated by financial constraints on public sector spending meaning that new ways of 
funding social/affordable housing are required working in conjunction with the private sector 
and using private finance. Ireland is faced with similar problems where traditionally 
government capital has been used through local authorities or Approved Housing Bodies to 
provide new housing in this sector.  
This thesis puts forward a model of institutional equity funding for social/affordable housing. 
The hypothesis is that a steady, cash producing investment in housing with a high level of 
security via government underpinning should be amenable to yield-seeking institutional 
investors. Within Ireland, dense concentrations of social housing have proven to be 
unsuccessful, accordingly the provision of a mixed tenure model, incorporating a tenant base 
with greater economic capacity facilitates the innovative delivery of sustainable communities 
in the rental housing sector. 
Most of the academic literature on Irish social housing has originated from the social sciences 
and from a historical perspective. Hence, there is a lack of research on how housing is funded 
including the absence of viable financial models of delivery. This thesis, in addressing this 
issue, combines the analysis of social housing funding mechanisms at an international level 
with a consideration  of the institutional residential investment environment. The research is 
set in the context of Irish social housing as a system in a historical institutional perspective 
highlighting strong path dependencies.  
The proposed fund articulated in this thesis advocates using public sector support to stimulate 
institutional investment in mixed-tenure housing through an equity capital vehicle with REIT 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION  
1.1 Contextual Background  
Housing is a deeply complex but fundamental human construct. It has an obvious physical 
manifestation in the form of structures where people live, but it also has profound, social, 
economic, anthropological, and political significance, together with strong emotional and 
psychological resonances that permeate all human societies. From nomadism to advanced 
western capitalist culture, housing plays an important role in the organisation of human 
societies. Indeed, the roots of the most recent world economic crisis lay in the malign effect of 
failed housing speculation, and its derivatives, on the financial system and ultimately the world 
economy. At its most basic level, housing provides us with a fundamental human need – 
shelter. Alongside food and water, shelter is one of our most basic requirements. Maslow’s 
hierarchy of needs (Figure 1.1) is often portrayed as a pyramid with physiological needs at the 
base, indicating that they are the requirements for basic existence. Housing is also fundamental 
to the second rung on that pyramid – safety and security. In most societies, housing also plays 
a key role in the social needs of an individual, as the locus of family life, the link to the 
“community”, and in settled societies to a sense of place and belonging. In most societies, the 
choice of dwelling is an important indicator of social standing, rank, wealth, and status. 
Fundamentally, housing as a construct is deeply important to our sense of ourselves and how 
we relate to each other.  
Figure. 1.1 Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs 
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The corollary of the importance of housing to the individual is that housing plays a very 
significant part in how economies and societies are organised. In western and capitalist 
economies, the price of housing is a key driver of wages and other costs in the economy. A full 
analysis of the dynamics of housing markets is outside the scope of the present discussion, but 
housing prices are a function of a complex nexus of demand/supply issues, credit availability, 
wages, underlying economic conditions and consumer sentiment. Purchasing a home is likely 
to be the biggest investment in the lives of most households. Homeownership therefore absorbs 
a huge portion of incomes that is thereby lost to other asset classes as an investment option.  
 
Housing also acts as a social segregator in society. While the gated enclaves that characterise 
homes of the wealthy in some cities are some of the most extreme manifestations of this, it is 
generally true that social classes are separated by location and the type of housing that they live 
in. From the favelas and barrios of Latin America to the large public housing estates of western 
Europe, rich and poor are generally spatially divided. Cities are therefore typically separated 
into areas according to the wealth or social class of their citizens. There is extensive literature 
investigating the links between housing and outcomes in health, education and other key socio-
economic indicators, and generally those outcomes are worse for those who live in poorer 
housing conditions. Aside even from any humanitarian or egalitarian impulses, such outcomes 
are likely to prove costly to society in terms of additional health costs, and a less-skilled 
workforce to drive the economy. Without an adequate supply of affordable housing, cities and 
city-regions are vulnerable to sharp upward wage pressures, and externalities such as 
congestion and sprawl that reduce their overall efficiencies. All advanced western democracies 
therefore provide some housing support to households who are unable to afford to house 
themselves in the market. Hence the need for provision of social housing in meeting the needs 
of disadvantaged/lower income households. However, the definition of social housing is 
problematic because of widely differing systems and methods of provision used in different 
contexts. In Ireland, the legal term used is “social housing support” which refers to a range of 
housing options from state-owned properties to supported private tenancies. Cahill (2014) 
surveys some definitions of social housing, noting that ownership of the property by a “non-
profit” type landlord – local authority or voluntary housing body for example, does not always 
adequately describe social housing, as subsidised housing might also comprehend “social 
housing” irrespective of the landlord.  
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Arguably Haffner et al (2009, 2010) interpret social housing on the basis of needs allocation, a 
definition that is utilised in this thesis to distinguish between social and market housing. This 
definition has been chosen as it is broad enough to encompass a range of descriptions that is 
not confined to the nature of the provider, and permits international comparison. Social housing 
is defined as housing provided for people on low incomes or with particular needs by 
government agencies or non-profit organisations. In many countries, housing is not directly 
provided; rather market-based accommodation is supported by a subsidy of one kind or 
another. Arguably the Irish situation is comparable as income limits for social housing 
encompasses households at median, or close to median income in many areas. However, the 
reality is that the majority of social housing applicants are entirely reliant on social welfare 
payments, notwithstanding a notable increase in applicants with some form of employment 
income in recent years (Housing Agency, 2016a). 
Developing social housing at scale has led to widespread social problems throughout Europe. 
This has resulted from poor planning and location, bad construction and low levels of 
investment in maintenance and other necessary interventions. Intense concentrations of 
households with low levels of economic capacity, and the consequent deprivation and poverty 
have led to entrenched patterns of exclusion, and marginalisation. Of course, this has led to 
poor perceptual problems for social housing, and make it a counter-intuitive real estate 
investment proposition. Acknowledging the mistakes of the past has led to a strong sustainable 
communities’ mandate in developing new social housing. This means that policy insists on 
higher levels of integration between social housing and other tenure types. It also reduces the 
volume of low-income housing that can be produced at any one location. Of course, this policy 
mitigates against the volume production of housing that is required (a) to meet the demand, 
and (b) to satisfy the needs of institutional investors for large-scale investment. Also, if the 
mistakes of the past are not to be repeated, there needs to be some additional economic capacity 
in the communities to render them sustainable.  
The industrialisation of the nineteenth century led to rapid urbanisation and the growth of towns 
and cities. As the industrial revolution progressed, the living conditions of many of those who 
came to work in the new factories was often extremely poor, with overcrowding, lack of 
sanitation and adequate light and ventilation. Concern about these conditions led to the public 
or philanthropic provision of housing for the working classes, and the origin of modern social 
or public housing as it is understood in Europe and North America comes about from this time 
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(Balchin and Rhoden, 1998). There were a number of drivers of this movement. Philanthropists 
and social reformers were appalled by the conditions they witnessed in the slums of the newly 
industrialised cities, and were motivated by religious and humanitarian concerns. However, 
concerns that overcrowding and poor sanitation were causing public health problems, and the 
concern that this could lead to social and political unrest led to the beginning of state-subsidised 
public housing from the middle of the nineteenth century (Norris, 2003). 
In Ireland, the development of this system for housing of the very poor was rooted in land 
reform movements and agrarian unrest rather than labour movement or philanthropic concerns 
as characterised other European countries. The evolution of the system is well covered in the 
literature (Norris, 2016; Kenna, 2011; Fraser, 1996). Supported housing in urban areas arose 
later, and as Norris (2003) describes in early attempts to provide a legislative underpinning to 
the provision of lower-income housing local authorities were not the principal providers, and 
that philanthropic or semi-philanthropic bodies provided the bulk of such housing with the aid 
of low-cost loans and grant aid from Dublin Corporation. The Dublin Artisans Dwelling 
Company (which formed the inspiration for this research) was a commercial concern, providing 
housing to the better paid of the working classes, and providing a 4-5% return to its investors 
with loans provided from local government. 
Both Norris and Kenna agree that the Housing of the Working Classes Act in 1890 represented 
a step change in the provision of housing in that it marked the beginning of local authority 
construction of low-income housing, and that the Housing of the Working Classes (Ireland) 
Act 1908 marked the point at which the principal providers of social housing became public 
bodies rather than non-statutory actors. This point also marks a divergence between Great 
Britain and Ireland and other northern European countries where non-governmental entities 
continued to provide the bulk of social housing. A full discussion of the historical development 
of Irish social housing is at Chapter 4. 
The Irish social housing system is marked by a number of characteristics: 
• The strong role of local government (Norris, 2003; Kenna, 2011 at p.24);  
• Particularly in the early years, the emphasis on rural housing for low-income 
workers (Norris (2003), at p.167; Kenna, 2011, at p.25;  Fahey, 1998); 
• Differential rent (Norris 2003, at p.175); 
• Tenant purchase options (Norris, 2003, at p.173; Hayden, 2014); 
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• Capital fluctuations (Norris, 2003, at 171); 
• Residualisation. 
 
Each of these individual characteristics has had particular consequences for the evolution of 
social housing in Ireland. The fact that local government was the principal delivery mechanism 
meant that the strong co-operative, voluntary, or non-profit housing associations that 
characterise social housing systems elsewhere in Europe did not develop. The emphasis on 
rural housing meant that significant developments in urban areas were later to arrive on the 
Irish housing landscape, a fact that is likely to have given rise to the rapid residualisation of 
social housing. The differential rents regime, which links the rent payable to the income of the 
household meant that the connection between the cost of providing housing and the income 
received to sustain it became more tenuous, and the moneys received were either inadequate to 
maintain and replenish the stock, or rental income was spent elsewhere by local authorities who 
themselves were often under financial strain. The development of new housing was dependent 
on capital allocations from central government.  
As political priorities and economic circumstances fluctuated, so too did the supply of public 
sector housing. This meant that the supply was uneven, and lacked a programmed approach 
linked to demand and the wider housing market. From a very early stage, tenants had the 
opportunity to purchase their dwellings through various favourable tenant purchase schemes. 
In 1999, Fahey noted that local authorities had built 330,000 dwellings in the hundred years of 
their existence, and of these 230,000 had been sold (Fahey, 1999, at pp.3-4). Indeed in the 
subsequent 15 years, a further approximately 14,000 units were sold. Obviously, this has had 
profound consequences for the overall supply of social housing, but it also had the effect of 
“residualising” the social housing stock, whereby the most economically able tenants chose to 
purchase their homes.  
 
These characteristics have led to a situation where there is a chronic shortage of low-income 
housing and none of the traditional policy levers are available to increase supply. Most obvious 
among these is an increase in the capital available to invest in new social housing either through 
acquisition or construction. Delivery of social housing has traditionally been the responsibility 
of local authorities, with an increasing role for the not-for-profit Approved Housing Body 
(AHB) sector, who have been assisted with a range of capital funding schemes and revenue 
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supports over the past few decades. Government policy seeks to grow this sector into the 
principal channel of social housing supply. However, the AHB sector as presently constituted 
is highly fragmented, and its small scale and limited financial skills means that it cannot deliver 
at the level required. Reality dictates that private-sector involvement in housing delivery is 
needed.  
AHBs have been operating in Ireland for several decades. They are non-profit organisations 
focusing on the provision of rental housing for low-income households, and for special needs 
including the aged, persons with a disability, and homeless households. In that time, they have 
provided about 27,000 homes largely via non-repayable grants or loans. This funding flow has 
slowed to a trickle due to the State’s fiscal situation. At present, the AHB sector is not equipped 
either financially or managerially to fund or deliver that task at the scale required, and the 
measures that are being taken to build capacity in the sector are all medium-term goals.  In 
2013, the AHB sector added only 211 units to the social housing stock – less than the local 
authority output of 293, albeit that just over 500 units were in progress. Between 2014 and 
2015, the sector dramatically increased its output to 357 units and 401 units respectively 
(DHPCLG statistics, various years).  
However, constraints in the public finances has not permitted an increase of the order required 
to meet the demand. The lack of capacity in the AHB sector means that channel is not able to 
deliver at the level required. The private sector, which has been an outlet for those in need of 
social housing support for some years via rent supplement, and other direct leasing 
arrangements between local authorities and landlords, is no longer in a position to meet that 
demand. The overhang in supply that existed at the beginning of the economic downturn has 
by and large been absorbed, at least in the centres of main social housing demand. The absence 
of new private home construction, poor credit availability, and adverse consumer sentiment has 
meant that no meaningful new supply has come into the private market since 2008. The 
proportion of households renting in Ireland has risen to its highest level in decades. This has 
led to rising rents and dwindling supply. The social housing cohort who are seeking housing in 
the lower cost percentiles of the private rented sector are increasingly squeezed, and in this 





Ireland has a politically-controlled rent-setting system that lacks a direct link between land, 
building and operating costs resulting in rents being set significantly below the cost-based 
approach used in most other European countries. Arguably the low level of social housing rents 
is at the core of the social housing problem in Ireland as articulated in later chapters of the 
thesis and are a defining element Irish social housing. Politically, a move away from a system 
that links rents to income would be extremely challenging making it problematic to move to a 
unitary rental model advocated by Kemeny (1995). 
The Irish government has produced various policy statements on housing strategy over the 
years. These are discussed more fully in Chapter 3. The most recent, Rebuilding Ireland: Action 
Plan for Housing and Homelessness (DHPCLG, 2016) continues a long-term trend 
underpinning these strategies in, on the one hand, promoting capital investment programmes 
along traditional lines, and on the other, an emphasis on private sector provision through the 
deployment of revenue payment systems rather than capital injection. The policy has also been 
to give the AHBs a much greater role in housing provision, however the capacity of the sector 
is constrained by its relatively small scale. The Housing Policy Statement of 2011 envisages 
the AHB sector as the principal provider of social housing in the place of the local authority 
(DECLG, 2011). However, it would not appear at present that AHBs are sufficiently equipped 
to provide units and the pace and volume required. The main problem is lack of capacity in the 
sector – the voluntary housing movement, whilst consisting of over 300 AHBs has less than 15 
organisations with any managerial or financial substance to commission new housing in 
volume. Most of the AHBs were established for a particular and locally based need, providing 
a small number of units in a particular community, or for a particular group, e.g. the aged. Even 
the capacity of the larger AHBs to borrow money is very constrained, and they generally lack 
capacity to manage complex building delivery systems. They are also constrained by the 
requirement to use State procurement procedures which tend to elevate costs and delay 
projects. 
In 2016, the new Government brought forward a more comprehensive housing plan, Rebuilding 
Ireland. The stated objectives of which are to deliver 47,000 new homes through construction, 
acquisition and leasing, and to fund a further 75,000 private sector tenancies through the 
Housing Assistance Payments Scheme (HAP) (DHPCLG, 2016). Indeed, the Housing Agency 
(2016) found that 91,600 households were deemed to be in need of social housing support. 
Unlike other policy-focused documents, Rebuilding Ireland is an action plan that is in some 
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ways more holistic than other policy documents in that it attempts to see housing in a more 
rounded way incorporating the market as well as social housing for the first time. However, it 
offers little change to social housing policy. Importantly, the Plan signals the deployment of 
State land for mixed-tenure developments, and new “cost-rental” housing models, but these 
plans remain short on detail. Ultimately Rebuilding Ireland commits to an expansion of the 
capital programme to develop new housing via the local authorities and AHBs, while 
increasing the targets for new HAP tenancies. It thus cannot be said to represent any shift in 
policy, but rather an acceleration of the existing policy direction.  
In the absence of State capital to acquire or build new social homes, policy and practice has 
moved to sourcing properties from the private rented sector, on medium-term leases of from 
five to 10 years, and then sublet to a social tenant at a differential rent. They are then effectively 
treated as if they were owned by the LAs (or the AHBs) but of course at the end of the lease 
the property is handed back to its owner. This system is known as the Rental Accommodation 
Scheme (RAS) or the Payment and Availability Agreement (PAA) system. However, the 
private supply system is currently under stress. While it operated satisfactorily in the recession 
of 2008–13 when supply of residences exceeded demand, in the current circumstances of tight 
supply and rising rents in areas of high social housing demand, it is resulting in private 
landlords terminating existing social tenancies and not taking on new ones. The consequence 
is severely constrained availability at a time of expanding demand. Furthermore, the existing 
Irish rental sector is very much a “cottage” industry of individual private landlords with 65% 
owning just one property, and just 19% owning three properties or more (Housing Agency 
2014). This factor has had significant impact on the nature of the industry and its practices and 
procedures. However, as evidenced by the recent investment by REITs and others in over 3,000 
rental units in Dublin, professional property investors from Ireland and overseas are available, 
in the right conditions, to invest in large-scale rental housing in Ireland. However, this is a new 
industry – one which has the potential to professionalise the sector with tenants being treated 
as long-term customers.  
The Irish private rented sector has long been characterised by small-scale landlords, 90% of 
whom own one or two properties. Residential property poses a number of challenges for large-
scale and institutional investors. Yields tend to be lower than those available in other real estate 
asset classes. Availability of stock at sufficient scale to attract institutions is problematic. Data 
on the performance of the sector is less available than other property assets. There are also higher 
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management costs, and greater political and reputational risk (whether real or perceived). This 
notwithstanding, more recently, large-scale investors have been attracted to Irish private rental 
residential property by the low values, strong yields and high potential for capital growth. These new 
investors include short-term foreign equity funds and the new REITs, one of which was established 
solely to deal in residential property.  
For institutional investors, especially pension funds, residential property represents a good 
diversification strategy, and can produce cashflows that generally rise in line with incomes, 
thus providing a hedge against inflation and a useful means of matching assets and liabilities. 
That said, however, such investment is at a very low level in Ireland and the UK, and only in a 
few European countries is residential property a substantial component of institutional 
portfolios.  
The barriers to institutional investment in housing generally are greatly magnified when it 
comes to social housing where perceptual problems around management, maintenance, and 
concerns around future values combine with even lower yields than general market housing, 
and lack of any precedents for such investment. This thesis argues however, that the long-term, 
steady returns with modest uplift in rents that social and affordable housing can produce should 
be well-suited to institutional investors. It sets out to develop a model that can produce long-
term steady yields with modest rental uplift and capital appreciation that should be attractive, 
in particular to pension funds. A further attraction of social housing should be the government 
backing of the system via revenue payments. However, if pension funds are to be drawn to a 
new asset class, it is necessary that the returns are better than sovereign bonds, but if returns 
are at similar levels to other real estate asset classes, then it is unlikely that rents can be 
produced at an appropriate level for social and affordable housing. Accordingly, yields will 
need to fall in this range. 
Affordable housing, as a subset of social housing, is allocated on the basis of need, but 
envisages a lower level of support or subsidy from the public sector. Subsequent chapters deal 
more fully with the taxonomies and typologies of housing systems and analyses. This new 
“affordable” housing category would be provided in consideration of (a) the land, and (b) the 
provision of a government-backed lease. It would not require any transfer payments. In return, 
key workers would be provided with long-term rental housing at below-market rents. This 
meets three public policy objectives: (a) new supply; (b) affordable rental housing, and (c) new 
social housing sourced from the private sector. It also meets the needs of investors in providing 
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a balanced and viable property-based investment. This thesis seeks to set out a way of providing 
the additional stock required via new financial methods and a more self-sustaining system of 
housing provision and finance into the future.  
1.2 Aims and Objectives  
 
The aim of the research is to examine financing structures for the delivery of social/affordable 
housing by the private sector, develop and test a model for funding future provision via the 
property investment market. It is a hypothesis of the research that a model(s) can be constructed 
that would attract large-scale institutional investors into the sector. Such models seek to provide 
a rental stream at an acceptable yield based on particular features of the investment instrument 
that is designed. The absence of such structures has been a serious deterrent to private equity 
financing into this asset class. Indeed, this has been the stimulus behind a project to establish a 
fund for social and affordable housing investment in Ireland. As such the findings are tested 
and reported in a “real world” context. The theoretical framework adopted is historical 
institutionalist in nature, so both the theory and the model assumptions are tested against real 
institutional structures in housing, politics, commerce, law and non-governmental sectors.  
The model developed to induce investment into social and affordable housing is based on 
research that seeks to meet the needs of investors but also to create stable, sustainable well-
managed communities that can provide a high standard of security and comfort for tenants over 
the long term at affordable rents. The principle adopted to achieve this is cost-based rents which 
are the basis of many social housing systems throughout Europe where rents are based on the 
cost of producing the dwelling rather than the maximum rent the property will bear. Usually 
cost rents are achieved by non-profit or limited-profit organisations who avail of certain state 
financial supports to reduce the cost of producing the dwelling, and apply the increasing equity 
in their portfolio to further capital investment. This model instead seeks to avail of cheap or 
free public sector land to take that element of cost out of the building cost and the cost of 
funding is reduced further by means of a “step-in” agreement where the Irish State commits to 
ensure income continuity in the event of failure of an AHB operator. Overall, discounts in the 
cost of finance, land, and efficiencies in construction and management are all applied to the 
end rent. In the proposed model structure (Figure 1.2), the investor is buying a long-term stable 
cash-flow income, the investment upside is a stable and secure indexed income and potential 
capital value increases.  
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In achieving the aim of this research the objectives of the thesis are as follows:  
1. to develop a theoretical framework for understanding the processes and dynamics of 
housing relevant to the Irish context 
 
2. to critically review the history, development and drivers of social housing in Ireland 
 
3. to evaluate existing supply-side mechanisms and funding models in the delivery of 
social/affordable housing in Ireland 
 
4. to provide an international comparative perspective of social/affordable housing and 
funding systems  
 
5 to explore the characteristics and investment performance of residential property as 
income-producing asset class  
6 to develop and test an investment vehicle for the delivery of social/affordable 
housing in Ireland 
 
1.3 Research Methodology and Approach 
   
The methodology underpinning this research is based on the research question whether 
institutional funding can facilitate the delivery of social and affordable housing provision in 
Ireland. The theoretical position adopted in this research is that social housing systems are 
heavily path-dependent: that is to say that once particular decisions are taken, the scope and 
range of subsequent choices is narrowed. This is sometimes due to positive feedback loops or 
the high costs of reversal (Pierson, (2004), but also due to mechanisms of “efficiency, 
legitimacy and power” (Mahoney, 2000) that constrain the ability of actors in the choices they 
can make. Path dependency can thus help explain how systems come into being, and how they 
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change. However, path dependency is not a complete theory in itself. This research casts path-
dependency in the context of historical institutionalism – where institutions are sets of rules 
and conventions, formal and informal that govern human behaviour (North, 1990; Pierson, 
2004). Housing systems exist in path-dependent institutional frameworks, which are generally 
stable for long periods of time punctuated by “critical junctures” when policy choices and 
change is required. From a path-dependency perspective the institutional framework considers 
the complementarity of social/affordable housing to investment criteria and role of stake-
holders in delivering a new funding model.  
In this context the thesis has six strands to research methodology namely: 
• theoretical development that fuses path dependency theory with investment; 
• assessment of the history of Irish social housing and international best practice 
through literature review; 
• policy evaluation in relation to social and affordable housing in Ireland; 
• secondary data analysis from industry sources (IPD/MSCI, JLL, CBRE) to analyse 
comparative investment trends and set perspectives for institutional investment in 
residential property and in particular social/affordable housing; 
• interview evidence involving the employment of two stages of structured interviews, 
the first with key actors in the property sector, the second with pension funds; 
• investment fund model development, requirements/characteristics and inputs; 
• utilisation of the model in a real live housing scheme. 
 
The methodology is designed to address the scale of the challenge in providing 
social/affordable housing. Given the constraints in the public finances, the research presented 
in the subsequent chapters of the thesis shows that the only real option is to move to a revenue-
based support system to meet Government policy of increasing investment in social/affordable 
housing.  In the absence of State capital, the challenge for the research is to show how stake-
holders can draw down funds within an institutional investment framework using equity 
capital.   
 
 
1.4 Thesis Structure 
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The introduction to the thesis in Chapter 1 sets out the background to the problem of the long-
term shortage of social housing and sets out the aim, objectives and a summary of the 
methodologies used. The chapter briefly describes a proposed funding model based on cost 
rental housing, institutionally funded and leased to AHBs on long-term FRI leases. The 
essential hypothesis is that social and affordable housing should be amenable to institutional 
investors.  
Chapter 2 considers the core underlying theory based on institutionalism and path dependency 
within the context of social and affordable housing.  In particular the chapter focuses on the 
inter-relationships between the welfare state, social housing, institutionalism and path-
dependency.  The arguments postulated reinforce path dependency as a process within the 
theoretical framework of institutionalism and more specifically historical institutionalism.  The 
literature review explores these strands creating the argument that path dependency provides a 
contextual framework in which to evaluate the role of actors in the delivery of institutional 
investment in the social/affordable housing sector. 
Chapter 3 applies the historical institutionalist/path dependency analysis to the Irish housing 
system highlighting a series of critical junctures at which point institutional change occurs. 
Through this analysis, the evolution and development of the Irish housing system is explained 
with the starting point land reform and rural housing, moving then to the urban dimension, the 
links between housing and politics pre and post Irish independence. Various policy and 
financial initiatives such as rent control, tenant purchase and residualistaion are articulated as 
part of the understanding of the social housing dimension. The chapter finishes with a review 
of contemporary housing perspectives and advocates that six policy initiatives critical for the 
social housing sector thereby setting an underpinning framework for low-income housing 
provision into the future. 
Chapter 4 explores demand side drivers and existing supply-side models for social/affordable 
housing in Ireland coupled with the cost of new development. The chapter articulates the 
constraints on State provision, the relative strengths of the various actors and agencies involved 
and the need for alternative/complementary private sector led funding models.  Specifically, 
Chapter 4 addresses the third objective of the thesis namely to evaluate existing supply-side 
mechanisms and funding models in the delivery of social/affordable housing in Ireland. 
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Chapter 5 considers social/affordable housing systems in six selected countries England, 
Australia, France, Germany, the Netherlands and Switzerland with selection criteria based on 
either an Anglo-Saxon politico-legal heritage or European countries which have very large and 
successful social housing systems or a high level of institutional investment in housing. The 
chapter draws upon a combination of primary sources and academic literature and identifies as 
appropriate parallels to and any lessons of the Irish system. 
Chapter 6 analyses the performance of income-producing residential property as an asset class 
relative to all properties using MSCI data. International comparison utilises five of the case 
studies discussed in Chapter 5 supplemented by other countries with long total return data 
series for residential property and compared with the investment performance of Irish 
residential property. In addition, the chapter draws out perspectives from surveys of Irish 
institutions and defined-benefit pension funds in relation to potential investment instruments.   
Chapter 7 details the various components of the Fund model including structure and 
governance issues. The chapter articulates the extensive engagement with stakeholders 
including high-level meetings, briefing papers to Government and consultations with the 
public, private and voluntary sectors to explain and actualise the Fund.  
Chapter 8 explores how the Fund was brought to reality. The chapter specifically sets out how 
the Fund entity emerged from the subject of this research. The operationalisation of the Fund 
is illustrated through a detailed consideration of the New Bancroft case study.  
The final chapter of the thesis assesses the policy impact of this research and its interaction 
with the institutional and policy-making framework. It argues that the research has led to an 
acceptance of the need for an intermediate “affordable” rental tenure. It has also highlighted 








CHAPTER 2: HOUSING, INSTITUTIONALISM AND PATH DEPENDENCY  
2.1 Introduction 
In theoretically framing why social and affordable housing in Ireland requires a new model of 
provision, it is necessary to understand the processes that have shaped the system as it is at 
present, and the factors and influences that will be important in developing or advancing any 
innovations in the area. Housing has very particular features as an asset class in terms of 
uniqueness, lumpiness, durability and relatively high cost. It also has extremely deep cultural 
resonances as a locus of family, identity, social status, source of wealth, and other deeply 
entrenched semiotic significances. While every advanced economy in some way supports 
households who cannot afford market prices for their accommodation, there remains an almost 
ubiquitous problem of providing adequate accommodation to meet the housing needs of urban 
populations in particular. This problem is of course most acute for poor and lower income 
households who depend on the city for their livelihood in one way or another, but for whom 
market rates for housing are unachievable. Of course, affordable housing is not an issue unique 
to urban areas, and indeed rural housing has lain at the root of movements for social change in 
many countries – including Ireland.  For these reasons, housing is deeply entrenched in the 
political, social and economic discourse of all countries and is rooted in the structure of modern 
capitalist societies.  
As Aalbers and Christophers (2014) note, property and land are one of the reasons for the 
development of states. In early human societies, wealth was derived directly from the control 
or ownership over land and resources. Thus, the structures that were required to allocate and 
sustain these resources led to the establishment of the rules and conventions that developed 
into polities and states. As land is a prerequisite for housing and one of its key uses, governance 
and issues relating to housing are inevitably central to modern societies. The role of land in a 
society is therefore a complex nexus of economic structure, social relations, political culture, 
and historical development. Put more simply, as control or ownership of land is one of the key 
sources of wealth and power in human societies, a great part of the social structures that govern 
human interaction are rooted in the need or desire to produce mechanisms to preserve stability 
and continuity in these constructs. Accordingly, the conventions and rules, both informal and 
formal, that go to make up human societies form a dense and complex web within which change 
takes places and continuity is preserved. Most human attempts to understand the world have 
been to understand these rules and conventions. A rich vein of scholarship has termed these 
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institutions and has developed a mid-range theory called institutionalism in which dynamics 
and stability in politics, economics and more latterly the social sciences are explained. As Lowe 
(2004) observes, following Merton (1949Harloe), a theory of mid-range is one between “the 
excesses of empirically empty grand theory or theoretically empty data gathering”.  
As theory of the middle range (Merton, 1949), historical institutionalism offers the potential to 
understand change and stability mechanisms at a level of magnification that is neither too 
“grand” in its scope, nor too small in merely attempting to assemble data without generalising 
at all. The very strong strain of neo-Marxian analysis that permeates much social science 
discourse cannot be ignored in this regard: this analysis which sees most of the institutional 
change in the world as part of “neo-liberal” project may be theoretically sound, but is of no 
particular help in this thesis. First, the starting point of this research is to bring private 
investment into social housing – almost definitionally hostile to the world view of this analysis. 
However, a review of the literature in this area would not be complete without reference to this 
school, exemplified well by Harvey’s (2005) critique of neoliberalism and Peck and Tickell’s 
(2002) essay “Neoliberalizing Space” which attempts to outline the neoliberalising processes. 
In housing terms, Blessing (2015) looks at housing reforms in the US, England and Australia 
through this prism, while Pawson and Fitzpatrick (2014) confine their analysis to the latter two 
jurisdictions. Norris and Byrne (2016) take a similar approach in an Irish context. It is not that 
these ideas lack power or cogency in charting changes to social housing provision systems, but 
their solution appears to be an unspecified return to State provision without explaining how 
this can be achieved.  
Social housing analysis is inevitably bound up with the broader welfare state. Torgersen (1987) 
described it as “the wobbly pillar under the welfare State”. Esping-Andersen’s (1990) 
monumental study of welfare state regimes was especially useful in understanding State 
support systems. Though Esping-Andersen conspicuously omitted housing from his study, it 
remains extremely important in analysis of welfare systems. Esping-Andersen’s analysis also 
fits well into the path-dependency/historical institutionalist analysis used here. O’Sullivan 
(2004) considers it in an Irish context, while Norris (2016) presents a fresh and original 
perspective on Irish housing and the Irish welfare state in developed differently rather than 
more weakly compared to other European states.  
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This chapter considers the inter-relationship between the welfare state, social housing, 
institutionalism and path-dependency and in doing so addresses the first objective of the thesis 
in providing the theoretical framework for the research.  
2.2 Housing and the Welfare State 
As regards pure theory however, the fundamental reason why interventions are needed in the 
housing market are required are in the structure of capitalist economies. Housing has often been 
discussed as the “wobbly pillar under the welfare state” (Torgerson, 1987) and in all advanced 
economies, some form of support is offered to poor households by the State through various 
means. Jacobs and Manzi (2017) argue that analyses of housing policy are either too broad and 
“structuralist” in nature (e.g. Harvey, 2010) to be insightful or are too narrow and focused on 
administrative interventions. Aalbers and Christophers (2014) point out that housing policy is 
either seen as a social policy analysis, or housing in the market as essentially a subject for 
mainstream economics. This is important. The absence of literature on private involvement in 
social housing probably derives from this bifurcated approach to housing studies. Aalbers and 
Christophers argue strongly that housing needs to be placed more centrally in political 
economy, and by implication that housing policy analysis needs to be more all-encompassing. 
Aalbers and Christophers highlight that a key missing part in housing studies is the sharp 
bifurcation between housing as an economic market commodity and the housing support 
systems that are supported by government policy.  
To consider the nature of interventions for lower income households to support their housing 
needs, it is necessary to reflect on the role of welfare systems in advanced capitalist economies. 
However, it is too imprecise to use the term “welfare state”, as housing in many countries is 
outside the formal welfare system. Esping-Andersen’s (1990) study radically recast studies of 
the welfare state into his tripartite categorisation of what he terms “welfare capitalism”. In this 
analysis, capitalist economies have adopted strategies for the “decommodification” of labour 
to varying degrees. Countries in the Anglo-Saxon tradition have tended towards a minimalist 
system of provision for the very poorest households. In this model, benefits are means tested, 
often stigmatised, and very much focused on maintaining the marginal benefits of work over 
welfare. The second category is a type of corporatist, insurance-based system, which while 
affording rights and benefits with a strongly decommodifying effect, were nonetheless based 
on class and status. Thus, systems in Germany, France and other mainland European countries 
follow this model where the State adapted or took over corporatist structures, typically based 
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on church or guild-type support mechanisms. The final category in Esping-Andersen’s 
typology is the “social-democratic” found in Nordic countries based on principles of 
universality and equality. Here, welfare benefits are extended well into the middle classes, and 
are designed to provide high-quality public services that crowd out the market. Thus “all 
benefit; all are dependent; and all will presumably feel obliged to pay”. 
Esping-Andersen omitted housing from his study of welfare states and typologies. This most 
likely occurred due to the highly ambiguous – if not tenuous – position of housing within the 
welfare state. Torgerson (1987) argued that housing “always will occupy a special and 
awkward position in welfare thinking due to the special nature of the commodity in question”. 
Stephens and Fitzpatrick (2007) consider the links between welfare regimes and housing in the 
context of Esping-Andersen’s concept of decommodification where housing outcomes are 
achieved independently from labour market outcomes. Stephens and Fitzpatrick challenge the 
equation of Harloe (1995) of decommodification of housing with state provision, noting that 
patterns of housing consumption, quality of public housing and its distribution are not 
accounted for in this analysis. They also reject the assumption that there can be no 
decommodification in the private housing sector. This brings us to an important point in the 
context of the long-run institutional change in housing in Ireland, and indeed across Europe. 
Abandoning purely publicly or wholly non-profit housing as the locus of housing welfare opens 
up crucial perspectives on new models of provision.  
The work of Kemeny (1995) is perhaps the most influential and seminal of all in housing 
studies through the analysis of rental housing using dualist and unitary models where in the 
latter the profit and non-profit sectors were much more closely integrated than in dualist 
systems where social housing was heavily residualised. While Norris (2014) argues that there 
may be some narrowing of that gap in Ireland in recent years though concedes that it is a very 
weak unitary market if it exists at all. Kemeny identifies the strength of the unitary rental 
systems to the “maturation” of assets and the basing of rents on cost of production rather than 
market prices or household incomes. However, Kemeny’s theory is predicated on a debt-
funded model of housing and hence is heavily immersed in the evolution of housing systems 
in different countries, but pays little attention to the market provision of housing and potential 
to leverage the market for the provision of social and affordable housing. It is therefore 
submitted that many of the benefits of the unitary market can be attained without the 
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assumption in Kemeny’s work that this can (a) only be delivered through maturation of debt-
based assets and (b) that only non-profit profit providers can bring about these benefits.  
Lennartz (2011) more thoroughly surveys the literature with regard to the placing of housing 
within welfare state regimes and the validity of applying Esping-Anderson’s categorisation of 
welfare-state regimes to housing. Lennartz further challenges Kemeny’s typology and 
understanding of welfare states as they relate to housing, observing  in the context of privatising 
programmes in three integrated housing markets that “privatization pathways beyond the 
common definancing policies could indeed be interpreted as path-dependent system 
divergences in Western European rental housing”, and that “the realities of rental housing 
markets and the new power constellations, as well as the outcomes on the market seem too 
complex to be reflected by the two-fold dualist/integrated market typology”. 
Ghekiere (2008) characterised European social housing systems according to a typology based 
on tenure, the provider of the services, the beneficiaries and the funding. Accordingly, 
European social housing systems can be described as universalistic, targeted, generalist, or 
residual. A universalistic model is based on a public policy that seeks to ensure adequate and 
affordable housing for all, for example Sweden (where housing is provided by municipal 
housing companies) and the Netherlands (where non-profit organisations are used) to provide 
a large volumes of housing. “In this context, social housing assumes a market-regulating role 
(e.g. through rent control) to guarantee the whole population’s access to quality and affordable 
housing, whereby social housing is typically allocated via waiting lists” (European Parliament, 
2013).  
2.3 Historical Institutionalism 
The underlying theoretical framework adopted in this thesis is that of historical institutionalism. 
Institutions are sets of rules and conventions, both formal and informal that govern human 
behaviour (North, 1990). Historical institutionalism attempts to understand and interpret the 
world in terms of the development of institutions in a temporal context. Key works in this canon 
include Skocpol (1979 and Pierson (2004) both of which explore politics through this prism. 
North (1990) takes an economic perspective. Efforts to apply historical institutionalism to 
housing are most notable in Lowe (2004) where he offers a detailed account of British housing 
policy. Bengtsson et al (2008) examine the development of Nordic housing systems in this 
context. Norris’ (2016) analysis of the Irish housing and welfare policy though not explicitly 
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institutionalist in its analysis follows the same approach, also deploying path dependency as a 
method.  
Hall and Taylor (1996) provide a useful taxonomy of institutionalist thought. Institutionalism 
has a number of strands, characterised as “rational choice”, “sociological” and “historical” 
institutionalism (Hall and Taylor, 1996). Steinmo (2008) neatly summarises the key 
differences. While all agree that institutions are “rules that structure human behaviour”, they 
differ in their interpretation of these institutions. For rational choice proponents, most strongly 
characterised in economic institutionalism, humans act rationally balancing costs and benefits, 
while for advocates of a sociological approach, people act according to habit and 
appropriateness Pierson (2004), though more in the historical institutionalist camp, argues that 
rational choice offers essential tools to institutionalist analysis but that rational choice theory 
in focusing on strategic interaction in close-up can miss the broader sweep of temporal 
processes, the importance of sequence, and the role of “macro structure”.  
“Historical” institutionalists see context and the nature of the rule in question as the key factors 
in understanding institutions. Historical institutionalists neither see humans as entirely rational 
choice actors nor as simple rule-followers. Therefore, what a historical institutionalist seeks to 
understand is “why a certain choice was made and/or why a certain outcome occurred” 
(Steinmo, 2008). Thelen (1999) reviews the variants of institutionalism more thoroughly, 
noting again that historical institutionalists place a strong emphasis on context, and are inclined 
towards a greater emphasis on empiricism rather than pure theory. She observes that rational 
choice institutionalism is inclined towards an assumption of equilibrium order that perceived 
change as a move towards a new equilibrium, whereas historical institutionalists focus more 
on historical processes. This is important in examining the evolution of housing systems which 
are located between market and non-market institutions, and are thus to some degree always in 
process.  
It is through this prism of historical institutionalism that this thesis examines the rationale for 
institutional funding of social and affordable housing. It is important to distinguish clearly that 
institutions are rules and conventions that organise societies. Defining in the negative, we do 
not mean institutions in the sense they are often taken in everyday speech as, e.g. universities 
or other bodies corporate, but rather the underlying rules that govern human behaviour. These 
rules can be formal or informal. For Hall and Taylor (1996) historical institutionalists see 
institutions as “the formal or informal procedures, routines, norms and conventions embedded 
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in the organisational structure or the polity or political economy”. This definition is broader 
and more useful than that of Streeck and Thelen (2005) who see institutions in more formal 
structural terms, whereas others (Hall, 1989) see them as also informal codes of behaviour. 
North (1990) sees a crucial distinction between institutions and organisations. He uses a sports 
analogy to describe institutions as the rules of the game within which players attempt to win 
by knowing the rules and perhaps even infringing them if possible. The rules not only include 
the formal code but also the unwritten code and conventions that go to make up the game. For 
North, organisations are collective entities that exist for some purpose that is related to the 
institutional framework but in turn influence the evolution of that framework. They are then 
the agents for change, within which he seeks to explain institutional change.  
Capitalism is an institution that organisations operate with to achieve certain goals (profit). 
Private property is an institution that has given rise to much of the law (an institution) and 
politics (a combination of institutions) that determine how capitalism operates. Other rules, 
written and unwritten, give rise to institutions such as the welfare state which both are products 
of, and influencers of the political system. Within the welfare state as an institution, there are 
institutions like state pensions, children’s allowances. In understanding institutionalism, it is 
necessary to consider an institutional framework rather than try to untangle the myriad 
individual institutions that go to make up the complexity of modern economic and political life. 
Of course, it is possible to follow the thread of any individual institution, but it is seldom 
meaningful without a broader view of the context and other influencing institutions.  
To understand the challenge and importance of bringing about a new supply of social and 
affordable housing finance, an appreciation of the institutional framework for housing is 
necessary. That framework has by and large come into existence over the past 150 years in 
Ireland, and indeed over most of the developed world. Because of the factors noted early – 
lumpiness, durability, high cost of production, and high transfer costs, change in housing 
provision patterns is slow, and policy changes can take some time to impact. Added to this, the 
strong personal, social, cultural and political significances of housing in modern societies 
means that housing must necessarily be deeply embedded in the institutional framework of 
societies. Some frame of reference that permits analysis of the dynamics – as well as the 
stability and continuity – of housing systems is required. As Steinmo (2008) argues 
institutionalism has been criticised for offering no explanation for change. Indeed, the nature 
of institutions is inherently difficult to change as each institution is embedded in a larger 
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institutional framework. While North sees organisations as the agents for change, it is important 
to identify the processes that bring about that change.  
Thus, historical institutionalism is a theory that identifies “institutions” as the rules and 
conventions that govern human behaviour and which both determine how societies are 
organised and which are themselves determined by humans. It sees history as crucial in 
explaining why institutions have formed the way they did, and seeks to explain them by looking 
to their historical development. Steinmo (2008) explains it thus: 
“Historical institutionalists understand that behaviour, attitudes and strategic 
choices take place inside particular social, political, economic, and even 
cultural contexts. Rather than treating all political action as if fundamentally 
the same irrespective of time, place or context, historical institutionalists 
explicitly and intentionally attempt to situate their variables in the 
appropriate context. Thus, by deepening and enriching their understanding 
of the historical moment and actors within it, they offer more accurate 
explanations for the specific events that they explore than had they treated 
their variables outside the temporal dimension”. 
Pierson (2004) notes that while there is a rich tradition of using history in the social sciences, 
it has often been to mine the past for empirical material rather than to study the particular 
processes by which structures change over time and is somewhat critical of other historical 
institutionalists for focusing more on the institutions than the history. For Pierson, a greater 
focus on the role of history will: 
“provide stronger theoretical grounds for emphasizing the ‘stickiness’ of 
inherited social arrangements, for questioning functional explanations that is, 
claims that social arrangements exist because they meet certain needs of 
societies or particular powerful actors, for concentrating on issues of timing 
and sequence and for investigating long-term processes of social change”. 
In his analysis of British housing policy, Lowe (2004) is influenced by historical 
institutionalism and considers that Thelen and Steinmo’s (1992) assertion bridges the gap 
between state-centred and society approaches and also permits a robust theoretical framework 




2.4 Theory of Path Dependency 
Given that historical institutionalism is the theory that underpins this thesis, and organisations 
are the agents that shape, and are shaped by the institutional framework, there remains the 
question of what is the process, the reason that explains stability and change in that institutional 
framework (Thelen,1999). One of the key concepts that characterises historical institutionalism 
is path dependence (Hall and Taylor, 1996), the idea that once patterns are set in institutional 
frameworks that the range of options to change them is considerably narrowed.  This sentiment 
was articulated by North (1990) as “a way to narrow conceptually the choice set and link 
decision-making through time”. Hence, path dependency is particularly well suited to an 
analysis of housing, as the nature of the policy area is such that decisions inevitably have long-
term effects and are hard to reverse. Path dependency can therefore be seen as a process of 
tracing back the chain of decisions that have led to the particular nature of a housing system, 
and to identify why certain options may not be open to policy-makers or other actors in the 
system. Notwithstanding what North says of the predictive power of path dependence, it is 
certainly the case that the likelihood of certain choices or options materialising in the future 
can be ascertained using the method.  
Bengtsson and Ruonovaara (2010) outline the evolution of path-dependency as an analytical 
tool in the social sciences, and in particular as it relates to housing. The strong form of path 
dependency (Sewell, 1996) “where what happens at an earlier point in time will affect the 
outcomes of a sequence of events occurring at a later point in time” is not ultimately that useful, 
as Bengtsson and Ruonovaara point out, saying that “history matters” is a truism, not a theory. 
Other scholars have sought to narrow the definition of path dependency, for example Mahoney 
(2000) who describes processes where contingent events lead to deterministic structures and 
outcomes. However, the weaker form of path dependency put forward by Bengtsson and 
Ruonovaara “one event which is more or less contingent considerably changes the probability 
of subsequent alternative events or outcomes” is far preferable.  
“Path dependence would then indicate and particular form of analysis that 
focuses on historical events and specifies in the theoretical terms the elements 
that build up the path between those events. It assumes that history matters – 
but the empirical challenge is not to “prove” this general assumption (which 
is probably always true) but to identify in what respect and via what type of 
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mechanisms history matters in a certain context” (Bengtsson and 
Ruonovaara, 2011, p.195). 
Kay (2005), though acknowledging the usefulness of path dependency, takes a more critical 
view of it in studying policy. He notes that it risks describing only stability and continuity not 
change. Malpass (2011) in contrast specifically illustrates how path dependence can describe a 
process of change as well as continuity. He also raises several key questions around path 
dependency – perhaps most significantly as to whether it should look at institutions or policies. 
Thus “social housing” is an institution, and following Kay (2005) policies are about choice and 
institutions are about constraint and stability. The answer is probably that both need to be 
studied in conjunction. However, taking the working definition of institutions as “rules and 
conventions”, within the strict sense Kay’s distinction rather describes an interplay between 
institutions where the policy is designed to maintain or change some element of the institutional 
framework. For Pierson (2004) it is precisely the description of processes of change, especially 
positive feedback/increasing returns and the effects of timing and sequence that make path 
dependence such a useful tool in analysing institutions. 
The methodology of path dependency has been described as “writing history backwards”, in 
other words to trace back decisions and policy changes to understand why certain options are 
not chosen or are unviable. Bengtsson and Ruonovaara (2010) identify the processes of path 
dependence as efficiency, legitimacy and power, where efficiency relates to the ability of 
institutions to change and the costs involved in that change process (Hall and Taylor, 1996; 
North, 1990). Legitimacy is concerned with what political choices are available, viable or 
acceptable at any time, so power then is concerned with the ability of actors to make those 
choices.  
2.5 Path Dependency Theory:  Irish Housing Context 
Bengtsson and Ruonavaara (2010) draw a distinction between “strong” versions of the theory 
where contingent events bring about determinate outcomes, while in the weaker version of path 
dependence “a historical pattern where one event which is more or less contingent, 
considerably changes the probability of subsequent alternative events or outcomes”. In this 
weaker version, for example, the agrarian roots of early State intervention in housing in Ireland, 
and the political environment in which it came about (Fahey, 1998; Norris and Fahey, 2009) 
determined the shape and nature of the social housing system for many decades, even after 
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dramatic improvements had been made to rural housing. Malpass (2011) takes a different tack 
in using path-dependency to explain the transformation in British social housing from a 
municipal-led system to a housing-association led one. He therefore differs from Bengtsson et 
al (2006) who used path dependency to explain the divergent approaches to the same housing 
problem in Nordic countries.  Thus, he sees path-dependency as a means of examining change 
rather than simply continuity. Norris (2014) applies path dependency concepts like “critical 
junctures” to tentatively suggest that Ireland has moved from a distinctly dualist housing 
system (Kemeny’s (1995) seminal typology) to a weak unitary system since the 1980s. 
Specifically, in the case of Irish housing and its development, a path-dependency approach 
both explains the history and evolution of supported housing, and the particular constraints that 
explain why the model postulated in this work, and the attendant variations and adaptations of 
that model, have been brought about by the pressures of a heavily path-dependent institutional 
framework. It is almost as though the hypothesis and attendant model put forward has been 
shaped by these forces. Bengtsson and Ruonavaara (2010), Kay (2011) and Malpass (2011) 
have each posited a different perspective on path dependency in housing studies. 
For the purposes of this thesis, a path dependency analysis of Irish housing policy will show 
that the choices made over many decades narrowed options for the provision of housing into 
the future. However, following Malpass (2011) path dependency does not simply account for 
continuity, far more important is the gradual process of change. In this context, Norris (2016) 
offers a detailed path dependence analysis of Irish social housing. Her conception of path 
dependence, however, is inclined towards the stronger form put forward by Mahoney (2000). 
In this conception, path dependence is based on patterns of contingency and determinacy. Thus, 
for Norris path dependence explains stability, which is disrupted by moments of contingency 
– critical junctures – where change is brought about. This notion of critical junctures is common 
to all path dependency scholars. There is always a point at which a certain decision leads to a 
branching that affects the probability or possibility of an alternative decision being taken in the 
future – or put more positively that will greatly increase the likelihood of a further step down 
a similar path being taken in the future. Norris’ analysis is especially welcome, not only 
because of its timeliness and path-dependent approach, but also because she has carefully 
identified critical junctures in Irish housing policy development.  
Malpass (2011) describes the incremental change in UK social housing provision from a 
municipal dominated landscape to one where a very substantial and capacious non-profit sector 
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is now the main provider of low-income housing. In Ireland the same shift in policy direction 
has been made at a lower level. The pace of the move in Ireland was much slower than in the 
UK, due to the much more consensual nature of Irish politics. In contrast in the UK where the 
power and legitimacy assumed by the Thatcher government drove through much more seismic 
changes. Thus the mechanisms assumed by path dependency analysis can be seen, prima facie, 
to explain the slower rate of change in Irish housing policy vis-à-vis the UK.  
However, because Irish social housing finance methods were not sufficiently far removed from 
the State at the time of the GFC, the sector was severely adversely affected, and unable to adapt 
sufficiently quickly to disengage when the public debt skyrocketed. The loss of economic 
sovereignty that occurred when the Government programme with EU, ECB, and IMF 
effectively meant that the range of options open to the State to deal with social housing was 
further narrowed. The GFC was a critical juncture that meant the State had to pursue private 
sector capital for social housing purposes. However, this represents an acceleration of the scale 
of change already envisaged – or at least provided for in policy. Thus, again path dependency 
can explain not only continuity but also small patterns of change that have large-scale impact 
over time. The next chapters offer a detailed analysis of the Irish housing system.  
As a framework for analysis, path-dependency offers much to this thesis. While it is not a 
predictive tool, it is important to the investment aspect this research that path dependency 
points to a durable private sector solution. As predicated in this thesis if the housing system is 
heavily path dependent and if the long-term trend in Ireland is towards private-sector provision, 
the Fund as postulated offers a solution that can benefit the State and end-user occupiers. It 
follows then that once established, the increasing returns and high costs of reversal (to the 
policy-makers) that are inherent in path-dependent processes further copper-fasten this mode 
of provision as both an investment proposition and a housing solution.  
2.6 Investment perspectives 
In facilitating the delivery of social and affordable housing in Ireland, the Fund to attract private 
sector finance needs to be based on the principles of investment and the application of 
institutional equity funding. Hence to achieve the hypothesis (ref 1.2), the research 
underpinning this thesis employs standard finance/investment analysis to create a product that 
fits the institutional investor model based on portfolio theory stemming from the seminal work 
of Markowitz (1952) and subsequent refinements (CAPM and the Efficient Market 
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Hypothesis) which analyse how asset allocation can be achieved with maximum risk mitigation 
at a given rate of return. A typical institutional investment portfolio is comprised of equities, 
bonds, property, cash, and alternatives with diversification benefits achieved by combining 
different asset classes with varying levels of correlation to produce an expected reward/risk 
profile. 
In most European countries, pension fund allocations to property are low, normally in the range 
5% to 10% (see Andonov, Kok and Eichholtz (2013); OECD, 2015). Long-term, property as 
an asset class outperforms bonds, but does not achieve the same returns as equities (Goetzmann 
and Ibbotson, 1990). However, property given its low correlation with bonds or equities has 
diversification value to institutional investors. Most of the research on property as an asset class 
has focused on the commercial sector (offices, retail, industrial) though the residential sector 
is increasing in importance as an investment type with organisations such as IPD/MSCI now 
producing reports on performance analysis on housing. Research has shown that property has 
a higher degree of liquidity via listed vehicles such as REITs or certain tradeable debt 
instruments which has led to the growth of indirect investment vehicles and funds across both 
the commercial and residential markets. However, challenges remain in attracting a weight of 
institutional funding into the social/affordable housing sector though the possibilities of 
institutional investment in rental housing (both for low-income and general needs housing) 
have been the subject of debate especially in the United Kingdom and Australia (Alakeson, 
2011; Milligan et al 2013; Oxley 2010; Montague 2012; Lawson et al 2014; Milligan et al 
2015).  Also there are many barriers to institutional investment into residential property 
identified in the literature.  
Firstly, low returns in comparison to commercial property. Jones (2007) reports that expected 
residential returns of 3-4% were well below the 7-8% returns from commercial real estate in 
Australia. Emergent evidence in Ireland is that relatively high yields – comparable to 
commercial yield – at present are likely to be reduced over time. Moreover, investors appear 
to expect a risk premium to reflect the fact that it is a new investment asset class.  
Secondly Crook and Kemp (2002) identify the potential for rent controls or other regulatory 
impositions as a concern for investors in residential property. This is echoed by Milligan et al 
(2013). Berry (2000) adds that uncertainty over taxation treatment and vacancy rates may deter 




Thirdly, the fragmented nature of the sector and high transaction costs together with relatively 
small lot sizes make assembling a portfolio at the scale required by institutions problematic 
(Crook and Kemp, 2002). Also, while institutional investors may be interested in the long-term 
stable income stream of residential property, they will not have an appetite for the planning, 
development and construction risks involved. Accordingly, some intermediate actor may be 
required to bring developments to the market.  
 
Fourthly, high management costs relative to other asset classes.  
 
Fifthly, until recently there has been a paucity of data on the performance of residential assets 
whereas there is extensive time series information on commercial property (Berry, 2000). 
 
More recent years have seen some improvement in sentiment towards investment in residential 
generally but investment in social and affordable housing present greater complexity. Private 
sector funds in the UK generally try to avoid households on housing benefit as tenants (Jones, 
2007) and Crook and Kemp (2002) found that whatever attraction residential investment had 
at the upper end of the market for institutional type investors, there was virtually no interest at 
the lower end of the market. Large-scale investment in residential property in Ireland has only 
recently re-emerged after many decades of dormancy. The reasons for the “cottage industry” 
(Chapter 3) nature of the existing Irish residential investment market are manifold. However, the 
overwhelming predominance of owner-occupation as the tenure of choice by working 
households, and the State’s support for this tenure pattern is the single biggest factor. 
Discussion of the Irish private rented sector takes place in Norris and Redmond, eds, (2005); 
Sirr, ed. (2014) and Kenna (2011). However, only Stafford (2014) and MacLaran and Williams 
(2005) consider the issue from an investment perspective.   
2.7 Conclusion  
In concluding, the theoretical framework for this thesis posits a dense institutional network 
within which social housing operates. Those institutions which have the greatest bearing on 
social housing include the market, the welfare state, and the governmental apparatus. The 
institutional network is complex and the various interdependencies, together with particular 
characteristics of housing, and the political environment lead to a stable, and difficult-to-
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change system. The system is heavily path-dependent, and path dependency is the approach 
that best explains the stability of the system, and the limited range of options there are for 
change. Certain junctures arise in the institutional framework whereby the range of choices has 
been shown to be determined by wider factors in the institutional framework, but timing and 
sequence are crucial.  
The key to fusing the investment requirements of the property market with those of public 
policy in terms of delivering social/affordable housing lies in achieving appropriate investment 
yields with underwriting by government through guarantees or similar support mechanism. 
Investment theory is premised on principles of risk, return, liquidity assumes a level of market 
efficiency. Given that the need for mechanisms to provide social/affordable housing is due to 
market failure, the normal rules do not apply given that a pure investment approach will be 
based on cash-flows and the quality of counterparties to the transaction. However, current 
conditions based on returns and yields are not in themselves sufficient to attract institutional 
capital. Therefore, the task underpinning the funding model is to create the conditions by which 
that investment can be induced by delineating the features of the investment product. 
The subsequent chapter will apply the institutional framework to Irish social housing setting 
the historical perspective within differing path dependencies. In doing so Chapter 3 sets the 











CHAPTER 3:  SOCIAL HOUSING IN IRELAND, PATH DEPENDENCY AND 
FINANCIAL MECHANISMS 
3.1 Introduction  
This chapter considers the history of housing in Ireland from around the last quarter of the 
nineteenth century, at least insofar as public or philanthropic endeavours attempted to bring 
about new housing for poor and low-income households is concerned. It is from these early 
interventions that the modern “social housing” system emerged. While the chapter provides an 
outline account of the historical development of low-income housing, its primary concern is 
presenting a critical review of the history, development and drivers of social housing in Ireland 
and in doing so addresses the second objective of the thesis. Given the focus of the research 
particular attention is paid to the financial support mechanisms and the underlying political 
attitudes that would have such a strong bearing on the system as it emerged.  
In examining the evolution of housing supports for poorer households from a theoretical 
perspective, the question that needs to be answered is how Government arrived at a position 
where no provision (outside Poor Law) was made for housing the poor, to a situation where 
loans were provided on increasingly favourable terms, through to the acceptance after World 
War One that subsidy was required if lower-income households were to be properly housed. 
This tracks the move from a laissez-faire economics to the welfarism that characterised the 
shift in British politics generally from the mid-nineteenth century to the post-War period, some 
further analysis is required, as Irish circumstances were markedly different from those that 
pertained in Great Britain through that period.  A useful perspective in this context is provided 
by Fraser (1996) in surveying the approaches taken, beginning with teleological analyses 
originating in government recognition that there was a substantial portion of the populace 
unable to house themselves and the subsequent incremental steps that eventually led to the 
point where government subsidy for low-income housing became accepted policy.  
Given the subject of this thesis, the financing of low-income housing, it is important that the 
evolution and history of social housing is understood, as the situation that pertains at the present 
day has been brought about by a unique set of factors that determine the peculiar nature of the 
Irish housing landscape. The avenues of reform and politically “possible” paths of reform are 
largely determined by this history. Accordingly, it is considered that a “path-dependent” 
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analysis of Irish social housing is more useful; its explanatory power is greater in terms of the 
available choices today, and in particular the Fund that is the subject of this thesis.  
3.2 Land reform and rural housing 
Lyons (1973, 26) succinctly summarises the nexus of politics and land that came to dominate 
Irish affairs in the latter half, and especially the latter quarter, of the nineteenth century, and 
the echoes of which are found down to the present day: 
“That the land question was the engine which would draw the national 
question in its train was partially glimpsed by the tenant-right agitation of the 
1850s and then brilliantly vindicated in the Land War which between 1879 
and 1882, laid the foundation for the ultimate revolution in land tenure 
whereby over the next thirty years the tenant was enabled to become the 
owner of the farm he worked.” 
Arguably the peculiarities of public/governmental involvement in land reform in Ireland 
persisted well into the twentieth century and laid the foundations for social housing which 
include the predominantly agrarian nature of early housing initiatives and the inter-wining of 
emergent nationalist politics with the “land question”.  While historians now agree that the 
traditional picture of a ruthless, absentee landlord class exploiting a vulnerable tenantry under 
constant threat of eviction is largely false, nonetheless land reform was to become the defining 
political issue in Ireland up to the turn of the twentieth century. The major achievement of this 
movement was the transfer of farms to tenants, but it would also give rise to a further division 
as those same farmers were set in opposition to a landless and desperately poor class of 
agricultural labourer.  
As Kenna (2011, 26) puts it: 
“Landownership, (and with it security of housing), became indelibly linked 
to the other national issues of identity and independence from England. This 
agitation coincided with the English Liberal onslaught on the feudal land 
laws, which had perpetuated the permeability of large inherited estates from 
the market, and the absence of free trade or market in land”. 
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Land reform became politically important, and was in many ways the driving political force 
and point of common cause for the Irish Parliamentary Party that was to dominate Irish politics 
well into the twentieth century. The model of landholding that predominated in Ireland from 
the early nineteenth century saw large ascendancy landlords sub-letting parcels of land to 
“middlemen” for onward letting to tenant farmers in holdings of 1-15 acres. With the chronic 
labour shortage caused by the Famine, this pattern had begun to give way to small and medium 
farms leased direct from the landlord with the consequent loss of the middleman. However, 
housing for the very poorest – the rural labourer – remained extremely poor.  Indeed, the Census 
of 1841 records the appalling conditions in rural Ireland with more than 40% of the population 
living in one-room cabins. Paradoxically, the loss of population caused by the Famine allowed 
the overall quality of housing conditions to improve, so that by 1861 only 10% of the housing 
stock comprised one room accommodation (Fraser, 1996, 23).  
After the Famine, the restructuring of Irish agriculture and land-holding patterns led to a series 
of statutes, the Landed Property Improvement (Ireland) Acts (hereafter Land Improvement 
Acts) which provided for low-interest loans to landlords and lessees for improvements to their 
holdings – though it was not until the 1860 Act that the loans could be used for housing 
purposes. Under the Act, public loans at 6.5% were made available over a period of 22 years. 
The motivation for these Land Improvement Acts, the first of which was enacted in 1847 was 
to make Irish agriculture more productive and efficient. This in turn had much to do with the 
food needs of Great Britain and as Lyons described as “to alter the structure of Irish agriculture 
in response to the changing pattern of British demand” (Lyons, 1973, 43). 
However, politics was to be an even greater force for change in rural Ireland, first in the long 
programme of land reform that endured even into post-independence Ireland; and secondly, 
but more importantly for the subject of this thesis – the succession of schemes to construct 
cottages for poor and landless rural workers. This in turn would provide the impetus, in 
conjunction with philanthropic and humanitarian concerns for a concerted effort on behalf of 
the nationalist political establishment to provide housing in urban areas, and would pave the 
way for what was to become the social housing system. The agrarian agitation that gave rise to 
the Land Acts was undoubtedly of profound significance for the long-term social structure of 
the country, but it was largely to the benefit of a certain class of better-off farmer. The reforms 
brought about did little to help the plight of the rural labourer. While accommodation standards 
had generally improved after the Famine, the emergent nationalist movement could not 
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countenance a situation arising where the predominantly Catholic population (its support base) 
could be split between the farmers who had acquired property through the land reform process 
and rural labourers who remained landless and marginalised. Accordingly, even as the reform 
process that led to the transfer of land began, calls emerged for the construction of rural cottages 
for labourers. Thus, even as the effects of the Land Acts transferring land to small farmers 
began to be felt, pressure to relieve the plight of the landless labourer led to a parallel set of 
statutes that came to be known as the Labourers Acts. The result of this effort was that 
approximately 50,000 houses were produced in Ireland in the period between the early 1880s 
and the outbreak of the First World War in 1914.  
In approaching this period from the Famine times to the end of the nineteenth century in terms 
of the legislative and financial supports for housing, it is therefore necessary to understand the 
land reform movement, together with the dynamic of British and Irish politics. The Land 
Reform programme, beginning with the Land Act of 1870, as Guinnane and Miller (1997) have 
noted “was much more a wealth-distribution program financed by the Britain than a serious 
effort to improve Irish agriculture”, and that “the Land Acts were intended less as economic 
policy than as efforts to compromise with Irish political demands”. 
The 1870 Act was designed to address the balance of rights between landlord and tenant. Foster 
(1988, 397) notes that he had accepted “to the dismay of many Cabinet colleagues, the Irish 
historical sense of a certain vested right in the land that had allegedly been expropriated from 
their ancestors”. The statute provided for legal underpinning for the “Ulster custom” (where 
tenants could sell their right in a holding). It also required tenants to be compensated for 
improvements made to land if they gave up their tenancy, thus improving security of tenure. 
More interestingly from the point of view of the present discussion was that the Act provided 
for tenant purchase on terms where two thirds of the cost could be borrowed from the State at 
5% over 35 years (the Bright Clauses). However, as there was little incentive for landlords to 
sell, and most tenants could not afford to buy, the end result was that fewer than one thousand 
holdings were sold (Lyons, 1973). 
The decade that followed was to see the crystallisation of a number of elements in Irish politics 
that would lead to more profound reform through the campaign for Home Rule that was 
established by Isaac Butt proposing Irish self-government through a parliament within the 
Union. Circumstances were particularly propitious for the growth of the new movement 
throughout the 1870s. The widening of the franchise, the introduction of the secret ballot, the 
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support of the Catholic Church were all important. The more extreme and separatist wing of 
nationalism, the Irish Republican Brotherhood (IRB) did not oppose or attempt to frustrate the 
development of the new movement, thus allowing it to grow. Lyons (1973) surmises that while 
neither the Land Act of 1870, nor the Act of a year earlier that disestablished the Church of 
Ireland were of seismic import in their direct consequences, they did have the effect of 
unsettling the long-assumed hegemony of the Protestant, landed classes, which in turn may 
have led those classes to be more open to new political options. Though Protestant support was 
very tentative, the removal of old certainties seems to have allowed it space to gain a foothold. 
Disastrous harvests between 1877 and 1879 coupled with renewed interest in agrarian agitation 
by more radical nationalists like Michael Davitt, led to land reform moving centre stage. The 
“Land War” and agrarian issues were co-opted by Charles Stewart Parnell who had replaced 
Butt at the head of the Home Rule Campaign, in order to build a broader based movement. As 
Foster (1988) observes, “There were two major ambiguities in Parnellism: the relationship 
between Home Rule and separatism, and the relationship between land agitation and 
nationalism”. Such issues are outside the scope of the present discussion, but the same land 
agitation led to a second Land Act introduced by Gladstone in 1881.   
3.3 Urban housing 
If the land reform programme under the Land Acts gave rise to the Labourers Acts which saw 
the standards of Irish agricultural labourers’ housing rise from some of the poorest in Europe 
to some of the best, urban housing conditions did not become an important political issue until 
after the turn of the twentieth century (Aalen, 2007). Agriculture was not only critical to the 
Irish economy, its produce was also vitally important to feed a growing industrialised 
population in Great Britain. Thus, land reform was not solely in the interests of the Irish tenant 
farmer; the British government also recognised the need for an efficient system of agriculture, 
and the political base of the Irish Party and its intertwining with the land reform movement 
drove this reform process. There was no such impetus to produce action to improve the 
drastically poor conditions that pertained for the poorer households in Irish cities and town.  
The only part of the island that was industrialised to any extent was the north east, in particular 
Belfast. There, housing conditions were much better than those of Dublin. Fraser (1996) notes 
that while families in Belfast and Dublin might expect to pay a similar portion of their income 
on housing, a one-room tenement in Dublin would cost the same as a three-roomed house in 
Belfast. The long decline of Dublin throughout the nineteenth century meant that little new 
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building took place. The movement of the middle classes to the suburbs meant that the houses 
they left behind became subdivided into the tenement system that persisted well into the 
twentieth century. The lack of speculative building in Dublin was not mirrored in Belfast where 
there remained a good supply of new housing. Cullen (2011) also points out that unlike Dublin, 
industrialists in Belfast before 1850 had provided housing for their workers. Cullen also points 
out that the availability of cheap materials in Belfast meant that a four-roomed house could be 
provided for £45–50 in Belfast while the equivalent unit in Dublin cost as much as £165 
(Cullen, 2011, 241).  
Early philanthropic efforts to house the newly industrialised working classes in Great Britain 
were not reflected by action at the same level in Ireland. There were a number of reasons for 
this, the first and most obvious being that industrialisation did not take place in Irish cities and 
towns at anything like the scale that pertained in Britain. Urban housing conditions in Irish 
cities were however, as bad as anything in the United Kingdom. Daly (1984) charts the 
appalling conditions of lower-class housing in Dublin from as early as the late eighteenth 
century, but those that pertained in the early twentieth century were widely acknowledged to 
be as bad as anything in Europe. One third of the population lived in one-roomed tenements 
and death rates were extremely high in comparison to other European cities (O’Brien, 1982). 
Such non-State action as there was confined to some very limited housing provision by 
industrial concerns such as Pim’s, Guinness, Watkin’s and the railway companies, but these 
only amounted to 569 dwellings by 1914 (Daly, 1984). Limited philanthropic housing was 
provided by the Guinness Trust (later Iveagh Trust) in the southwest of the city of Dublin. 
Concerns about outbreaks of cholera and other diseases in Dublin from as early as the late 
1840s had led to call for action on housing. A Public Health Committee was established by the 
Corporation in 1866, and in that year the Labouring Classes (Lodging Houses and Dwellings) 
Act provided for public loans at 4% for 40 years to housing companies in respect of half of the 
cost of construction of dwellings. In the following 20 years, 3,426 dwellings were completed 
under the Act. Notably, the first effort at a semi-philanthropic company, the Dublin Industrial 
Tenements Company built only one scheme which later failed (Fraser, 1996). A smallpox 
epidemic in Dublin in 1872 was linked to conditions in the slums and led to the formation of 
the Dublin Sanitary Association. Fraser (1996) notes two important effects of this body: first, 
it led to the adoption of housing, sanitation and other standards by the Corporation, and 
secondly it led eventually to the extension of the Artisans’ and Labourers’ Dwellings 
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Improvement Act 1875 (the Cross Act) to Ireland. This provided for loans to local authorities 
at 3.5% over 50 years to clear sites for the provision of new housing by private concerns.  
The Sanitary Association initiative also led to the establishment of the Dublin Artisan’s 
Dwelling Company (DADC) which would go on to build over 3,600 dwellings throughout the 
city. Though firmly committed to commercial principles (it paid a dividend of between 4 and 
5%), the DADC was the beneficiary of both public loans at advantageous rates and the 
provision of sites by Dublin Corporation to the company at a loss (Fraser, 1996). However, 
Daly (1984) notes that rents of the earliest schemes were approximately 40% of the wages of 
an unskilled worker. Although the company played an important role in adding to the housing 
stock, and undoubtedly provided quality accommodation for skilled workers, some public 
servants and better-off and securely employed labourers, the problem of chronically bad 
accommodation for the very poor remained.  
Both Daly (1984) and Fraser (1996) speculate on the reasons why the authorities did not move 
to improve standards of accommodation in the private rented sector where most of the poorer 
inhabitants of Irish towns lived in tenements. As mentioned above, the Corporation had adopted 
standards, and there were bye-laws and sanctions in place. The authors attribute this to a general 
concern that however bad the housing conditions might be, its closure would leave the 
inhabitants utterly destitute. It also appears that landlord interests were well represented in 
Dublin Corporation, and further the requirement to pay compensation to landlords acted as a 
significant brake on closure and clearance of poor accommodation. While it was recognised 
that the urban housing issue required urgent action, the political will to act was severely 
constrained by a number of factors. Indeed, the predominant laissez faire economic ideology 
favoured private sector action as the means to provide housing and the repeated experience of 
projects in urban areas demonstrated that there was no financially viable way to provide 
housing for the very poor. While this ideology pervaded central government thinking in 
London, indigenous municipalities were unwilling to burden their ratepayers with additional 
costs in subsidising rents or paying down loan charges. The political imperative that drove the 
rural land reform packages (both the Land Acts and the Labourers Acts) was not strong in 
urban areas. Thus, the bulk of measures proposed throughout the UK for the provision of 
housing for poorer households were based on loans on more or less favourable terms for the 
provision of sites or housing which in turn had to be let at economic rents – that more often 
than not could not be afforded by the poorest households. 
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Repeatedly, schemes failed, or rents were too high to cater for poorer households. Direct 
municipal action began in Ireland in Waterford in 1878 where the Corporation-built scheme 
could not produce rents that were affordable by the poorest households. Dublin Corporation’s 
first scheme in 1886 produced low rents, but the standard of construction was so poor, the 
buildings required remediation and were deemed unsanitary in just a few years (Daly, 1984), 
and the Corporation was accused of building slums (Aalen, 2007). In Cork, the Corporation 
proposed to clear seven areas in the city and to lease them to a semi-philanthropic company in 
1878, but only three areas were cleared and at a loss to the Corporation. By the turn of the 
century, approximately 750 municipal and semi-philanthropic dwellings had been provided in 
Cork, but as with elsewhere, with limited impact on the overall demand, or for the very poorest 
(Cullen, 2011). However, Fraser (1996) notes that housing activity by Irish municipalities far 
outstripped activity by those in Britain, noting: 
“Ireland with an urban population only 5 per cent of that in Britain, had 
produced nearly 25 per cent of Britain’s stock of municipal dwellings. Even 
before 1890, Irish urban housing was comparatively more municipalised”. 
Certainly, the link between poor housing and wider social problems was recognised, but 
however well Irish municipalities compared to their British counterparts, the dearth of the 
philanthropic activity and relative absence of speculative building meant that housing 
conditions for poor households in Irish cities remained desperately bad. Aalen (2007) notes 
that 20 percent of Dublin’s housing stock was made up of Corporation, philanthropic or 
privately constructed workers’ dwellings in 1914 – a greater proportion than any other city in 
the United Kingdom. However, it would appear that over 3,000 of these were DADC dwellings, 
and the Government-appointed inquiry into housing conditions in 1914 estimated that 14,000–
20,000 units were needed.  
3.4 Housing and Politics 1900–1921 
Fraser (1996) dates the turning point in British policy towards urban housing as 1916 when in 
the aftermath of the Easter Rising: 
“The belief in Britain, however misguided, was that the most effective way 
to control Irish disaffection was to address urban grievances rather than rural 
issues. From this point on, the Castle administration consciously employed 
housing as a political tool”.  
38 
 
However, it is likely that the Rising marked the end of a process that had been ongoing since 
the turn of the century which meant that the issue of urban housing, especially in Dublin, could 
no longer be ignored. Daly (1985) points to a substantial housing crisis in Dublin in the first 
decade of the twentieth century, caused by a weak economy and rising unemployment meaning 
many households downgraded their accommodation. The stock was in very poor condition, 
and there were several fatal accidents as a result. Moreover, rising interest rates affected the 
cost of new development, and led the Dublin Artisan’s Dwelling Company to stop building in 
1907.  
The introduction of the Local Government Act 1898 had significantly widened the franchise in 
urban areas, and the emergent labour movement was also posing a threat to the bourgeois status 
quo in local government. This, of course, is in addition to the tumultuous political events of the 
1913 lockout, the outbreak of World War I and then the Rising itself.  However, the political 
environment was not attuned to the needs of the urban poor. Foster (1988) puts it thus: 
“Yet Dublin politics remained orchestrated by the increasingly nationalist 
corporation, dominated by small manufacturers, grocers and publicans, and 
fixed on the iniquity of British Rule rather than the shortcomings of social 
organization in the city …. Vested interests meshed with political apathy: 
Catholic nationalism in the form of bishops as well as politicians, was firmly 
dedicated against committing any future Home Rule state to burdens of social 
expenditure and secular welfarism …. A more widespread kind of 
organization was necessary before national attention was brought to bear on 
urban conditions” 
The hegemony of the Home Rule nationalists was coming under increasing threat from the 
growing labour movement under the radical trade union organizer, James Larkin, and also from 
more militant nationalists in the form of Sinn Fein. Further, “the Irish Party was forced to turn 
attention to social legislation in face of its inability to deliver Home Rule” (Fraser, 1996). Part 
of this was a firm determination to deliver a new Labourers Act. The 1903 (Wyndham) Land 
Act was the apotheosis of the land reform programme, providing for massive transfers of land 
to tenants and forcing landlords to sell entire estates if three quarters of the tenants concurred. 
Some shortcomings in the workings of the Act were addressed in 1909, but the Wyndham Act 
was a significant milestone in the land reform programme. But for the Irish Party to keep its 
coalition of Catholic nationalist-minded citizens together, action would also be required to 
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provide for farm labourers. While as Fraser (1996) notes, the situation of rural housing in 
Ireland had dramatically improved, the terms of the 1906 Labourers Act were exceptionally 
generous. Loans could be obtained by local authorities at 3.25 percent over 68.5 years. Most 
significantly, especially for a Liberal Government, the principle of subsidy was accepted where 
the State made up 36 percent of loan repayments, and a dedicated loan fund was put in place. 
With these new provisions, local authorities could provide better quality accommodation to 
tenants at approximately 10% of their income, and increasingly could do so at no additional 
cost to their ratepayers (Fraser, 1996). Moreover, Fraser identifies two huge steps in the 
evolution of housing in Ireland. First, the principle of subsidy for housing provision was almost 
universally accepted in Ireland. Secondly, and importantly, the phase of the Labourers Act 
programme from 1906 to 1914 almost completely dealt with the issue of rural housing and this 
led many local authorities to provide housing to other working-class households, not 
necessarily intimately connected to agriculture.  
This progress on rural housing compared to the poor state of working-class accommodation 
did not go unnoticed, and the Irish Party was acutely conscious of the political threat from 
militant nationalism and Labour representatives in the towns and cities. If the principle of 
subsidy was well accepted throughout Irish political life, the same could not be said for the 
Parliament in London. While prepared to indulge in a certain amount of exceptionalism in 
acknowledgement of the poor state of rural housing in Ireland, there was no appetite to concede 
on the principle of subsidy for urban housing. 
The Housing of the Working Classes Act 1890 was a pan-United Kingdom statute that led to a 
flurry of construction activity throughout Ireland, but especially in the Dublin suburban local 
authorities. The Act contained several important innovations, including giving the power to 
local authorities to demolish unfit properties without compensation, and to develop on new 
land in their functional area. It also provided improved loan terms of 3.125 percent over 60 
years.  However, the issue of subsidy remained, and pressure to bring about a new urban 
housing law in Ireland led to the introduction of the Clancy Act in 1908. Though much diluted 
from the original Irish Party proposal, the Act is an important milestone in the evolution of 
housing policy in that it did contain an element of subsidy. Among its significant provisions 
were a power to local authorities to build outside their own boundaries. This was significant in 
the growing pressure to build working-class housing in the suburbs rather than in the city 
centre, and it also provided an answer to the problem of displacement that could arise in the 
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case of slum clearance and replacement. As Daly (1984) notes, the financial aspects were the 
most important. Housing loans were removed from the local authority borrowing ceiling, loan 
terms were extended, and a two-year moratorium on repayments was provided for. The subsidy 
though tiny and massively diluted from the original proposal (from a subsidised £5 million loan 
fund at 2.5% to a £6,000 Housing Fund) represented a divergence from mainland British policy 
for the first time and breached the longstanding government resistance to the principle of 
subsidy for urban housing.  
Fraser (1996) attributes the Clancy Act with the further galvanising of general opinion behind 
the municipalisation of housing, the direct build by local authorities. Despite the weakness of 
the subsidy the Act led to an increase of almost 700 percent in loans in the five-year period to 
1913 in comparison to the five years before 1908. Crucially, local authorities found that they 
could fund schemes without recourse to the rates. Development took place throughout Ireland, 
with the south Dublin suburbs again the most active. Despite the proportionately greater 
contribution of municipal housing in Ireland, and Dublin in particular, conditions remained 
extremely poor in the tenements. Fatal collapses of tenement buildings in 1911 and most 
notably in 1913, together with an awareness of the role of housing in fuelling Labour unrest 
that would cumulate in the Lockout of 1913 led to an inquiry by the Irish Local Government 
Board (ILGB) which found that 14,000 houses were needed in Dublin. Daly (1984) surmises 
that “it would not be implausible to trace an interest in Dublin housing to the threat of socialism 
and the aftermath of the 1913 lockout”.  The report also concluded that subsidy would be 
required to produce rents that could be afforded by those who needed the accommodation. It 
put this figure at 16 percent of the loan repayments, and made a series of other 
recommendations as to the type and location of housing.  As ever, action on Irish housing 
would founder on the issue of subsidy. While the Clancy Act had conceded the principle of 
subsidy for urban housing, its extent had been severely curtailed by the British Treasury. The 
response to the ILGB report became caught up in the debate on the Home Rule Bill, and before 
the matters of who would pay for what could be resolved, war was imminent.  
The Rising in 1916 was to prove more momentous for Ireland than the conflict on the 
continental mainland. Certainly, in the aftermath, the slums were identified as a key cause of 
urban discontent. It did not go unnoticed that the Rising was overwhelmingly urban, and as 
noted above, British attitudes to urban housing in Ireland changed markedly after the Rising. 
The first manifestation of this came in the discussions over the reconstruction of the city centre 
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after the disastrous effects of the insurrection, and as Fraser (1996) notes “from this point on 
the Castle Administration consciously employed housing as a political tool”. Inevitably, 
however, wartime financial constraints meant that any large-scale initiatives would have to 
wait for peacetime. The Liberal Government in the UK was prepared to concede further on the 
matter of central government subsidy as part of a Home Rule package, and it was widely 
recognised that action on housing was essential if political stability was to be maintained. While 
the British authorities were encouraging of efforts to improve housing conditions as part of the 
post-Rising reconstruction, Irish demands were for greater subsidy from the Exchequer. 
Wartime economic conditions meant that, except for a small loan to Waterford, no money was 
approved for Irish municipalities in 1916. Efforts on behalf of Dublin City Council to raise its 
own bond failed, and it would be unrest due to rising unemployment and a more benevolent 
attitude from the British government that eventually led to the Cowan Report in 1918 which 
recommended that a new Dublin Housing Board be set up to build 16,500 cottages on suburban 
locations, and to renovate 3,800 tenement buildings to modern standards. It is significant also 
that the remit of the Cowan Report for Dublin was significantly narrower in scope than the 
parallel Tudor-Walters Report in Great Britain which paved the way for the 1919 Town 
Planning Act, but was not extended to Ireland. That Act would lead to the system of State-
supported “council” housing in Great Britain. In Ireland however, housing was just one issue 
to be resolved as part of a Home Rule settlement, and elements of the Cowan Report found 
their way into the housing recommendations of the Irish Convention, which was established to 
make recommendations for Irish self-government. As the Convention achieved nothing when 
it reported in 1918, its recommendations for 67,500 homes nationwide with a 50% subsidy, 
while wildly optimistic, were ultimately to come to naught. Increasingly, British policy became 
more autocratic with regard to Irish housing. The 1918 election proved disastrous for the Irish 
Parliamentary Party who were eclipsed by the much more militant and separatist Sinn Féin, 
who declared an independent Irish parliament (Dáil Éireann). Further, the rift was widening 
with Ulster Unionist opinion.  
While all sides were seemingly agreed on need for housing in urban areas, it was 1919 before 
the Irish Housing Act was passed. The Act imposed on local authorities a duty to prepare a 
scheme to meet the housing requirements in their functional area, and provided for a subsidy 
from the Exchequer to meet those needs. That subsidy was subsequently set at around 25 
shillings for every pound of rent collected (Fraser, 1996). The Act became immediately mired 
in controversy over whether the terms of the subsidy were more or less favourable than those 
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that pertained in Great Britain. It was strenuously opposed by Unionist and Irish Party interests, 
and there was a clear paradox facing the “independent” Dáil Éireann with regard to British 
subsidies for Irish housing.  
Aalen (1987) describes the situation under the Irish Housing Act of 1919 compared to the 
British Town Planning and Housing Act of the same year (the Addison Act): 
“Whereas in England under the 1919 Housing Act the liability of ratepayers 
was fixed and that of taxpayers indeterminate, in Ireland the position was 
reversed. The Treasury contribution was a yearly subsidy of 25s per 20s of 
rent actually collected, a superficially attractive arrangement. But prices 
unexpectedly rose steadily and prospective tenants from slum areas could not 
pay the level of rent necessary to avoid a heavy burden on the already high 
rates.” 
The consequences were stark: by the end of 1921, only 800 homes had been built under the 
Act compared to 175,000 completed or in progress in England and Wales (Aalen, 1987). 
To complete the picture of housing in Ireland prior to independence, it is necessary to consider 
the housing schemes for ex-servicemen that were put in place via the Irish Land (Provision for 
Sailors and Soldiers) Act 1919. In the face of the rise of Sinn Fein and growing political unrest 
and fears of social upheaval, the British government was concerned to make some provision 
for the many demobilised troops returning to Ireland. The terms of the Bill were such as to 
permit ex-servicemen acquire cottages and land on terms analogous to the Labourer’s Acts, or 
to pursue larger 10–12 acre holdings through the Land Commission and Congested Districts 
Board. The policy was designed to develop “colonies” of loyalist ex-servicemen throughout 
the country. However, amid the worsening political and economic situation, output was very 
low. Irish nationalists remained hostile to the idea, and progress had stalled by the time of 
independence. The new Provisional Government however, agreed to the establishment of the 
Irish Sailors’ and Soldiers’ Land Trust to complete the programme of just under 3,700 cottages 
on both sides of the new border, using British government finance. Yeates (2015) observes 
that: 
“… the Sailors’ and Soldiers’ Land Trust made a very significant 
contribution to renewing [sic] the social housing stock of the country 
nationally between 1922 and 1928. While 4,128 new housing units were built 
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by the local authorities, of which 2,436 were in Dublin (60 per cent), the trust 
built 1,927, of which only 526 (27 per cent) were in Dublin city and county”. 
 
3.5 Housing initiatives post-independence 
At independence in 1922, the new Irish state found itself in a unique position as regards 
housing. As Fraser (1996) observes: “... within the context of Europe and America before 1914, 
it is clear that Ireland had by far the most socialised system of working-class housebuilding”. 
It was, of course, a feature that action on Irish housing was predominantly rural in nature (for 
the reasons set out above), but in urban terms too, Daly (1984) points out that Dublin 
Corporation had housed a greater proportion of its population than any other UK city – albeit 
that need remained extreme. Daly also points out that municipal and philanthropic efforts had 
contributed 18.75% of the city’s housing stock (adding DADC and Corporation output 
accounts for the overwhelming preponderance), but that those in greatest need were generally 
excluded.   
The post-war housing and reconstruction efforts that took place in Great Britain were not 
paralleled in Ireland because of the unique political situation. The 1916 Rising, the Home Rule 
debate, the 1918 election and the onset of what would become the War of Independence, 
engulfed the issue. So Ireland, post-independence found itself facing a desperately urgent urban 
housing problem. However, if it no longer had the British Exchequer to stymie plans on 
grounds of parity and precedent for Britain, neither did it have anything like the economic 
might that its former colonial master could bring. The economy was even more dependent on 
agriculture, as the only part of the island with an industrial base was now severed into the new 
Northern Ireland statelet. While the impetus that the British Government had displayed to act 
on urban housing as counterweight to the nationalist threat had gone, the fear of socialist and 
labour unrest remained. As Foster (1988, 515) noted: “on both sides of the Treaty divide, the 
reaction of conservative rural nationalism was predictably hostile to the Labour renaissance”. 
Norris (2014) citing Powell (1992) notes that the incoming Irish Government was deeply 
conservative in outlook, despite many coming from a tradition of violent political struggle. 
Lyons (1973, 471) wryly observed “That the revolutionary of today is the conservative of 
tomorrow is a truism of politics in no way contradicted by the recent history of Ireland”, and 
Foster (1988, 519) also points out “Certainly the new regime believed in ‘strong’, not to say 
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ruthless, government. Any ideas of a social welfare utopia were rigorously dismissed: the old-
age pension was actually cut by a shilling a week in 1924.” Perhaps, more fundamentally, the 
apparatus of government in terms of its administrative and legal structures remained almost 
perfectly intact. Foster (1988) notes that post-independence 98% of civil servants had served 
under the old regime, and more than 10 years later, that figure was 45%. The overwhelming 
preponderance of trade was with Great Britain, and economic orthodoxy was rigidly focused 
on delivering balanced budgets and in reality differed little from British policy, except insofar 
as it aspired to economic self-sufficiency. All of this was overseen by the hegemonic 
Department of Finance, through which everything passed.  
The first initiative in the area of housing of the new State was the announcement of the “Million 
Pound Scheme” in 1922. This would produce about 2,000 homes between 1922 and 1924. It 
was based on a tripartite financing arrangement where local authorities placed a small levy on 
the rates, borrowed a further portion, and received a matching State subsidy for the balance. 
Fraser (1996) cites these as “effectively the first post-war municipal dwellings south of the 
border”. However, most of these dwellings were sold to owner-occupiers, mostly middle-class 
Dubliners (Aalen, 1992).  
The politics of housing at this time are interesting. WT Cosgrave (the President of the Executive 
Council – effectively prime minister), could state in 1922 that “the housing problem, was, 
perhaps, the greatest, problem they had to tackle” (Irish Times, 5 May 1923). However, having 
won the 1923 election, attitudes changed markedly, and there was little place for housing in a 
new era of fiscal rectitude. By 1924, Cosgrave’s answer to the housing problem definitely did 
not lie with the local authorities. Yeates (2015) describes a speech to the Rotary Club in which 
Cosgrave set out a new direction for housing. He acknowledged that while housing was needed, 
“the difficulty in … supplying the need was high cost of building and high rate of interest, and 
the unwillingness of many tenants to pay suitable rates”. Yeates observes: 
“He dismissed previous experiments at providing local authority housing as 
‘impracticable; instead he suggested that the way forward was encouraging 
private house-building … But he made it clear that ‘it was not intended that 
local authorities should undertake building’. In a nod to the Labour Party and 
the ‘sympathetic hearing’ it had given the government’s Housing Bill in the 
Dáil he said that a ‘final opportunity’ might be afforded to local authorities 
to build houses ‘where no private individuals … undertake the business,’ but 
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the ‘Government had come definitely to the conclusion that that there was 
only one real method of making this service a success and that was by giving 
private enterprise full and complete freedom’ The government would 
therefore contribute £100 towards the cost of a £500 house”. 
Thus, despite the atmosphere of fiscal retrenchment, the 1924 Housing Act made grants 
available for the construction of houses, and later that year extended the grants to local 
authorities. However, introducing the Bill in the Dáil, Cosgrave said “This is an opportunity at 
any rate for private enterprise to show how much better it can do than local authorities have 
done.” (Dáil Debates, 24 January 1924, Vol, 6, No. 8, col. 560). A year later, the Government 
made grants available to public utility societies which were to contribute significantly to private 
housing development up to the 1960s (Norris, 2003, 2014). The 1924 Act also replaced the 
loan subsidies that characterised earlier housing supports with a system of grants, but local 
authorities could neither raise the loans required, nor develop housing at affordable rents 
(Norris, 2014). These subsidies were, however, for owner occupier housing rather than for 
renting to the poorer sections of the population. The subsidy could cover up to one-sixth of the 
cost of a house (Norris, 2014), and were supported further by government loans under the Small 
Dwellings Acquisitions Act. This paved the way for a uniquely Irish system of active 
government support and subsidy for owner-occupation that would endure for the next half-
century. Local authority housing built at this time was similarly sold via tenant purchase or for 
cash (McManus, 2011).  
Notwithstanding the significant progress that was made in rural housing under the Land Acts 
and the Labourers Acts, the new State reconstituted a Land Commission under the Land Act 
1923 to distribute land to former tenants as small farmers. It achieved this through powers of 
compulsory acquisition and State-assisted purchase. Through this measure and amending 
provisions, a further 155,000 holdings had been transferred to tenants between 1923 and 1959, 
and the Land Commission had built 20,000 rural houses (Kenna, 2011). As Kenna observes, 
“the effect of the work of the Land Commission was to transfer almost half a million 
households into fee simple owners of land” (Kenna, 2011, 29). Thus, in its approach to property 
and housing issues, the new State had marked out for itself a clear preference in favour of 
owner occupation. Pfretzchner (1965) diagnoses a complete absence of ideology in Irish 
housing policy irrespective of the composition of the government. However, the fundamentally 
conservative outlook of the political establishment, the historical attachment to ownership that 
46 
 
derived from the centrality of the land issue in late nineteenth century Ireland, and the influence 
of Catholic social teaching were all part, in some proportions, of the reasons for this. The effect 
of the policy, however, was generally to favour better-off households, and very little was done 
for the urban poor. Certainly, the slum conditions in Dublin and other Irish cities remained as 
bad after independence as they were before. In 1936, the Irish Press ran a series of articles on 
slum conditions and estimated that 23% of the population of Dublin, some 109,000 persons 
lived in the tenements.  
Slum clearance began in earnest in the 1930s. While it is easy to characterise this as a change 
brought about by a new Fianna Fáil government in 1932, in fact the Housing (Miscellaneous 
Provisions) Act 1931 had made the business of clearing slums easier for local authorities 
(Kenna, 2011). The Housing (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act of 1932 increased the subsidies 
available to local government. Housing output rose across all sectors in the 1930s, with local 
authority output peaking in 1935 when 6,734 dwellings were provided. In the decade to 1942, 
between urban and rural, private and local government, 82,000 dwellings were added to the 
housing stock.  As of 31 March 1941, a total of almost 75,000 dwellings had been provided 
under the Act. Of these, 43,177 were provided by local authorities, 16,994 were provided by 
private individuals, and 14,274 by public utility societies (Dáil Debates, Vol. 85, No. 1, col. 
650). 
Approximately, 11,000 condemned houses were demolished in that decade (McManus, 2011) 
and by 1938, 7,400 new dwellings were provided for tenement families (Kearns, 1994). 
However, in 1939, the Minister for Local Government and Public Health, Sean T. O’Ceallagh, 
was complaining that fewer than half of the local authorities had made the survey returns of 
insanitary dwellings that would have enabled them to access State assistance for reconstruction 
(Dáil Debates, Vol. 75, No. 3, col. 348). By 1947, the Minister could report that 21,652 slum 
clearance houses had been built nationally under the 1932 Act. He also gave further figures 
that 20,770 labourer’s cottages had been built, and that “normal” municipal housing built under 
the Act numbered 10,466. The emphasis of housing policy therefore remained firmly focused 
on rural dwellings, and provision of housing for the “better off” urban dweller. That is not to 
say that progress was not made on slum clearance and the provision of housing for the poorest 
households, but as observed by Pfretzchner (1965), Irish Government policy on housing was 
completely pragmatic, “challenged by the unfulfilled demand from almost all segments of the 
population and they have attempted to meet that demand by direct action programs.” This 
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meant that support for private ownership, and a slant towards the provision of rural houses 
reflected the political realities of Irish life. Housing for the urban poor would be dealt with 
under the 1932 Act and slum clearance programme. O’Connell (1994) cited in Norris (2005) 
attributes this regime for the unique “shape” of social housing in Ireland, with the poorest 
households renting socially while homeownership was available to almost all other households.    
The Fianna Fáil government also continued and enhanced the policies in support of owner-
occupation however in 1935 there was a radical reform of the ability of local authorities to 
borrow money for onward lending to house-purchasers thereby easing a key blockage to 
supply. This lead to local authorities being the main source of housing finance for private 
purchasers in the 1940s and 1950s (Daly, 1997). Land annuities that tenant purchasers paid 
under the Land Acts were reduced, and a year later in 1936, tenant purchase of labourers’ 
cottages was introduced (Kenna, 2011).  
Inevitably, the outbreak of war in Europe had an effect on housing output in Ireland, and the 
number of dwellings built with State assistance (public and private) fell from a high of 17,017 
in the financial year 1940 to 1,765 in 1947. In the aftermath of the War, there was a chronic 
shortage of materials for housing across Europe and Ireland was no exception. In the Dáil in 
1947, Sean McEntee, Minister for Local Government cited labour and material shortages as 
severe problems in housing supply. He also reported on 8 October of that year that it was 
estimated that 60,848 new dwellings were required (Dáil Debates, Vol. 108, No. 1, col. 54, 8 
October, 1947). Output rose sharply after this and had reached a peak of 15,733 dwellings built 
with State assistance in 1953, in particular as a result of the Housing Acts of 1948, 1950 and 
1952. A White Paper on Housing was produced in 1948. It estimated that the number of new 
dwellings needed was 61,000, of which 23,500 were needed in Dublin. It set a target of 
producing 100,000 houses in the following ten years: 60,000 by local authorities and 40,000 
by private developers.  The Housing (Amendment) Act 1948 began the post-war housing drive 
(Meghen, 1965). It increased the grants, and empowered the Minister to make regulations for 
the management and letting of local authority housing. This perhaps marks an important step 
in the centralising of housing matters that had previously been much more in the purview of 
the local councils. It set the interest rate for loans under the Small Dwellings Acquisitions Act 
at 50 basis points above the local authority borrowing rate, further incentivising home-
ownership. The Acts of 1950 and 1952 further increased the grants available and widened the 
cohorts of households that could be accommodated.  
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In the decade 1947–1957, Dublin Corporation provided 15,822 units of accommodation, 
mostly houses on the periphery of the city. This led to calls for more city-centre flat complex 
development, but overcrowding was such that the Corporation had to “thin out” the population 
of the city centre slums before flat development became feasible, which it did in 1956 (Meghen, 
1965). For most of the 1950s, more than 50% of all housing built in Dublin was completed by 
local authorities (McManus, 2011). In 1958, it was found that based on the 1948 assessments, 
23 County Health Districts and 42 urban districts had met their housing need and for the first 
time in the Dublin Corporation area, the number of vacancies exceeded the number of 
completions (Meghen, 1965). Thus, at the end of the 1950s, huge efforts had been made to 
meet the country’s housing needs. Almost 53,000 dwellings were built, and contrary to 
expectations, private sector housing activity also expanded sharply, largely driven by the ever 
more generous subsidies offered by the State. Meagher (1954) observes that 95% of Irish 
houses received State subsidies in 1953 compared to 80–85% in Britain, France, and 
Scandinavia.  
3.6 The 1960s and Rent Policy 
Capital expenditure on housing obviously increased dramatically, and by the time of the 1964 
White Paper on housing, it was estimated that £225 million had been spent since 1948. 
However, only 15% of total capital was provided from private sources (Kenna, 2011). 
Pfretzchner (1965) opines that scarcity of capital in Ireland was a large part of the reason for 
high input of public funds (though he puts the ratio at 3:1). He also offers a fascinating insight 
into the financing of housing at this time in Ireland. The overwhelming preponderance of loans 
came via local authorities, who in turn sourced their finance from the Local Loans Fund, which 
itself was funded by a National Loan (government bond). Though banks did invest in the 
National Loan, their role in the housing development business was largely as funders of 
builders and developers not homebuyers. The development business for private sale was 
dominated by “agents” who sourced land, broke it into lots, and sold it on to smaller developers. 
This has remained a persistent feature of the housing market in Ireland which lacks specialist, 
large house builders. As regards public housing, in the early-mid 1960s, the State paid up to 
two thirds of the loan costs if the housing development was for slum clearance and one third if 
for other purposes. Pfretzchner estimated that half of the cost of a unit of public housing was 
paid by the State, and the other half by the tenant and ratepayer) estimating that 98% of all 
housing constructed in Ireland between 1950 and 1965 was subsidised.  
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The White Paper of 1964 proposed that while rents would be charged according to the 
household income, those who could afford it would pay a maximum rent which would be the 
economic cost of providing the dwelling. By the mid-1960s, the Minister for Local Government 
had encouraged local authorities to move to differential rent systems. Pfretzchner (1965) notes 
that some local authorities were operating such schemes, but that probably a third of the tenants 
were paying a fixed or variable rent that bore no relation to the cost of providing the unit 
because they were never revised. A senior Department official (Meagher, 1959) saw 
differential rents as a better system because the “long term upward trend” of incomes would be 
better than a fixed rent that was never revised, for political reasons. Pfretzchner (1965, 76) 
gives the example of Bray Town Council: 
“Bray has not adopted a variable rent scheme and in all likelihood without 
external compulsion will never do so. Approximately 40% of the town 
population lives in council-provided houses, and despite a token increase of 
3d per room in 1960, it is judged that any attempt at an across the board 
graded rent system increase would result in devastating political 
consequences”. 
In 1963, 46.4% of Dublin Corporation tenants were on fixed rents with the balance on 
differential rents at one-sixth of income. However, the rent scale was fixed in 1950, and 
construction costs doubled between 1950 and 1963, again widening the gap between the cost 
of provision of the dwelling and the income that could be received under differential rent. 
The Housing Act of 1966 provided for “differential” rents regulated by the Minister for the 
first time. Such rents are related to income rather than to the quality, location, or size of the 
dwelling in question. The differential rent regime was first introduced in Cork City as early as 
1934 based on one-sixth of household income (Meagher, 1954), and was applied unevenly 
across the country from that date. From 1967, all new social lettings were on differential rents. 
The Act provided for ministerial oversight of the rent regime and ushered in differential rents 
across the country the following year. However, this met with stiff resistance from tenants, 
with street protests, and vigorous political campaigning to have the maximum rent reduced. 
This culminated in an umbrella group of tenant organisations, the National Association of 
Tenant Organisations (NATO), leading a rent strike in 1972 that would last 15 months and 
become enmeshed in the 1973 General Election campaign. The political pressure exerted by 
NATO led to commitments from the subsequent winners of the election, Fine Gael and Labour, 
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to substantially reform rents and importantly tenant purchase provisions (dealt with below). 
After the election in 1973, a new national differential rent scheme was introduced under which 
rents were about 20% lower. Under this scheme, rents were set annually according to a formula 
set by the Minister (Blackwell, 1988), but the link of maximum rent to economic cost of 
provision was lost. 
Blackwell (1988) explains that in the original conception of differential rent as envisaged 
around the time of the 1966 Act, the maximum rent would be related to the cost of providing 
the unit at current prices, with certain adjustments for older dwellings. The post-1973 regime 
ended up with a definition of maximum rent as a fixed 5.25% of the all-in cost indexed to CPI. 
However, the Department also capped the permissible increase that would result from the 
formula, so as Blackwell observes there is no necessary relation between maximum rents and 
economic rents.  
The 1966 Act in forecasting a need for 12,000–14,000 houses per annum provided the initiative 
to encourage new building methods and created an increased role for the National Building 
Agency (NBA) in local authority house-building. The NBA was a new agency established to 
ensure that the land and building needs of Ireland’s new industries were met. It would also 
oversee the development of the massive social housing project that would see over 3,000 social 
housing units provided at Ballymun in Dublin (Kenna, 2011). Arguably, the 1966 Act 
represented a significant, modernising milestone in Irish housing provision. Aside from the 
provisions already mentioned, it consolidated much of the housing code in one statute and 
abolished the rural/urban distinction that had characterised the system since its foundation over 
a century before. It remains effectively the founding statute of the social housing code that is 
still in operation. Among the other important effects of the Act that currently resonate are the 
extension of tenant purchase rights to urban dwellers, and to require local authorities to assess, 
provide and allocate dwellings in their functional area in a prescribed manner (Norris, 2005).  
Modernising the legislative code did not improve supply. Demand for housing based on 1967 
estimates was 59,000 units, of which 35,000 were required to replace unfit dwellings (Kenna, 
2011). The next housing White Paper in 1969 reported that 57,000 houses were produced since 
1964 and 47,000 reconstructed. However, the pressure for more housing remained as 
intractable as ever. In an interview with RTE in 1966, Jim Larkin Jnr, the chairman of the 
Corporation Housing Committee said that housing conditions in the city had improved from 
the chronic overcrowding that had pertained, but blamed delays in getting approvals and lack 
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of finance, especially cuts to capital budgets that would not only curtail local authority output, 
but also reduced the funds available for households to purchase privately. In the face of this 
new chronic shortage, the Dublin Housing Action Campaign was founded to agitate for a 
response to the crisis. O’Connell (2007) attributes the new role for the National Building 
Agency to official nervousness and concern about the capacity of the State to deliver in the 
traditional way (via the local authorities). 
3.7 The 1970s and 1980s: Tenant Purchase and Residualisation 
The 1969 White Paper, Housing in the ‘70s explicitly pursued home ownership as the preferred 
tenure to social housing. O’Connell (2005) points out official concern that the grant and subsidy 
scheme that existed was not sufficiently attractive to achieve the objectives of the policy which 
was to “help persons who would otherwise have to seek a local authority house to provide 
houses for themselves” (Department of Local Government, 1969). The increase in support for 
owner-occupiers in the early 1970s, through widening of credit by building societies, and tenant 
purchase schemes further enhanced the numbers of private households in the country. 
O’Connell (2005) points out that while 93,000 council houses were built between 1973 and 
1987, a total of 67,200 were sold by local authorities. However social housing output also 
continued to rise up to the middle of the 1970s before falling back somewhat, and representing 
around a third of all housing built in the State. But the rate of increase in private housing output 
meant that the overall proportion of households renting socially began to fall. Coupled with 
more generous tenant purchase schemes, both Norris (2005), Kenna (2011), and Hayden (2014) 
attribute this to the beginning of the residualisation of social housing. Kenna (2011) points to 
a NESC report in 1977 which found that subsidies to owner-occupiers were greater than those 
available to the social rented sector, while Hayden (2014) refers to a subsequent ESRI study 
that showed substantial underestimates in the NESC figures as subsidies for home-owners were 
even higher.  
Hayden (2014) goes on to illustrate a further “auction” of favourable tenant purchase scheme 
terms by political parties in the general election of 1977, this time resulting in a Fianna Fáil 
victory. Thus, clawback provisions restricting sale of tenant-purchased dwellings were 
abolished. Significantly, this election also led to the abolition of domestic rates in 1977, which 
removed completely the potential for local authority action on housing construction, as they 
were now dependent on the rates support grant. The previous government had also decided to 
fund centrally the full cost of the loan charges local authorities incurred for housing purposes. 
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With the low rent base, no domestic rates, and the government paying the full cost of loan 
charges, the local authority role in the provision of housing had altered radically. Moreover, as 
the split on sale of a council house went 60:40 between the municipality and the Exchequer, 
tenant purchase suited both sides, especially as the economy began to decline in the 1980s.  
Although the volume of social housing output in the 1970s remained high, its quality remained 
dubious. The poor design standards and lack of regard to planning, facilities, and amenities that 
was referred to by Pfretzchner in his 1965 analysis continued. Indeed, the very innovation that 
was aspired to in the 1969 White Paper in terms of modern methods of construction led to many 
pre-cast and system-built structures that would come to be regarded as sub-standard. Certainly, 
the combination of poorly designed, badly serviced housing estates in the suburbs of major 
cities assisted the poor perception of social housing. While large-scale residualisation of social 
housing would not take place until the 1980s and onwards, nonetheless, with the generosity of 
subsidies available for owner-occupation, it was inevitably poorer households who became the 
tenants of the new estates. Additionally, the generosity of the tenant purchase schemes meant 
that households who had the wherewithal could buy out their property, further residualising the 
social rented sector. Because of the differential rent system, they were also by definition paying 
low rents, thus further weakening the revenue stream into local authorities from housing. 
Furthermore, as acknowledged by Hayden (2014) the rights of successor tenants (i.e. family 
members) were seen as inviolable with impact on available supply.  Thus, a social tenancy at 
this time had a series of characteristics that made it both uneconomic and unattractive to the 
local authority landlord to maintain as the rent was well below market, a tenant could buy the 
property on very attractive terms with 60% of the sale price reverting to the local authority and 
the tenancy was in effect heritable.   
Another tenant purchase scheme was set in motion in 1980, again based on the construction 
cost of the unit rather than the market value or replacement cost (Hayden, 2014). In 1984, a 
new government introduced the “Surrender Grant”, a £5,000 payment to households who gave 
up their social tenancy to purchase a unit in the market. The objectives were to stimulate the 
construction industry and to release social housing to those most in need. However, as many 
working and economically able households left the social housing estates, they became even 
further residualised as the incoming tenants were poorer, and a “disproportionate number with 
histories of alcoholism, mental illness or substance abuse” (Hayden, 2014, citing Threshold, 
1987). Blackwell (1988) notes that social housing became more available from 1985–1987, 
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especially in low-demand areas. This was due to the effects of the surrender grant and the high 
level of house completions by local authorities. In a particularly lucid analysis, Blackwell 
(1988) sets out the reasons why these heavily residualised “difficult-to-let” neighbourhoods 
emerged:” 
1. Due to the incentives for owner-occupation and a declining private rented sector, 
social housing was catering for the very poorest households. 
2. As more economically able households either moved out or were moved to 
“better” Council estates, the sector became more stratified. 
3. Poor build quality, low-rent policies meant little maintenance or renewal. 
4. Poor management of the maintenance system. 
5. Clearance programmes meant that many of the same slum-dwellers were decanted 
to new housing developments in the suburbs with the same attendant 
concentrations of poverty and vulnerability.  
6. The recession devastated the employment base of many local authority areas.  
7. The use of “sink estates” by housing administrators as “deterrent” 
neighbourhoods. 
 
In 1988, yet another tenant purchase scheme was launched. The extraordinarily generous terms 
of this scheme would lead to 45 per cent of eligible households – over 40,500 applying to buy 
their homes. With discounts of at least 40% and additional grants available, the scheme 
radically altered social housing in Ireland (Hayden, 2014). In the Dublin Corporation area, it 
was estimated that the average discount from market value offered to tenants were as high as 
65% in 1992. 
3.8 Contemporary housing perspectives  
The 1988 Housing Act provided for local authorities to prepare regular assessments of social 
housing need in their area, schemes of letting priorities, and introduced for the first time 
provisions for homeless households and travellers. From the point of view of the present 
discussion on financing social housing, the principal provision to note is in s.5 where powers 
to support and fund approved housing bodies were conferred on housing authorities. Though 
this did not have any great effect at the time in terms of general purposes housing, s.10 provided 
for supports to be provided by approved bodies for the provision of accommodation for 
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homeless persons. However, the housing situation at the end of 1980s was relatively benign, 
social housing waiting lists had fallen from 30,000 in 1982 to 17,770 in 1989 and house prices 
were rising at a sustainable rate (Norris and Winston, 2002). 
A new White Paper on Housing, A Plan for Social Housing was produced in 1991. The 
document endorsed further supports for low-income households to access home ownership, 
and signalled a new role for the voluntary and co-operative sector. Importantly however, it took 
a holistic view of the overall housing landscape for low-income households rather than merely 
attempting to set a target number of social housing units required. It signalled a change in the 
role of the local authority to become more strategic in nature, rather than being simply 
providers, “it will also require of local authorities a new facilitating and promotional role aimed 
at improving and speeding up access to housing” (Department of the Environment, 1991).  A 
Plan for Social Housing also marks the beginning of a change in strategy towards smaller more 
integrated developments, and away from large, socially segregated housing estates. A second 
housing policy statement emerged in 1995 called Social Housing – The Way Ahead 
(Department of the Environment, 1995). This largely reinforced the message that provision via 
the voluntary sector would be an important channel of supply. Its other novelty was its 
recognition of the role of all tenures in meeting housing demand – importantly including the 
private rented sector.  
As to the evolution of the voluntary sector, Brooke (2001) notes that some small, locally based, 
and usually religious-founded housing associations were founded in the latter half of the 
twentieth century, usually catering for elderly, or special-needs households. Geoghegan (1983) 
notes the existence of about 75 housing associations in the early 1980s holding around 2,000 
dwellings. The Housing (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1970 made provision for grants to 
bodies representing or promoting voluntary and co-operative housing (Kenna, 2006). In 1984, 
the first scheme targeted specifically at housing associations was introduced, the Capital 
Assistance Scheme (CAS), also for special needs housing. However, A Plan for Social Housing 
provided for a 100% capital grant to approved housing bodies which marked effectively the 
beginning of general needs housing in Ireland provided by housing associations. This was the 
Rental Subsidy Scheme. The reasons for this policy shift towards Approved Housing Bodies 
is not explicit. Brooke and Clayton (2005) observe that it was not born of any perceptible 
ideological view, but rather as a pragmatic reaction to poor housing management practices in 
the local authorities. That Rental Subsidy Scheme changed over time and morphed into the 
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Capital Loan and Subsidy Scheme (CLSS) which provided a non-repayable loan to the housing 
association covering 100% of the capital cost and a subsidy for management and maintenance. 
The Housing Finance Agency (HFA), established in 1981, extended loans to local authorities 
under the approval of the Department of the Environment, who in turn recouped the cost of the 
loan repayments from the local authorities. Brooke and Clayton (2005) cited the “byzantine” 
financial arrangements, together with the close scrutiny of every aspect of projects as the cause 
of undue delays and complexity in project delivery. Between 1996 and the end of the decade, 
over 4,500 units had been provided between the CAS and CLSS schemes, making a significant 
contribution to overall social housing from the non-State sector for the first time in the history 
of the State. The sector had tripled in sized between 1990 and 2002 (Mullins, Rhodes and 
Williamson, 2003). 
The economic climate in Ireland improved dramatically throughout the 1990s, and this, 
together with inward migration placed additional demands on housing across all sectors. 
Moreover, the absolute rise in social house completions throughout the decade belied the fact 
that total output at 21,187 (Figure 3.1) units was just over half the number that was produced 
in the 1980s (Norris and Winston, 2002).  
Figure 3.1 Social housing completions 1990s 
 
The latter part of the decade was characterised by rising house prices and supply constraints 
that threatened the strong economic growth that was by then well established. Government 
action around this time was strongly focused on housing, and on foot of a series of reports 















to increase housing supply by reducing impediments via taxation, planning, and other 
measures. It should be stated these measures were largely focused on general market housing 
supply, as distinct from social and affordable housing, which was the subject of a parallel 
programme.  
By the turn of the Millennium, the Irish economy was growing strongly, house prices were 
rising dramatically, and the country was in the midst of an economic boom that would see 
housing output rise dramatically. However, affordability problems remained. NESC (2004) 
analysed the housing boom, and in terms of social housing noted that the contraction in social 
housing production in the previous decade contributed to the problems of affordability and 
access. It noted that this led to a greater use of rent supplement, the requirement for additional 
social housing and the creation of affordable housing schemes. The National Development Plan 
2000-2006 explicitly recognised that “the market alone will not address the housing needs of 
all sections of the population.” Accordingly, it proposed to provide an additional 35,500 units 
of local authority housing in that period, together with 4,000 AHB dwellings per annum. It also 
sought the regeneration and refurbishment of some older Council housing.  
The Planning and Development Act 2000 introduced, in Part V, a new form of planning gain 
in the form of social and affordable housing to be provided based on the “existing use” value 
of the land. Thus, additional new housing stock was provided by developers to local authorities 
and housing associations. The Act was amended in 2002 to widen the range of options available 
to developers to fulfil their Part V obligations. However, from the time of its inception until 
2011, the measure produced under 4% of all housing delivery in that period, and 62% of that 
quantum was affordable rather than social housing. Including the value of cash contributions, 
the total potential value of Part V amounted to 4.8% of output. The measure was however, 
successful in introducing mixed tenure and implementing sustainable development principles 
in developments throughout the period (DKM, 2012). While NESC (2004) had specifically 
pointed out that affordable renting – the creation of an intermediate tenure between social 
housing and the market – should be explored, Delivering Homes, Sustaining Communities 
(DEHLG, 2007) only alluded in a vague way to examining it as a possibility. Thus, affordable 
housing in Ireland inevitably meant owner-occupier housing purchased at a reduced price, 
usually via Part V.   
Affordability problems in the private market and the lack of social housing led to a rise in those 
renting in the private sector with state support via Rent Supplement. Rent supplement is a 
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demand-side payment to tenants to subsidise their rents in the private sector. Originally 
conceived as short-term payment to assist households during short periods of unemployment 
or while waiting for social housing allocation, the payment developed into a long-term housing 
support mechanism. The lack of social housing charted above was the primary reason for this. 
However, the payment was problematic as it prohibited full-time work, and was beleaguered 
with irregularities. As early as 1999, the Government was considering moving the system into 
local authorities where it would reside with the rest of the housing support system (Department 
of the Environment and Local Government, 1999). O’Sullivan (2004) notes a doubling of 
households in receipt of the payment in the decade to 2003 (from 30,000 to 60,000) observing  
that: “Unlike other countries, this increased dependence on demand-side subsidies came about 
not because of a deliberate policy decision; rather it emerged in a somewhat ad hoc fashion”. 
The onset of the economic downturn led to a rapid rise in demand for rent supplement. From a 
low point of 59,726 recipients in 2007, by 2010, 97,260 rent supplement payments were being 
made before the number began to fall back to 66,409 in 2014 (Department of Social Protection, 
2015). 
The Private Residential Tenancies Act 2004 significantly reformed the private rented sector in 
Ireland. It introduced compulsory registration of tenancies, a standard four-year tenancy, 
confined rent increases to one per annum and only to market rent, and it provided for a system 
of dispute resolution. This new system would be administered by a new agency, the Private 
Residential Tenancies Board. The private rented sector in Ireland had very informal regulation 
since the striking down of rent control measures in the early 1980s. Norris (2014a) characterises 
the sector in the mid-twentieth century as very unevenly regulated, and describes a pattern of 
increasing regulation and subsidisation for the sector from the 1970s to which she attributes its 
expansion. However, Norris concludes that “the Irish private rented sector is still not an 
attractive long-term accommodation option for many households or long-term investment 
option or landlords”. Galligan (2005, 118) characterises the changes: “The Victorian basis for 
governance of the private rented sector has finally been replaced by a system of administration 
that seeks to balance the interests of government landlords and tenants in a modern policy 
framework”. 
The proportion of households renting privately rose dramatically in the period between 2006 
and 2011 (Figure 3.2) to the point where 18.5% of people rented their accommodation privately 
(Census, 2011). While the proportion of social renters remained relatively static (at c.10%), the 
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overall size of the private rented sector increased to its highest level in decades (Figure 3.3). 
Sirr (2014) attributes this shift to an attitudinal change to renting due to changing work patterns, 
lifestyle choices, and the property collapse which altered perceptions towards home-ownership 
as the default housing choice. 
Figure 3.2 Tenure change 2006–2011 (source: CSO, 2011) 
 
Figure 3.3 Tenure composition 2011 (source: CSO, 2011) 
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of output in the private sector. Its principal novelties in terms of social housing was to commit 
to the Rental Accommodation Scheme (RAS), under which long-term rent supplement tenants 
were transferred to the local authority system where they were housed in private sector 
tenancies, but with greater security and with the employment restrictions that operated under 
rent supplement removed. This marked a significant departure in social housing provision. 
Local authorities were now de facto availing of the private rented sector to meet housing needs. 
Strictly, these were not social tenancies, and those households in RAS remained on the social 
housing waiting list. This measure signalled a new direction of travel in low-income housing 
provision, but also further reflected a move towards mixed tenure, where social housing 
candidates were housed in private developments with the direct support of the local authority.  
In 2007, a more substantial policy document was produced. Delivering Homes, Sustaining 
Communities continued long-standing Government policy of encouraging home-ownership, 
but now emphasised choice in the provision of housing to those who could not afford to house 
themselves in the market (DEHLG, 2007). The policy aspires to a life-cycle approach, and talks 
about rights and responsibilities in tenancy terms, together with a fair and equitable approach 
to rents and allocation schemes and seeks a more attractive private rental sector with new 
methods of assessing social housing need. Taken in the round, the policy document may be 
seen as a wry attempt to signal quite a radical change in social housing policy, where “life 
cycle” approaches and equitable rents mean changing lifelong tenancies at submarket rents 
even where households could afford more, and where “tenant purchase reform” means sale on 
more economic terms. The policy document also continues the emphasis on sustainable 
communities’ principles, which was reflected in ongoing commitment to Part V and to the RAS 
scheme together with commitments to regeneration and to mixed tenure approaches to new 
housing developments.  
The legislative response to the 2007 policy document was the Housing (Miscellaneous 
Provisions) Act 2009. Despite its unpropitious title, the Housing (Miscellaneous Provisions) 
Act 2009 represents the most radical step in Irish social housing since the first municipal houses 
were provided in the nineteenth century. In s.19 of the Act, Ireland switched from using the 
term “social housing” to “social housing support” which embraced state-supported tenancies 
in the private sector. While there are unquestionably more profound meanings in this change, 
it does not contradict the Haffner et al (2009, 2010) definition, as discussed in Chapter 1, as 
access to the means of securing the accommodation is on the basis of need. Hence, within those 
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terms, social housing support is a form of social housing similar to the German or US system 
of low-income housing provision (Chapter 5) which are largely based on tenancies that are 
identical in terms to private tenancies, but where access and allocation is on the basis of need.  
The Act introduces the concept of “social housing support” as distinct from “social housing” 
simpliciter. Together with copper-fastening of rental accommodation availability agreements, 
and provisions that defined leasing as a form of social housing support, this had the effect of 
making privately provided accommodation a form of social housing, via leasing arrangements 
and the RAS scheme which was given a firm statutory underpinning. The Act redefines what 
is meant by social housing. Speaking in the Dáil, the then minister, Michael Finneran referred 
to: 
“the creation of a flexible and graduated system of housing supports for those 
in need of housing. It sets out a framework to allow for the delivery of these 
services in a way that meets individual needs, but respects the concept of 
developing sustainable communities.” (Dáil Debates, Vol. 681, No. 3, col. 
569, 30 April 2009). 
As Kenna (2011) writes: 
“The traditional concept of social housing, involving local authority rented 
houses has now been replaced by a new term “social housing support” 
enshrined in the Housing (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act of 2009. This 
encompasses the variety of housing arrangements made by local authorities, 
as well as new subsidised purchase arrangements and new leasing scheme 
where local authorities enter into long leases with landlords/developers and 
rehouse eligible applicants through a new “Chapter 4” tenancy. It is 
anticipated that these new arrangements will replace all new local authority 
housing from 2010, as capital allocations are curbed and the large overhang 
of unsold properties, many owned by developers and banks controlled by 
NAMA, will be used to house people on low incomes”. 
The Chapter 4 tenancy referred to is a tripartite arrangement where a private tenancy exists 
between a landlord and tenant, but an availability agreement is made between the landlord and 
the local authority. The local authority pays the landlord, and the tenant pays the local authority 
a differential rent (Housing (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2009, ss. 23–27).  
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In 2009, the Government launched a new Social Housing Leasing Initiative where landlords 
could lease their properties to a local authority or an approved housing body on terms ranging 
from one to 20 years. The initiative effectively offered two schemes to landlords. In the first, 
properties could be leased long-term (for periods between 10 and 20 years) and the lessee local 
authority or AHB would assume responsibility for routine maintenance, keeping the unit 
tenanted, and collecting rent. In the second scheme, a landlord would provide property on an 
availability agreement basis. This reflects the arrangement where a landlord-tenant relationship 
exists between the property owner and the end tenant, as distinct from the leasing arrangement 
where the owner’s relationship was with the local authority or the AHB. Reflecting the risks 
and responsibilities involved, the availability agreement structure paid approximately 92% of 
market rent while the long-term leasing carried a payment of approximately 80% of market.  
Critically, it needs to be remembered that in the period between the publication of Delivering 
Homes, Sustaining Communities, and the 2009 Act, Ireland’s economic circumstances had 
gone into a sharp reverse. The long period of growth that had begun in the mid-1990s came to 
a spectacular end that would result in one of the world’s greatest property market collapses, 
and cause one of Europe’s sharpest economic contractions. As the country’s finances became 
increasingly unsustainable, huge cuts were made to capital budgets. The leasing initiative was 
an attempt to avail of plentiful vacant property for social housing using revenue funding rather 
than capital sources. The economic contraction would result in an EU/IMF programme for 
Ireland that would impose even more stringent fiscal measures on the country from 2010. 
Social housing production collapsed, as capital budgets were cut from €1.515.5bn in 2008 to 
€518.5 in 2011, and they would fall further (DPER, 2011). 
The Department of Public Expenditure and Reform (DPER) conducted a review of social 









Table 3.1 Changes to structure of social housing (source DPER, 2011) 
Year  Measure 
2004 Rental Accommodation Scheme – introduced with the purpose (i) eliminating 
long-term dependence on the Supplementary Welfare Allowance rent 
supplementation scheme [sic] and (ii) enhancing local authority response to 
long-term housing need. The Scheme has involved local authorities taking over 
responsibility from the former health boards for the accommodation of 
households in receipt of Rent Supplement continuously for a minimum of 
eighteen months.  
Feb 2009 A reorientation of housing policy from construction to acquisition and leasing 
with the introduction of the Social Housing Leasing Initiative. The new leasing 
programme has allowed for reduction in capital allocation 
2009 Local authorities begin to utilise unsold affordable housing for social housing 
purposes. 
2009 The administrative functions of the Rent Tribunal were transferred to the 
Private Rented Tenancies Board.  
2009 Housing (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2009 – The Act provides for the 
making housing services plans and new provisions on the assessment of social 
housing needs and updating housing authority management and control 
powers, including the adoption of anti-social behaviour strategies. It also 
broadens the choices available to those seeking social housing by providing a 
more developed legislative basis for the Rental Accommodation Scheme and 
by expanding paths to home ownership through the new incremental purchase 
scheme.   
2010  Incremental Purchase Scheme became operational. It will replace the existing 
Tenant Purchase Scheme in 2012  
2010 Housing Finance Agency put a facility in place to allow for direct lending to 
approved housing bodies.  
2010 The Housing and Sustainable Communities (HSCA) was established and is a 
operating on an administrative basis pending legislation establishing it on a 
statutory footing. It rationalises the functions of the National Building Agency 
(NBA), the Affordable Homes Partnership (AHP) and the Centre for Housing 
Research (CHR). The AHB and the CHR have been closed down and the NBA 
is in the process of being wound up.  
2011 The Limerick Northside and Southside Regeneration Agencies are being 
serviced by a single executive, and resources freed up through this will be 
reassigned to deliver the Phase 1 implementation plans for Limerick 
Regeneration. The Agency will be re-integrated into the new Limerick Local 
Authority by 2014.  
The Housing Policy Statement of 2011 is seen as a coherent work programme for the 
development of housing policy over the short to medium term. The principal innovations of 
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the Statement were a commitment to a tenure-neutral approach by the Irish Government, thus 
ending a commitment to supporting home ownership that went back to the foundation of the 
State. The Statement also identified the AHB sector as the main channel of delivery for social 
housing and stood down the subsidised-purchase “affordable housing” schemes committing 
the remaining capital budget to regeneration, special needs and accommodation for homeless 
households.  
Hence there has been a gradual process of reform where social housing provision moved from 
being the sole preserve of local authorities to involving approved housing bodies, and the use 
of private sector properties to deliver. This reform was also characterised by the adoption of 
mixed tenure, sustainable communities’ principles, and an increased emphasis on management, 
which had often been a weakness in local authority housing. The improved regulation in the 
private rented sector and general improvement in the volume of the housing stock that emerged 
from the building boom meant that Ireland had a very high proportion of new properties.  
However, the economic crash of 2008–2010 engulfed the process of reform and demanded new 
responses. In particular, six policy initiatives are critical to social housing sector and set the 
underpinning framework for low-income housing provision into the future namely:   
(a) establishment of the National Asset Residential Property Service (NARPS); 
(b) Housing Assistance Payment (HAP); 
(c) Residential Tenancies Bill; 
(d) regulation of the Approved Housing Body sector; 
(e) Social Housing Strategy; 
(f) Rebuilding Ireland. 
 
The first of these, namely The National Asset Management Agency (NAMA), was established 
by statute in 2009 as a “Bad Bank” to take on the very significant debts largely associated with 
the property crash and to manage the assets in such a way as to maximise the return to the State. 
There was much talk in political and media circles about the NAMA “social dividend”. 
However, despite a reference in s.1 on the purpose of the NAMA Act as “to contribute to the 
social and economic development of the State”, nothing in the purposes, functions, or powers 
of NAMA as described in ss.10–12 of the Act bestow any social function on the Agency. 
However, in response to widespread demands that NAMA make assets available for social 
housing, the agency established National Asset Residential Property Services Ltd (NARPS) in 
64 
 
2012 as a vehicle which leases residential property to AHBs or to local authorities. NAMA 
also facilitates the sale of suitable properties from receivers to AHBs or to local authorities. It 
is envisaged that 2,000 social units will be provided from NAMA into social housing. Of these, 
NARPS will hold approximately 1,300 and 700 will represent disposals from receivers to social 
housing providers. Of the NARPS properties, approximately 1,200 will be leased to AHBs and 
the balance to local authorities (source: interview with Felix McKenna, Senior Asset Manager, 
NAMA). NARPS is included for the purposes of the present discussion as a significant player 
in Irish social housing.  
Second, the Housing Assistance Payment (HAP) was introduced by the Housing 
(Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2014 and represents a significant innovation in Irish social 
housing provision. There are a number of specific characteristics of the payment that mark it 
out as novel. First, the tenant can source a property in the private rented sector, and subject to 
HAP limits, can enter into a tenancy with the landlord. The tenant can also make a top-up 
payment to the landlord. The payment of HAP is made direct to the landlord, and the tenant 
will pay a differential rent to the local authority. The most significant step with HAP is that it 
is regarded as a form of social housing support under the Housing (Miscellaneous Provisions) 
Act 2009. The payment is in its early phases, but theoretically a HAP tenant is in the social 
housing system, and should be able to move through that system through transfers. Any 
employment traps that exist under rent supplement should be removed. However, from a 
downside perspective, a HAP tenancy is ultimately private and therefore does not enjoy the 
permanence of a local authority or AHB tenancy. Also, strictly, with HAP the State is 
supporting a class of tenant who never enjoyed housing support before. There are therefore 
risks that ending the employment trap in rent supplement could create an employer subsidy in 
that working households come to rely on HAP to meet their accommodation needs. Further, if 
HAP becomes a demand-led scheme as rent supplement is, then the State could find itself with 
spiralling costs that are difficult to control. On the other hand, if HAP is not demand-led then 
it cannot fulfil its potential either as an activation measure or as a better accommodation option 
for households in need. The interim position appears to be that the HAP budget is capped, and 
by implication, some households may continue to rely on rent supplement, or at least have to 
wait for HAP. This matter awaits resolution. HAP is a radical new option in the provision of 
housing. While it offers the potential for a household to take a job that they could not otherwise 
do, and to source their own property in an area of their choice, if the system is not fully 
integrated with the wider social housing system, it could lead to a more stratified and unequal 
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housing environment. However, as a new form of social housing support, HAP marks an 
important step in social housing provision.  
Third, the Residential Tenancies Bill 2015 brings approved housing body tenancies under the 
ambit of the Private Residential Tenancies Board (renamed as the Residential Tenancies 
Board). This will mean that private and AHB tenancies will be subject to the same protections 
(although it is hard to see AHB tenancies being subject to the same insecurities as private 
tenancies). This might be seen as the regulation on the “consumer” side, while formal 
regulation of the sector on the “producer” side will take place under the auspices of a new 
Regulation Office that will oversee the governance and financial regulation of the sector. The 
purpose of regulation is to build capacity in the sector so that it can access private finance, and 
develop new and more sophisticated methods of provision (DECLG, 2013).  
The fourth policy initiative concerns that regulation of the Approved Housing Body sector 
which hitherto was relatively unregulated. Having gained “approved” status from the 
Department of the Environment, housing associations were by and large “regulated” via 
appraisal processes for scheme proposals, and with limited local government oversight through 
management agreements. Though voluntary in nature, regulation is intended to be put on a 
statutory footing in 2016, and a “shadow” system is in place pending legislation under the 
auspices of the Housing Agency and working under an interim regulatory committee. The 
approach to regulation reflects the nature of the sector in Ireland which is very fragmented and 
is characterised by a large number of small community- or parish-based organisation with a 
very small number of units, and a few large (by Irish standards) associations with several 
thousand units. Regulation is therefore applied in three “tiers” where Tier 1 are small 
organisations without development plans, and Tier 3 are larger organisation with ambitions to 
expand and develop. As at end 2014, 194 approved housing bodies were regulated under the 
voluntary code, representing almost 80% of the AHB Stock (DECLG, 2013; Housing Agency, 
2015).  
The fifth of these policy initiatives, a new Social Housing Strategy, was brought forward in 
November 2014 (DECLG, 2014). The impetus for the Strategy came from the need to develop 
policy in more depth from the Housing Policy Statement of 2011, and from increased capital 
allocations to housing from Exchequer sources. The Strategy has three pillars, designed 
respectively to increase social housing supply by 35,000 units, to increase private sector 
involvement, and to a programme of reform and innovation. While the Strategy ostensibly 
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aspires to restore the State “to a central role in direct provision of housing through a resumption 
of building on significant scale” (DECLG, 2014), the vast bulk of the units proposed to be 
delivered into social housing are via social housing. It is an explicit goal of the Strategy that 
75,000 households will be housed through an “enhanced” private rental sector. Pillar 1 of the 
Strategy aspires to the provision of 35,000 new social housing units in the years to 2020. 
However, while the Strategy talks of re-starting local authority provision, it also consistently 
refers to acquisition and leasing as part of that delivery. Taking the proposed spend of €3.8bn 
on these 35,000 units, it is clear that a sizeable portion will be leased, presumably from the 
private sector. The Strategy also seeks to leverage private sector finance, and to create new 
mechanisms, including off-balance-sheet financial vehicles to provide new housing. 
Importantly, there is a multi-annual budget, clear targets and an outline of the methods of 
delivery. Shortly after the Strategy’s launch, the Government announced the creation of a cross-
departmental “Clearing House” group to evaluate private sector proposals for social housing 
(DECLG, 2015). Almost two and a half years on from the launch of the Strategy, the shape of 
any of the private sector or off-balance-sheet mechanisms is no clearer. A number of direct 
build projects have been sanctioned or are under evaluation, and the AHB sector has been 
active in developing proposals to take advantage of cheap HFA debt and Social Housing 
Strategy funding. However, given the scale of the challenge, it is difficult to see 35,000 new 
units coming into existence without a significant increase in wider, private housing production 
that could provide a source of acquisitions.  
The sixth policy initiative, Rebuilding Ireland, a more comprehensive strategy for housing 
sought to approach the overall housing supply issue in a broader way, by widening the scope 
of the document to the wider housing market, vacant stock, as well as measures to increase 
social housing supply. This raised the target numbers of units to be supplied, but did not 
radically alter any of the supply mechanisms. Significantly, it also failed to take the opportunity 
to promote an intermediate or “affordable” housing tenure, preferring instead to pursue a vague 
“cost rental” model. One of the important innovations in Rebuilding Ireland was the 
commitment to deploy State land for mixed tenure developments. The implication, though not 
at all explicit was that this could include some affordable housing. While the document remains 
gnomic on the precise vision for “mixed tenure”, it is nonetheless encouraging that for the first 






In This chapter has ranged over more than 150 years of low-income housing provision and set 
out the sequence of events that has brought about the current system of social housing.  For 
most of that period, just one State-supported housing system was in operation: the traditional 
“Council” house. However, the pace of change in the past 25 years has accelerated dramatically 
to the extent that “social housing” can include any of the following options: 
(a) A traditional “Council” house owned and supplied by the local authority with 
de facto security of tenure with the council as landlord. 
(b) An AHB property with the AHB as landlord. Many of these are effectively 
“Council” tenancies. 
(c) A RAS dwelling, which is a private tenancy where rent is paid by the local 
authority and where the local authority has assumed responsibility to provide 
a secure tenancy, even if not in the same property.  
(d) A dwelling leased from a private landlord and sublet to a tenant where the 
landlord/tenant relationship lies between the end tenant and the local 
authority, while the head lease is between the owner and the local authority.  
(e) An availability agreement property, where the tenancy may be with a private 
landlord or with a housing association, but where the rent is paid to the 
landlord, with a differential rent paid by the tenant. 
(f) A HAP property: a private tenancy arranged between a tenant and a landlord 
with a further agreement between the local authority and the landlord.  
 
Hence there exists a wide variety of social tenancies with radically different levels of security 
and support. Thus Irish housing policy has come to a critical juncture and the validity of the 
path dependency hypothesis with regard to Irish housing policy. This chapter shows the 
importance of path dependency in understanding how the particular characteristics of the Irish 
housing system evolved and the mechanics of change.  The chapter also demonstrates the 
importance of historical analysis in understanding institutions and their particular features with 
path dependency analysis showing that the potential for disruptive change of institutions is 
highly constrained.  
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The analysis shows that many moments of contingency occurred throughout the history of Irish 
housing. It is perhaps noteworthy that one of the most seismic moments – independence from 
the United Kingdom passed over with relatively little change to the trajectory of housing policy. 
However, many other moments had far reaching and sometimes unforeseen consequences for 
policy in the long run, for example the decision to abolish rates which affected local 
government spending and the decision to move to differential rents which broke the link 
between the cost of providing the dwelling and the cost of remunerating that capital. The 
chapter also highlights the direction of travel in policy since the 1980s which opened-up new 
avenues of housing supply and methods of delivery via revenue-based funding mechanisms, 
and use of the private sector.   
The chapter highlights how the economic collapse of Ireland in the 2008–2010 exposed the 
weaknesses of the old capital funded models, but the new channels of delivery are not fully 
mature and require concerted State action. The next chapter provides a closer analysis of the 
social housing in Ireland, incorporating three core elements of institutionalist path dependency, 














CHAPTER 4: THE SOCIAL HOUSING SUPPLY SYSTEM IN IRELAND 
4.1 Introduction  
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Chapter 3 articulated the evolution of the Irish housing system in a historical institutionalist 
path-dependent context. The purpose of Chapter 4 is to focus on supply mechanisms and 
existing funding models for the delivery of social/affordable housing in Ireland within the 
context of path dependency. Understanding these relationship is critical to the construction of 
an institutional model for leveraging private finance in the provision of low-income and state-
supported housing. The nexus between the market and social housing, in particular the need 
for social housing usually arising from market failure means that it is important to review the 
operation of the housing market in Ireland particularly in relation to the social housing supply 
system and role of demand-side drivers. 
For a range of reasons, which are more fully explicated in this chapter, the private sector is 
identified as a key provider of rental accommodation for social housing purposes. The chapter 
shows how housing supply in Ireland is constrained, leading to rising rents and prices, causing 
shortage which has been most acutely felt at the bottom of the rental market. Furthermore, the 
chapter argues that the viability of newly constructed dwellings is marginal across large 
swathes of the country and although the improved economic climate has stimulated the market 
for owner-occupier houses, social/affordable housing development remains a challenge, 
especially in areas where affordable rents would be expected. Consequently, landlords in the 
existing private rented sector are maximising rents and undermining affordability for lower 
income cohorts.  Given these constraints, the chapter argues that institutional equity investment 
presents the best and most sustainable means of providing social/affordable housing but 
requires policy measures to facilitate a funding model for cost-based rents. In this respect, 
Chapter four specifically addresses the third objective of the thesis namely to evaluate existing 
supply-side mechanisms and funding models in the delivery of social/affordable housing in 
Ireland.  
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 2 briefly discusses salient issues pertaining to the 
theory of housing supply in terms of demand, supply and elasticity with reference to the market 
in Ireland as appropriate. Section 3 examines demand-side drivers notably economic 
fundamentals, demographics, house price and rental trends.  Section 4 forms the core of this 
chapter focussing on supply-side issues, this is complemented by Section 5 which assesses the 
effectiveness of the various delivery mechanisms for social/affordable housing in Ireland. 
Section 6 explores finance models for delivering social/affordable housing and Section 7 draws 
conclusions and points towards the need for new funding sources for social/affordable housing. 
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4.2 Housing Supply Theory  
In the literature, there is consensus on the factors impacting new house supply – a combination 
of second-hand house prices, finance availability, construction costs, and price   and 
regulation of land.  However, there are different approaches to the issues with some 
scholars concentrating on house prices whilst others have focused on housing stock changes. 
Ball et al (2010) argues the case for either or both approaches, citing studies based on stock-
adjustment models that focused on the level of house prices. Ball et al (2010) argue that the 
supply equation models can be identified as a sole contributor, but also argues for the stock-
adjustment approach (Andrew and Meen, 2003).  
Generally accepted theory is that following a systemic shock (as happened in Ireland in 2008–
2012), housing prices adjust to clear the market of the housing stock. This has been 
demonstrated by Topel and Rosen (1998) and is supported by later work in in Ireland by Duffy 
and Fitzgerald (2014). However, even when new housing supply comes on stream, it will only 
add a small proportion to the existing stock, generally at a rate not exceeding 1% (Barker, 
2004). Thus, as new units can only be sold at the existing (stock) price, and construction 
depends on the level of market prices relative to marginal construction costs there is a 
synergetic relationship between cost and price. As construction starts to expand, the initial 
increase in prices (resulting from the rise in demand) will be offset through the cumulative 
effect on the stock. Poterba (1984) points out that prices may initially overrun, as convergence 
to the equilibrium state may take several decades. 
If land supply is inelastic, then as demand increases land prices rise as output expands. The 
importance of this factor is likely to vary both within and between countries. For example, 
Bramley (2002) argues that the UK land-use planning system imposes major supply constraints 
which impacts on prices. This is discussed in detail for the UK in the Barker Report of 2004 
and is probably equally applicable in Ireland. In the US, the greater volatility of house prices 
in the coastal states has been attributed to more restrictive zoning regulations (Glaeser et al, 
2008).  
Of course, there is mobility within the existing stock that affects supply, as households move 
according to circumstances. A study on housing markets and structural policies in OECD 
Countries (Andrews et al, 2011) found that the average household's probability of moving 
within two years is 12% (measured as the percentage of households that changed residence 
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within the last two years). This study found that mobility was lower in southern and eastern 
European countries, compared with English-speaking and Nordic countries, where households 
move twice as much. This study also noted that such mobility tends to be lower among 
homeowners than renters. 
In Irish terms, a housing stock of just over two million units and a turnover rate of 6% over 
two years (Figure 4.1) implies an annual market turnover of about 60,000 residences. This is 
in line with the stock turnover figure of 50,886 in 2016 and 50,507 in 2015 (CSO, 2016).  This 
is a relatively low turnover rate pointing to the conclusion that in Ireland new supply, as distinct 
from the recycling of existing housing, may have a greater impact on price elasticity than in 
countries with higher turnover and go some way to explaining big swings in prices of the course 
of an economic cycle.   
Figure 4.1 Percentage of households that changed residence in the two years to 2008 (source 
Andrews et al, (2011)). 
 
Literature on the issue of price and price elasticity within housing markets (Glaeser and 
Gyourko, 2003 and Glaeser et al (2008) indicates that in the long run housing prices reach a 
steady state following any increase in housing demand. First, as construction starts to expand, 
the initial increase in prices (resulting from the demand rise) is offset through the cumulative 
effect on the stock, prices initially overshoot, although as Poterba (1984) points out, 
convergence to the steady state may take several decades., Second, if land supply is inelastic, 
then land prices rise as output expands, again reducing profits or feeding through into house 
prices due to possible land hoarding (Ball et al, 2010).  
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In short, an increase in housing demand will translate into increases in real house prices if new 
housing supply is not responsive. In countries with more flexible supply chains housing 
investment should respond more rapidly to large changes in demand. However, despite its 
importance, very little cross-country empirical evidence exists on such supply responsiveness, 
partly reflecting data constraints. Andrews et al’s (2011) estimates of the long-run price 
responsiveness of new housing supply for some 20 countries show that housing supply 
responsiveness varies substantially across countries. Housing supply tends to be relatively 
flexible and responsive to price signals in North America and some Nordic countries, while it 
is more rigid in continental European countries and in the United Kingdom. These findings are 
broadly consistent with the study carried out by Malpezzi and Maclennan (2001) who looked 
at the long-run price elasticity of supply of new residential construction in the US and the UK. 
Their findings were that elasticity ranged from 1 to 6 in the US but from only 0 to 1 in the UK 
with Ireland very close to the UK. 
Glaeser et al’s (2008) work has particular relevance supply, demand, and price elasticity of 
housing in Ireland. Their examination of housing supply bubbles looked at almost 100 US 
urban areas using a market model plus local construction cost and land availability to argue 
that places with more elastic housing supply have fewer and shorter bubbles and with smaller 
price increases. Using these arguments, it would follow that Irish Government policy should 
be aimed at increasing the responsiveness of the development industry to supply more housing 
in the early stages of economic recovery rather than wait for market forces.  
4.3 Demand-side Drivers   
This section considers demand-side drivers firstly through a consideration of economic 
fundamentals, secondly in terms of demographic trends and thirdly with respect to the key 
market indicators of house price trends and rents. 
 
 
4.3.1 Economic fundamentals 
The macro-economy is the mainspring of the housing market driving both demand and supply. 
Following a period of relative underperformance in Ireland, the mid-1990s marked a change in 
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the economic fortunes of the Irish economy. The first part of this convergence with the higher 
income countries within the EU was dubbed the “Celtic Tiger period”, an era which ran from 
1995–2001. During this period, GDP growth averaged 9.4%, with double digit growth achieved 
in some years. With Irish labour costs at the time very competitive, Ireland rode the wave of 
export-led growth in a period of significant globalisation. Unemployment fell rapidly over the 
period, from 13% in 1995 to less than 4% in 2001. With labour prospects much improved, this 
period also saw a progressive increase in net migration flows into the country, with inward net 
migration rising from -2000 in 1995 to +33,000 in 2001. Rising incomes and increased 
population contributed higher housing demand throughout this period.   
After a brief period of slower economic growth in 2002, Irish economic growth reaccelerated 
from 2003 onwards, but the dynamics of this period were different. Ireland’s competitiveness 
was being eroded by rapid wage growth, thus export growth was a less important ingredient in 
this phase. Instead, rapid credit growth facilitated a boom in construction. Intense competition 
between banks brought about a period of looser credit conditions which increased 
homeownership rates, but also a substantial increase in speculation by the buy-to-let housing 
sector. During this period the balance sheets of banks ballooned, facilitated by lending in the 
interbank markets. When the international credit markets froze, starting in 2007, what were 
first diagnosed as liquidity problems plagued the Irish banking system and led to a significant 
credit tightening and subsequently the Irish depression of the 2008-2013 period. The bailout of 
the banking system by the Irish State, partly contributed to the request of an €78bn adjustment 
programme to the “Troika” of the ECB, IMF and European Commission. This programme ran 
from December 2010 to December 2013, during which time output in the Irish economy 
stabilised and the banking system was recapitalised and deleveraged.   
Starting in the second half of 2013, the Irish economy began its recovery. Inward foreign direct 
investment (FDI), particularly from US firms, has played a major role in the recovery and 
record low ECB interest rates also played a role in the adjustment process for Irish households. 
While doubts currently exist about the accuracy of Irish GDP statistics as a gauge of economic 
activity due to the peculiar impact of the multinational sector on government accounts, 
underlying measures of activity suggest a growth rate of c.4% in 2017.    
Thus the Irish economy has recovered significantly over the period 2013-2017 (Table 4.1) and 
overall, the macroeconomic fundamentals for Ireland are favourable with strong rates of 
growth, GDP and GNP, and employment key drivers fuelling demand for housing. 
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Table 4.1 Macro-economic indicators 1995-2017 (Source: CSO, Goodbody *to Q2 2017 for 
employment, Goodbody forecast for 2017 GDP & GNP)  
   1995-2001  2002-2007  2008-2012  2013-2017*  
GDP  9.4%  5.4%  0.5%  15.0%  
GNP  8.1%  4.8%  -0.2%  15.5%  
Employment  4.3%  3.4%  -3.0%  2.6%  
  
4.3.2 Demographics  
As indicated by the literature, demographics is a key demand-side driver for housing in 
particular total population, age composition and household size. The population of Ireland after 
consistently declining from the mid-19th century, stabilising in the mid-20th century and 
increasing for the past 50 years has reached a current level (2016 figure) of 4.76m. To illustrate 
the pace of growth in the 21st-century, between 2002 and 2016 the population rose by 844,662, 
reflecting an increase of 21.6% or 1.41% pa. However, demographic dynamic varies widely 
across the country with the Dublin commuter belt and the counties of Meath, Kildare and Laois 
among the fastest growing areas (Table 4.2) with significant implications for housing supply.  
Table 4.2 Population size and growth by region (source CSO, 2017) 
Regional  
Authority  










1,862,630  2,328,517  465,887  25.01%  1.61%  48.90%  
Southern  1,343,563  1,585,906  242,343  18.04%  1.19%  33.30%  
North/West 711,010  847,442  136,432  19.19%  1.26%  17.80%  
Total 3,917,203  4,761,865  844,662  21.56%  1.41%  100% 
 
While population growth is an important factor, a more sensitive variable regarding pressures 
on the housing market is the rate of household formation. Analysis over the period from 2010 
to 2016 (second quarter figures) demonstrates an overall increase in the number of households 
by 3.1% although the rate of change was irregular with a decline of 0.7% between 2010 and 
2011, at the height of the financial crisis in Ireland.  However, rates of household growth 
recovered in 2012-2013 (with a 1.3% growth rate) and most significantly between 2015-2016 
with a 2.2% increase in the number of households (Table 4.3). Highlighting demographic shifts, 
the rate of growth of one person households over this period was 8.8%.  





2010q2 2011q2 2012q2 2013q2 2014q2 2015q2 2016q2 
1 person 379.3 362.7 366.3 381.1 378.9 384.4 412.6 
2 persons 500.3 496 504 511.5 511.1 493.4 493.5 
3 persons 304.5 309 294 303.1 297.4 305.1 312 
4 persons 282.3 278.2 285.5 285.2 285.7 286.5 288.4 
5 persons 139 148 152.1 142.7 147.5 147.9 153.4 
>6 persons 68.8 68.8 66.5 66.5 67.6 72 65.8 
Total 
households 
1,674.30 1,662.70 1,668.30 1,690.10 1,688.20 1,689.30 1,725.80 
 
A key indicator of housing need from the literature is the decline in household size and the 
pressure on the housing stock and supply-side pipeline. Ireland, in common with other 
comparator countries (Chapter 5) has experienced a steady decline in average household size 
from 3.7 in 1991 to 2.73 persons per housing unit. It increased marginally to 2.75 in the most 
recent intercensal period but this was still well ahead of the European and UK average of 2.3. 
Projecting forward to the equivalent European average household size would lead to demand 
for an extra 300,000 units in Ireland (CSO, Eurostat, and Goodbody).  
Regarding demand estimates there is significant divergence at the macro level and even greater 
variation at the local level when it comes to allocating the projected growth to particular regions 
or urban areas in Ireland. For example, the government forecast suggests allocations of 25% 
for Dublin, with the balance in the other cities and the rest of Ireland with the Housing Agency 
estimating a minimum requirement of 81,118 housing units between 2016 and 2020 or 20,279 
on average per year (Housing Agency, 2016) of which 44,902 (55.4%) are needed in the five 
major urban centres in Ireland and in Dublin City and the surrounding suburbs a minimum 
requirement for 33,109 units (6,622 annually). However, Davy (2017) place a higher estimation 
of a minimum 35,000 units per annum to 2021 and Hughes (2017) argues that to alleviate the 
short-term shortage in Dublin, upwards of 60% of housing output should be concentrated in 
the Greater Dublin Area. The difference between official Government/Housing Agency figures 
and those of other experts are disturbing as they involve an under or over allocation of scarce 
resources with a significant impact on prices and affordability for homebuyers or renters.  
4.3.3 House price and rental market trends  
The Irish housing market is integral to the overall economy and like the macro-economy has 
been subject to cyclical fluctuations. This pattern has been established over the long-term, with 
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the market punctuated by periods of price booms and crashes (Figure 4.2).  For example, with 
the market peaking in 1979, 1999 and 2014 and troughs falling below zero house price growth 
in 1987 and in the period 2009-2012 with prices dropping year on year by between 15% and 
20%.  Indeed, in Dublin house prices at the deepest point of the recession were down 56% from 
their peak and apartment prices down over 62% (CSO).   
Figure 4.2 Cyclical changes in house prices in Ireland (source, CSO, DHPCLG, ESRI) 
 
In terms of the recovery phase in the Irish housing market, evidence from Daft.ie shows prices 
starting to rise in 2013 with a year-on-year increase of 6.5%. Indeed, the rate of house price 
growth, reached 17% in 2014 falling back to 7.1% in 2015 and rising again to 9.0% in 2016 
(Figure 4.2).  According to figures provided by Daft.ie, the rates of increase in Dublin were 
even higher with average price increasing from €233,920 in 2013 to €354,765 in 2017 (quarter 
three figure), equivalent to a 52% rise. However, like all housing markets there is considerable 
spatial variability in rates of house price growth, for example the distribution of house prices 
across the Greater Dublin Area and key markets in Ireland demonstrates a complex picture 


















Source: CSO, DoHELG, ptsb/ESRI
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 Figure 4.3 House price variations in Dublin and key market areas (source, Daft.ie)
 
Regarding rental levels, trends are similar to the owner-occupier housing market with the same 
sharp peak, deep trough and subsequent recovery apparent over the period from 2006 to 2017 
(Figure 4.4). Rents rose from a national average in 2006 of €900 per month, peaking in 2008 
at just over €1,000 but dropping back to €743 in 2012. As in the owner-occupier market, the 
rate of post-recession recovery has been sharp with rents escalating to nearly €1,200 per month 
in the third quarter of 2017, a 61% rate of increase, that is slightly above the house sales market 
but of similar magnitude. In Dublin, rents in 2017 averaged €1,744 per month rising from 
€1,217 in 2006 and a low point in the current cycle of €1,004 in 2010.  
Figure 4.4 Rental levels from 2006 to 2017 (third quarter) (source daft.ie. ) 
 
Due to increasing issues with rental affordability, the Irish Government in 2016 introduced rent 
pressure zones, initially intended for Dublin and Cork city but were extended to Galway and 
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Affordability analysis, based on the assumption that 33% of gross income is the upper level for 
housing costs, shows that a household with a gross income of €60,000 per annum and a 20% 
tax take would pay a rent of €1,300 per month. In the case of house purchase, the Central Bank 
has imposed strict lending limits of 3.5 times annual gross plus a deposit of 20% for all seeking 
a mortgage. First-time buyers are required to have a 10% deposit. However, the purchasing 
power of the majority of household is significantly below that needed to purchase in the market 
with the current average house price in Dublin being €345,000 (Source: Daft.ie) relative to 
average household income level of €65,000.  Analysis shows that a house-buyer would need a 
household income of €90,000 per annum to purchase a house selling at the average price level 
for Dublin (Table 4.4). 





Deposit Price  
€40,000  €140,000  €15,556  €155,556  
€50,000  €175,000  €19,444  €194,444  
€60,000  €210,000  €23,333  €233,333  
€70,000  €245,000  €27,222  €272,222  
€80,000  €280,000  €31,111  €311,111  
€90,000  €315,000  €35,000  €350,000  
€100,000  €350,000  €38,889  €388,889  
 
 
4.4 Supply-side issues 
At the start of the recession in Ireland, there was an available stock of over 62,000 properties 
for sale on the market. At current absorption rates, this amounts to more than one year’s supply. 
However, this stock was gradually absorbed and by end 2016 the number of housing units listed 
for sale had fallen to just under 22,000 (Source Daft.ie). Similarly, in the rental sector, the stock 
of vacant residences available to let in 2008 amounted to circa 27,000 units of which 6,000 
were in Dublin. However, by end 2016, the available stock had fallen to just 4,000 units of 
which only 1,500 were in Dublin (Source: Daft.ie).  
The standard market response to a scarcity of any product is for new supply to emerge to meet 
that demand. However, in the case of housing markets, that response can be impeded by supply 
side blockages which range from construction period lag to non-viability of new development. 
The output of new houses (Figure 4.5), as measured by the preferred government method of 
counting the number of connections to the electricity grid, highlights the impact of the recession 
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on new supply and the slow response by the housing-building industry in the recovery cycle 
with 93,419 new units in 2006, falling back in 2013 to 8,301 units at the trough and rising in 
2017 to an estimated 18,262 new housing units (DHPCLG, 2017). 
Figure 4.5 New housing supply 2000-2017, ESB connections (source: DHPCLG statistics)  
 
However, these housing output numbers have been challenged with Davy Stockbrokers (2017) 
arguing that the recent official figure for housing completions using the ESB connections 
approach overstates the true level of house building and that housing completions in Ireland 
over the past two or three years have been heavily reliant on previously built “ghost estates” 
being occupied. Furthermore, Goodbody Stockbrokers (2017) have developed their own 
measure of housing supply, based on Building Energy Ratings (BER) certificates issued, which 
shows that new housing supply in 2016 was a third of the “official” electricity connections data 
suggesting that the housing demand/supply imbalance in Ireland is probably even more severe 
than previously assumed. However, with changes to policy such as reducing Part V 
requirements from 20% to 10%, investing in infrastructure and removal of development levies 
for homes priced under €300,000 in Dublin, (below €250,000 in Cork), the housing supply 
industry is beginning to respond. Planning permissions for 12,953 new homes were granted in 
the 12 months to mid-2016 and 19,247 new homes were granted during the twelve-month 
period up to end June 2017, an increase of 49% year on year (Figure 4.6). Of these, 6,662 were 
















Figure 4.6 Units granted planning permission, 2015 Q1 to 2017 Q3. (CSO) 
 
The upward trend in planning permissions is mirrored by commencement notices served by 
developers prior to starting construction. In total 17,151 commencement notices (of which 
6,869 were in Dublin) were served in the 12 months up to October 2017, up 37% year on year 
(Figure 4.7). These figures indicate that from a project supply level of about 8,300 new housing 
units in 2013 (as measured by the electricity connections yardstick), output has picked up 
significantly, but to meet housing output targets, almost 20,000 units per annum are required.  



























That scarcity of new housing supply is attributable to multiple factors: 
1. The decimation of the house development industry during the recession due to the 
banking collapse and bankruptcy or liquidation of developers;  
2. Scarcity of finance for the development process including land purchase, construction, 
and soft costs; 
3. Availability of existing stock at prices below replacement cost; 
4. Constraints on mortgage lending imposed by the Central Bank;  
5. Affordability of new homes to households in terms of monthly debt service or rental 
cost; 
6. Long timescale for regulatory approvals;  
7. Part V requirements;  
8. Scarcity of infrastructure and serviced development land;  
9. Many home owners and buy-to-let investors in negative equity and unable to trade on 
or up;  
10. High potential cost inflation.  
Several of these factors are relevant to the viability and volume of new development. Common 
yardsticks for measuring viability of a housing development are cost/price ratio of a new three-
bed semi-detached house and the cost-value ratio of a new two-bed apartment. In this context, 
the Society of Chartered Surveyors Ireland (SCSI) produced a detailed report in 2017 which 
showed that the total development cost of a three-bed semi-detached house would be €330,493 
(Table 4.5). However, the land costs in this example may be unduly high, as evidence provided 
by IRES REIT in Clonsilla in west Dublin had an average development cost of €295k (IRES, 
2017) suggesting a lower viability point of circa €300,000. Indications are therefore, that as 
house prices have increased, the viability of new development is stimulating higher levels of 
construction activity.  
Table 4.5 Development costs of a three-bedroomed semi-detached house (source SCSI, 2016) 
Construction Cost €150,251 
Land €57,500 
Developer’s profit  €37,980 
Soft Costs inc. levies, finance, fees  €45,452 
 VAT  €39,310 
Total €330,493 
 
Converting house construction cost and purchase prices to rental levels can be fraught with 
difficulty, as views differ on the appropriate yield to apply. The Clonsilla transaction, with a 
rental value of €1,650 per month (€19,800 per annum) shows a net yield of just 5% after 
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allowing for operating cost of 15%. Therefore, at a construction cost of €300,000 and a rental 
value of €19,800 per annum, it is viable to provide a rental house. However, for developing 
higher density new apartment schemes, the cost of developing a new two-bed (79 sq.m) unit in 
ranges from €293,000 in a suburban, low-rise location to €470,000 in a mid-rise city-centre 
location and could rise to €637,471 depending on location, standards and land values (Figure 
4.8). Apartment sales prices at mid-2017 for such units ranged between €298,000 and 
€441,000.  
Figure 4.8 Viability of two-bedroomed apartment by location in Dublin (SCSI, 2017) 
 
Having considered supply-side issues, the next section of this Chapter explores in more detail   
and assesses the respective effectiveness of the main mechanisms for the supply of 
social/affordable housing.   
4.5 Social Housing Supply Mechanisms 
This section specifically considers the varied range of mechanisms for the delivery of social 
housing provision in Ireland. This also includes affordable housing as these schemes fall within 
the definition of social housing adopted from Haffner et al (2009, 2010) where allocation is on 
the basis of need – albeit that the need arose from lack of ability to purchase in the market.  
In Ireland, social housing support is provided through three main channels:  
1. Local authority provision 




































3. Private sector tenancies with support.  
Local authority provision is the largest of these accounting for 112,000 properties.  In Ireland 
each housing authority (the local authority) operates under the auspices of the Minister for 
Housing, Planning, Community and Local Government who makes regulations and produces 
guidelines that must be followed in determining whether households are eligible for social 
housing support. Section 20 of the Housing (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2009 requires the 
housing authority to carry out an assessment to ascertain if a household is eligible for social 
housing support, and if so the form that support should take. In essence, the two principal 
criteria for eligibility for social housing support are (a) the income of the household concerned; 
and (b) the availability of alternative accommodation. Under the Social Housing Assessment 
(Amendment) Regulations 2011, the Minister sets maximum income limits for each local 
authority area. These relate to net disposable income, and for high-demand areas such as Dublin 
and metropolitan counties are set at €35,000 for a single person household up to €42,000 for a 
couple with four children. This reflects income limits at around 80–100% of median, and lower 
thresholds around the country reflect similar correlations. Given that the availability of 
alternative accommodation renders the needs for State support unnecessary, this implies that 
Irish public policy perceives that households at this level of income are likely to be in need of 
support to house themselves. 
The structures for funding local authority owned housing were described in Chapter 3 including 
that the State traditionally paid the capital costs of building the units, and that the differential 
rents paid by tenants did not cover the full cost of producing the house. As the local authority 
is in law the housing authority for its area, and because of the way the housing system has 
evolved, all social housing schemes and programmes are administered through them. Hence 
the local authorities are central to social housing in Ireland, a role that has widened considerably 
in scope and, compared to the past as discussed in Chapter 3, has now a more strategic role 
working with AHBs and the private sector in providing housing and acting as a conduit for 
funding and policy from central government. This is a key point in understanding the 
institutional framework for housing. The centrality of the local authority to housing delivery is 
a defining feature of Irish social housing. Even in the face of ongoing centralisation of policy 
to central government, and delegation of supply to the private and voluntary sectors, local 
government has remained the focal point. Local authorities have however moved from their 
position of provider, to becoming the locus of housing administration and regulation. Thus, 
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almost all government schemes are delivered via local authority structures, even those 
involving the voluntary or private sector.  
This process has been characterised as part of the neoliberal “roll-back” phase described by 
Peck and Tickell (2002), where the role of the State in the provision of services, and the 
managerialist view of previous post-war decades is replaced with a more “entrepreneurialist” 
approach by government (Harvey, 1989). This manifested itself in a series of reforms in Irish 
government including local government. Hardiman and MacCárthaigh (2008) describe the new 
public management change programmes that were implemented in Ireland while Keogan 
(2003) describes more closely the reform programme in local government. These overt 
schemes for changes in public management were paralleled by a programme that saw the range 
of sources of housing opening out incrementally to include an increasing role for the housing 
association sector and more latterly the private sector. Untangling the path dependencies in this 
process is difficult. On the one hand, global thinking on governance from international 
organisations such as the IMF and OECD was supportive of such reforms (Hardiman and 
MacCárthaigh, 2008), while Peck and Tickell (2002) argue that this is part of an even more 
fundamental shift in structure in political economy towards neoliberalism. Contemporary 
accounts, Keogan (2003) described a series of reports from consultants that drove the reform 
process. How much of this is endogenous to an objective analysis of local government 
governance and how much is driven by exogenous factors in the wider world cannot fully be 
discerned. However, a significant shift in the institutional framework for housing occurred.  
AHBs, as discussed in detail in Chapter 3, are non-profit organisations whose purpose is the 
provision and management of housing for households in housing need at affordable rents. 
AHBs own approximately 28,000 units in a highly disparate manner, both organisationally and 
spatially.  The top 10 AHBs control just over 30,200 properties (via ownership, leasing, and 
management), while some 300 AHBs are active at varying levels.  AHBs generally have little 
or no equity capital and rely on the state for virtually all their capital funding and much of their 
revenue funding through various support mechanisms. Traditionally, AHBs operated on the 
basis of 100% capital funding from central government via either the Capital Assistance 
Scheme (CAS) or Capital Loan and Subsidy Scheme (CLSS).  
Concerning the private sector, there are a number of mechanisms by which the State supports 





Rental Accommodation Scheme (RAS) 
Households with a short-term need for accommodation have for many years been supported in 
private tenancies via the short-term income supplement known as “rent supplement”. In time, 
the number of households remaining long-term in such accommodation rose dramatically, and 
the Rental Accommodation Scheme (RAS) was conceived in response to this. As far back as 
1999, Government had aspired to transfer rent supplement (then the responsibility of the old 
Health Boards) to the local government system which was the locus of housing policy delivery 
(Kenna, 2011; Department of the Environment and Local Government, 1999). Responsibility 
for rent supplement moved to the Department of Social Welfare (now the Department of 
Employment Affairs and Social Protection (DEASP)) where it now resides. In 2004, long-term 
recipients of rent supplement became eligible to transfer to RAS. The RAS tenancy is a hybrid.  
The landlord-tenant relationship is a private tenancy under the Private Residential Tenancies 
Act 2004, while the rent is negotiated and paid by the local authority to the landlord. The tenant 
in turn pays a differential rent to the local authority. In the early years of the scheme, tenants 
remained on the social housing waiting list and were eligible for offers of local authority 
accommodation. However, under the Act of 2009, RAS is now a form of social housing 
support. RAS is financed by the DEASP via the Department of Housing, Planning, Community 
and Local Government and the local authorities. There are currently approximately 20,000 
RAS tenancies. 
 
Housing Assistance Payment (HAP) 
HAP was introduced in 2013 as a further step in the integration of the housing system. Under 
HAP, a recipient sources their own property within defined rent limits. The local authority pays 
the landlord directly, and the tenant pays the local authority a differential rent. Thus the tenant 
is paying the same rent as a tenant in any other form of social housing, and is free to work 
without losing their housing support (though as their income rises, so will their differential 
rent). There are several features of the HAP system that are significant for housing policy, 
public policy in general, and for the choices open to tenants in terms of housing. The principle 
of HAP is that it is available to any household who is approved for social housing support. 
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Households earning up to between 80% and 100% of median income (depending on location 
and household composition) are eligible for social housing and can therefore claim HAP. 
However, the HAP scheme also permits additional payments to landlords by tenants to top up 
the State payment. This brings a much wider range of accommodation into the scope of “social 
housing support”. For example, the rent limit set by the HAP (Amendment) Regulations 2017 
(S.I. No. 56/2017) for a couple with one child in any Dublin local authority is €1,250 per month. 
That couple could therefore rent an apartment at €1,600 paying a top-up of €350. To this must 
be added their differential rent to the local authority. Assuming an annual disposable income 
of €30,000, in, say South Dublin County Council area, their monthly rent would be 
approximately €250, bringing their monthly housing cost to €600 (i.e. a net subsidy of €1,000 
pm). That housing cost will represent about a quarter of their income, which is an affordable 
rent. At that income level, they earn approximately two thirds of the median income for the 
Dublin region (CSO, 2016). The ability to select accommodation (within certain limits) and to 
pay top-ups accordingly creates a de facto “affordable” rental tenure.  
From a theoretical point of view, the HAP system represents an interesting case study in 
institutional change. The series of decisions that led to the introduction of HAP are rooted in 
the longstanding policy goal of moving long-term rent supplement recipients into the social 
housing system proper. The second motivating force was the recognition that there was a labour 
market activation benefit to allowing such households to work (removing the employment 
trap). Given the increasing dependence on the private rented sector in general, and the high 
refusal rate of local authority housing from housing applicants, the choice that HAP offered 
tenants also appeared a good option in terms of efficiency. As there is no exit mechanism to 
withdraw HAP support from a household at present, and there is no tapering of the level of 
State payment, HAP has the potential to become a very open-ended and expensive scheme. 
HAP appears to offer both a purely social housing choice for those who rely on the HAP 
transfer solely, and an affordable option for those with the means to pay more. Rebuilding 
Ireland aspires to providing 47,000 properties between 2015 and 2020 from direct provision 
and from leasing. It also seeks to provide 75,000 units of accommodation via the Housing 
Assistance Payment. It is therefore clear that the State is committed to the private sector as a 
source of social housing supply, and that it needs a lot of stock to meet its needs.  
Social Housing Current Expenditure Programme (SHCEP) (formerly SHLI) 
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In 2009, the Government introduced a new initiative whereby local authorities and approved 
housing bodies could lease property from the private sector which was then sub-let to social 
housing applicants. Approximately, 5,000 properties were fully operational in mid-2014 with 
approval granted for a further 2,700. Leasing differs from RAS in that the landlord is the Local 
Authority or AHB. Approval for leased properties depends on proving housing demand in the 
area concerned and the rent needs to be in line with reference rents in the area. The issue is 
further complicated by the sustainable communities’ principles of housing policy which 
demand that there is no over-concentration of social housing tenants in particular areas or 
developments. This makes it difficult to achieve any scale in leasing volumes of properties, 
which in turn makes it hard to attract large-scale investors.  
National Asset Residential Property Services Ltd (NARPS)  
NAMA established a special-purpose vehicle to provide leased properties for social housing 
purposes. NARPS holds property for leasing to local authorities and AHBs. By December 
2017, some 1,600 properties have been transferred to the NARPS vehicle, with a further 555 
under negotiation. NAMA have said that they anticipate some 2000 units delivered in this way, 
and it appears that this number will be achieved. While no clear statement of intent as to the 
future of NARPS has been made, given the time-limited nature of NAMA, and its commercial 
mandate, the likelihood is that the NARPS SPV will be sold in time.   
Rent Supplement 
While rent supplement has been referenced in some of these initiatives, certain important 
features need to be explained. Firstly, in the context of the present discussion, rent supplement 
is not a recognised form of social housing by the State, despite falling comfortably within the 
definition of allocation based on need. It is effectively a residual form of tenancy that is made 
available to those for whom no other form of social housing can be found, and who cannot 
afford to house themselves. However, there are approximately 44,500 households receiving 
rent supplement, making it comfortably the second-largest body of low-income housing in the 
country (Department of Employment Affairs and Social Protection, 2016). Secondly, rent 
supplement makes up approximately 20% of the entire private rented sector. This means that 
the State is a major player in that sector. Thirdly, rent supplement limits are set by the State at 
approximately 18-month intervals. These effectively floor the market and because of this, the 
Department of Employment and Social Protection (DEASP) takes the view that increases are 
very quickly absorbed by the market moving the floor higher and accordingly is reluctant to 
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raise the rents. Such increases are normally targeted at the 30th percentile or rents in a given 
area. Furthermore, DEASP also believes that increases in rent supplement limits therefore place 
upward pressure on rents with consequent effects for other low-income tenants who have to 
compete with the rent supplement recipients for accommodation. The effect of this in a rising 
market with severely constrained supply means that many households are falling out of the 
housing market, and in the absence of alternatives are presenting to homelessness services.  
As a consequence of the above schemes, the private sector has emerged as a key supplier of 
housing for social tenants. However, the nature of that sector, characterised by amateur 
landlords (the overwhelming preponderance of Irish landlords own fewer than three 
properties), short tenancies, and a general lack of security presents certain challenges to the 
supply and stability of the sector into the future. While recent years have seen the emergence 
of Kennedy Wilson, Hibernia REIT, and IRES REIT as larger scale holders of residential 
properties to let, these new landlords are not generally providing properties at rents that could 
be sustained by State-set rent guidelines, and indeed, it is likely that they would eschew such 
tenancies in any event. As rents have risen sharply (Section 4.3.2) with the recovery of the 
economy and the absorption of the supply overhang, many landlords are exiting low-income 
housing schemes like RAS and rent supplement. Recovering values have led many “accidental” 
landlords to sell, either voluntarily or under pressure from their creditors.  
Models described in this chapter thus far have focused on the social tenant and welfare-
dependent households and hence do not include higher-earning, more economically able 
households who might nonetheless struggle with the affordability.  Whilst in theory households 
with gross incomes of up to about €45,000–€50,000 are eligible for social housing support, low 
levels of supply and allocation on the basis of need means that few households in these income 
brackets have been offered social housing and such households have to find accommodation in 
the private rental sector. However, renting at market rates can place such households into a 
housing cost overburden, where their accommodation costs may take up more than 30–35% of 
their disposable income. The private rented sector is currently not suited to long-term renting, 
and security of tenure.  While Part V dwellings have established a number social tenancies in 
private developments, 2,910 in 2008 but falling to 908 by 2016, these measures by definition 
cannot provide a supply at the scale required with the waiting list for social housing at just 
under 86,000 at the end of 2017. 
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In terms of the rate of delivery of social housing this dipped dramatically in the recession and 
its aftermath reaching a low of 4,362 units in 2014. However, following the growth in house 
prices and rents (Section 4.3.3), though lagging by circa two years, social housing output has 
recovered substantially since 2015, with 19,045 new units delivered in 2016 and 27,892 new 
units delivered in 2017 (Table 4.6).  
Table 4.6 Social housing output units delivered 2009-2017 (source, DHPCLG various years) 













In terms of the effectiveness of the different delivery channels, 75% of new social housing 
came directly from market sources in 2015, rising to 83% in 2016. More specifically of the 
19,045 social housing units supplied in 2016, 12,075 were through the HAP system with market 
purchases providing the next highest delivery route (1,680 units). In contrast, RAS is a 
declining mechanism and continued to deliver fewer units (1,256) while CAS/CLSS through 
AHBs provided only 331 units (Table 4.7). The long-term trend is that the private sector will 
deliver the majority of social housing units going forward with the target of 80% of new social 
housing in 2018, a figure already exceeded in 2016. 
Table 4.7 Social housing supply by initiative 2009-2016 (DHPCLG, various years) 
Year total CAS/CLSS 
 via AHBs 










2009 10536 2,011 3,999  437 727  
2010 8055 753 4,258  866 850 5974 
2011 6991 745 4,234  1,193 325 5752 
2012 6221 677 3,571  1,259 351 5181 
2013 4674 211 2,875  1,042 253 4170 
2014 4362 357 2,173 485  1,062 183 3903 
2015 13394 401 1,836 5,680 1,477 1,104 10097 




The Government response to the supply-side issues started with an effort to revive the 
construction industry, through Construction 2020 (2015) and Rebuilding Ireland (Chapter 3), 
which was accompanied by a significant increase in both capital and revenue funding for 
housing, to more than double between 2016 and 2018. The greater proportion of this funding 
was specifically allocated to social housing and associated infrastructure to facilitate the new 
development. Furthermore, this strategy has found expression in the National Planning 
Framework (NPF) (Government of Ireland, 2018) which includes housing policy objectives to 
deliver of 550,000 additional homes by 2040 (23,000 pa).   
4.6 Social/Affordable Housing Finance Models  
The previous section has reviewed supply side mechanisms in social/affordable housing sector. 
Before considering financing structures/models based on cashflow returns, it is useful to first 
consider in more detail the rental system. In this context, the Irish policy on the rent paid by 
tenants (the “differential rent”) is usually pitched at around 15-20% of net income. For 
example, Dublin City Council has a minimum weekly rent of €23.40, which is just 12.44% of 
the SWA rate of €188. The rent scheme seeks to produce rents of 15% of the assessable income 
of each earner in the household.  The maximum rent on a one-bedroomed property is €301 per 
week – a figure substantially in excess of the market rate when the scheme was adopted in 2013 
(Dublin City Council, 2013). Rent schemes are further complicated with a wide range of 
income sources disregarded for the purposes of assessing income, and with additional 
provisions relating to additional members of households. Differential rent regimes are further 
complicated by the fact that a different scheme applies in each local authority, and that rents in 
AHB properties can vary further with additional charges and slightly higher rents pertaining. 
As a consequence, there is no connection between the rent charged and the location or cost of 
the property. Notionally, a single-income, two-person household with a combined net income 
of €35,000 living in Dublin City could afford to pay rent of €875 per month at a 30% 
affordability metric. Average rents in that area for one-bedroomed accommodation are 
significantly in excess of this figure, though there are notionally properties that such a 




As illustrated in Chapter 3, for much of the history of Irish social housing, rents were based on 
the cost of providing the dwelling. The gradual process by which rents came to be linked to 
incomes presents an interesting case study in path dependency and institutional change. A 
differential rent scheme was introduced in Cork in the 1930s with a view to assisting the very 
poorest households to afford rents. Norris (2016) records that the system was gradually 
extended across the country due to tenant agitation before being formally institutionalised in 
the Housing Act 1966. Pfretzchner (1965) from a more contemporary viewpoint explains that 
older homes were often on a fixed (cost-based rent) but that these became completely out of 
line either with incomes or with the cost of construction that then pertained. Furthermore, they 
were never revised due to political reasons. He notes that the then Minister was encouraging 
of differential rents. It seems that government officials were also supportive of differential 
rents. Meagher (1959) preferred differential rents as they offered a “long-term upward trend” 
that was absent from cost-based rents. Norris (2016) also notes that the belief at the outset of 
the differential rent regime was that better-off tenants would end up subsidising their poorer 
counterparts, but that this proved to be wildly optimistic.  
The point at which one local authority moved to an income-based rent set in motion a profound 
shift in institutional arrangements for housing. It appears that the old fixed rent system which 
linked rents to costs of housing construction produced results that were just as anomalous as 
the system that replaced them. In both cases, the political nature of the decision-making process 
meant that efficiency mechanisms were subordinated to legitimacy and power issues related to 
the electoral process and the close link between the Irish electorate and its politicians. As the 
differential rent system became embedded, changing it to produce results that would be more 
equitable, such as removal of maximum rents became just as impossible as increasing rents 
under the old fixed rate system. Moreover, the pace of institutional change is instructive. From 
the time differential rents were first introduced in Cork, it was some 40 years before the system 
was formally incorporated nationwide. The process in between saw much discussion of reform, 
but what appears to have happened was layering. Pfretzchner (1965) records that in 1963, 
53.6% of Dublin City tenants were on differential rents, with the balance (presumably older) 
tenants on fixed rents. Thus the system is characterised by very slow incremental change due 
to path dependency. In turn the path dependency is not endogenous to the housing system: it is 
part of the wider institutional framework within which the housing institutions reside, 
particularly the political structures that over-arch governance in all policy areas.  
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Each local authority is required to produce a housing allocation scheme and a housing rent 
scheme. Allocation of the scarce resource that is local authority housing is further complicated 
by priority cases, transfers, refusals, and housing areas. A housing authority will be presented 
with households who have a priority need for accommodation due to factors such as 
homelessness or unfit dwellings etc. Typically, an applicant household will express a 
preference for accommodation in a ranked order of housing areas. These may sometimes 
straddle housing authority boundaries. Refusals normally result in suspension from the list for 
a period of time, which time does not count as waiting, though such households may still re-
join the list ahead of other non-suspended households. Most local authorities also make 
provision for households to apply for transfer to other accommodation after a period of time, 
and a certain proportion of available dwellings require to be made available for this purpose. 
Given that there may be strong mismatches between the housing stock available in an area and 
the housing needs of the applicant households, there can be great unevenness in allocation 
within and between housing areas in local authorities. Hence, for example, there may be very 
few one-bed units in an area where there is strong demand for such units.  
The first significant initiative in housing finance for AHBs was the Capital Assistance Scheme 
(CAS), introduced in 1984. This originally provided grants to AHBs by way of a non-repayable 
loan from a local authority (Norris and Winston, 2004). The amounts were then recouped by 
the local authority from the Department of Housing, Planning and Local Government 
(DHPLG). The scheme was amended on several occasions to vary the maximum amount that 
could be “borrowed” ranging from 80% up to 95% of the costs to the AHB. As CAS was (and 
still is for special cases) currently 100% funded by the State, the primary issues for the AHB 
were process and cash flow. AHBs were required to fund booking deposits and contract 
deposits. These were both refundable but where volumes were high this could be significant. 
A second initiative, the Capital Loan and Subsidy Scheme CLSS (originally the Rental Subsidy 
Scheme) operated between 1991 and 2011. It provided 100% capital funding for AHBs to assist 
in the provision of self-contained rented accommodation for low-income households in need 
of housing. The scheme worked by the provision of a 100% non-repayable loan from local 
authorities to AHBs. The local authority borrowed the money from the HFA to fund the loan 
and recouped the cost from the DHPLG. A management and maintenance allowance was also 
paid to the housing association on a yearly basis under this scheme.  
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At the onset of the financial crisis in 2008 caused a rapid contraction of capital budgets and 
forced a rapid transition to revenue-funded models of housing provision. This in turn brought 
about a need for Approved Housing Bodies to source capital from other suppliers and to taking 
on levels of debt that they had not hitherto considered. The AHB sector had to get to grips with 
a very new skillset, and to take on some new stakeholders such as financial institutions who in 
turn were not always familiar with funding mechanisms and procedures for social housing 
finance. As discussed in Chapter 3, the Housing Policy Statement of 2011 placed AHBs firmly 
at the centre of social housing provision, while the Social Housing Strategy of 2014 set a goal 
of providing some 35,000 new social housing units via local authorities and AHBs through 
construction, acquisition and leasing (DECLG, 2014). Rebuilding Ireland, the 2016 strategy 
for housing across all sectors increased these social housing targets further to 47,000. This has 
set a strong challenge for the sector. A range of new financing options from quasi-governmental 
sources together with unprecedented cheap debt in the general market and a demonstrable 
demand for new units has widened the financing options available.  
Thus, the sector has had to make a step change in the culture and scale of their operations and 
ambition. Government also decided that to build confidence and capacity in the sector that 
AHBs needed to be properly regulated. Preliminary to statutory regulation, the Government 
established an interim regulatory structure to raise standards in the sector, to ensure robust 
governance, and to give some comfort to funders and lenders as to the strength of the 
organisations. This has been done in a tiered fashion, so that those small organisations without 
growth ambitions can have a lower regulatory standard than larger organisations with 
significant development plans and which are subject to more rigorous regulation ((DHPLG), 
2016).  
The funding landscape for AHBs has moved from CAS and CLSS to one largely based on a 
combination of a capital subsidy via a soft loan of up to 30% from Government with the balance 
borrowed from the HFA or from banks. The borrowings taken on by the AHBs   were serviced 
via a “Payment and Availability Agreement” (PAA) whereby local authorities contribute an 
annual amount for a term of 20 to 30 years of up to 92% of market rent. This income was 
supplemented by the tenants’ differential rent payments, in some cases a one-off payment for 
administration costs was made by Local Authorities to AHBs. The payments made by Local 
authorities to AHBs under this scheme were reimbursed by DHPLG. The payment was indexed 
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to the CPI rent index. This often meant that an AHB operating a unit under the PAA regime 
could receive an income at above market rates (NESC, 2014).  
a) The soft loan finance is provided via a DHPCLG loan, called the Capital Advance 
Leasing Facility (CALF). This scheme operates by the DHPLG advancing an unsecured 
long-term loan of up to 30% of the value of a project at a rolled-up 2% per annum at 
simple interest.  This loan is subordinated to the main loan referred to in b) below 
b) The balance of the acquisition costs is funded by either a HFA or commercial bank loan, 
and the CALF loan does not become repayable until that loan is repaid.  
c) The AHB simultaneously enters into a PAA Agreement whereby it will receive a 
payment from the State, provided it keeps the unit available for social housing for a 
period of 20 to 30 years. This is not an arduous condition and the PAA is effectively a 
State lease on the property for the duration of the loan.  The payment is up to 92% of 
market rent indexed regularly. Therefore, based on a rental value €6,000 pa, the rent 
received by the AHB is €5,520. This is used by the AHB firstly to service the debt, 
including amortisation on the borrowed capital, and secondly as security for that debt to 
the lending institution. The debt service calculation under the same assumptions but with 
interest and amortisation at 6% per annum is illustrated in Table 4.8.  
Table 4.8 CALF/PAA debt illustration  
HFA or Bank debt-25-year loan €70,000 
 Interest and Amortisation €4,200 
 Payment to AHB by government  €5,520 
 Surplus to AHB €1,320 
 Differential Rent paid by occupying tenant to AHB €2,000 
Net Income to AHB to pay operating costs  €3,320 
 
At face value this is a very good deal for the AHBs at current interest rates, as in addition to 
giving an initial cashflow surplus, the PAA income is indexed whereas the HFA loan terms are 
generally fixed for 20 or 25 years. Thus, outgoings on HFA loans are fixed and the PAA 
revenue will move with rent inflation. The property will become debt- and rent-free at the loan 
expiry date subject only to the outstanding CALF loan. However, of the three-main funding 
models, the CALF/PAA model has the highest number of variables which increases the 
potential risks for an AHB whilst at the same time generally generating a surplus cash flow. 
The three variables with the most potential impact are (i) changes in interest rates on 
borrowings, (ii) property rent levels and (iii) inflation assumptions. These currently look benign 
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but circumstances could change, and the impact of such changes are considered further later in 
this section. Other key variables include bad debts, service charges payable, property 
maintenance, the proportion of CALF funding in the deal and the terms of the arrangement. 
The DHPCLG will look to only approve schemes that have an IRR of circa 7%. The two 
mechanisms the Department can approve/influence are the term of the PAA agreement and the 
percentage of CALF approved. 
Most AHBs have little commercial borrowing experience. Currently, the HFA have access to 
EIB funding at a currently low fixed interest rate of 3.25% including amortisation. This is 
significantly lower than rates currently available from the commercial banks. However, from 
a State viewpoint, it has the disadvantage of being on-balance-sheet for government accounting 
purposes. As the borrowings are long term for 20/30 years and on the balance sheet of the 
AHB, this is a major change for the Boards of AHBs who formerly received all capital funding 
from the state on a non-risk basis.  Thus, the AHB in arranging a loan has several issues to 
consider namely the length of loan, interest rate, whether to fix the interest rate or have it 
variable and to manage through the often-complex terms and conditions sought by the lender 
including what security to provide and what covenants to agree to.  
Interest rates in Ireland and Europe are currently at historically low levels, due to the prolonged 
policy of quantitative easing. Borrowing rates at 3.25% including amortisation over 25 years 
would have been unimaginable before the crash. On the basis that such low rates cannot 
continue in the long term, any prudent board will be considering the impact of higher rates on 
their business model. The impact of changes to the total cash flow for each shift of interest 
rates of 1% is significant and is illustrated in Table 4.9 which is for an actual project carried 
out by Focus Ireland in 2017 in respect of a 29-unit scheme in Dublin.  As will be seen, this 
scheme remained viable with interest rates from 3.25% up to somewhat over 6.25% but became 




Table 4.9 Impact of interest rate increase on cash flow 
  
HFA BOI 
   
 
3.25% 4.25% 5.25% 6.25% 7.25%  
Cashflow Cashflow Cashflow Cashflow Cashflow 
Cash Inflow 
     
      
Net Differential Rental Income 61,944 61,944 61,944 61,944 61,944 
Net Availability Payment (PAA) 343,705 343,705 343,705 343,705 343,705 
Surplus transferred to General Reserves 0 0 0 0 0 
Technical / Set up Costs Grant 0 0 0 0 0 
Total Cash Inflow 405,649 405,649 405,649 405,649 405,649 
      
Cash Outflow 
     
      
Set up Costs 0 0 0 0 0 
Management & Maintenance Costs 48,045 48,045 48,045 48,045 48,045 
Sinking Fund / Life Cycle Costs 0 0 0 0 0 
Designated Reserves (Sinking Fund) 0 0 0 0 0 
Debt Service Costs (Capital plus Interest) 206,638 230,001 254,592 280,331 307,132 
DoEHLG Soft Loan Repayment 52,500 52,500 52,500 52,500 52,500 
Total Cash Outflow 307,183 330,546 355,137 380,876 407,677 
      




Rising rents and a steady low level of inflation can be good for profitability of AHBs. The rent 
index used for the PAA purposes is the CSO rent index. Over the last 30 years, property 
inflation has broadly tracked CPI. There have, of course, been significant peaks and troughs 
over shorter cycles within the 30 years. Rent reviews under PAA terms can be triggered 
between three and seven years. Inflation significantly impacts the PAA values, especially if 
borrowing interest rates are fixed.  
Table 4.10 shows a sensitivity analysis of three inflation rates on the NPV of a proposed 
housing acquisition. The calculation is based on a 25-year investment period with an initial 
PAA contract payment of €31,650 pa and a zero to 3% inflation rate over 25 years but with no 
inflation in years one and two. At the higher rate of inflation, the PAA rises to €39,029 pa whist 
debt service costs remain fixed, giving a surplus at the end of the period, ranging from € 18,277 
to €69,761 having repaid the CALF loan of €18,546.  Rents in most parts of Ireland have 
increased significantly over the past five years (Section 4.3.2) and this has benefited PAA 
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arrangements enormously. At 2011 rent levels, the PAA payment would barely have covered 
the debt servicing cost. Indeed, in locations with low rent levels, it is doubtful if a PAA 
agreement would be sufficient to cover development cost of new units even at 2018 rent levels.      
Table 4.10 Inflation sensitivity analysis 
Annual Inflation Years 1 - 5 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Annual Inflation Years 6 - 25 0.00% 2.00% 3.00% 
    
  NPV NPV NPV 
Cash Inflow   
  
Net Rental Income 31,650 36,272 39,029 
net Availability Payment 167,999 200,592 220,519    
0 
Technical/Set up Costs Grant 0 0 0 
Total Cash Inflow 199,649 236,864 259,548 
        
Cash outflow       
Set up Costs 0 0 0 
Management & Maintenance Costs 22,826 28,029 31,241 
    
Debt Service Costs (Capital plus Interest) 140,000 140,000 140,000 
DECLG  CALF  Loan Repayment 18,546 18,546 18,546 
Total Cash Outflow 181,372 186,575 189,788 
        
Net Cash Inflow/(Outflow) 18,277 50,289 69,761 
 
The change in approach to funding AHBs moves the sector much closer to being property 
investment businesses rather than simple charities. Property investment is about managing 
property portfolios and income streams, borrowings, building development and making 
judgment calls on inflation, rents and interest rates. These are mostly new skills for AHBs 
requiring management and boards to have a commercial or semi-commercial mindset.  There 
are numerous risks associated with commercial borrowing which both the CAS and leasing 
methods insulated AHBs from. Having funding available from the HFA is some way towards 
the reality of commercial borrowing, but the fact that this debt is on AHBs’ balance sheets must 
mean that the availability of this funding source will be constrained over time.  However, in 
the present market disequilibrium where the Irish State cannot access social housing stock at 
the requisite levels to meet demand, it is unlikely to restrict HFA finance or to make the PAA 
arrangements unworkable. Nonetheless with pressures on public sector spending and the 
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stringent financial management required to remain within EU economic governance rules, new 
sources of finance are increasingly required to fund the provision of social/affordable housing. 
Such finance will need to be drawn from the private sector in ways that keep it off the state 
balance sheet. 
So far, this section has looked mainly at an ownership-based model whereby the AHBs 
purchased properties paid for directly or indirectly with capital or revenue provided by the 
state. The PAA agreement is equally capable of being used by AHBs to lease housing from the 
private sector provided the investors accept (a) the rent discounts of 8% from market levels, 
(b) a rent indexed to CPI, and (c) that the AHB can manage the property for the differential 
rent received from the occupier. From an investor perspective, the RAS choice is to accept a 
longer lease and a more secure payee in return for a small rent discount. The fact that the RAS 
scheme has provided 20,000 units for social housing tenants demonstrates that this proposition 
is attractive. However, whilst the RAS scheme may be attractive to investors and to provide 
social housing it is not as attractive to AHBs as the purchase model. It may lead to a situation 
that AHBs will opt out of the RAS approach and property investors may have to take over some 
of the tenant social service element of such housing now provided by AHBs and local 
authorities. Alternatively, AHBs may provide this tenancy support for a fee either from the 
state or to institutional investors.   
Institutional equity investment in housing is theoretically a good fit. Residential rents tend to 
move in line with wages with long-term liabilities matched to investment time horizons. 
Furthermore, returns from such property investment move in different cycles to bonds, bank 
borrowing terms and equities and so help to provide a steady income stream (BSHF, 2012) 
where investors will be focused on the long-term value of the properties and will expect values 
to follow the general property value trajectory over the long term. 
In proposing an institutional approach to the delivery of affordable housing, the McKinsey 
Global Institute identified four key elements namely: unlocking land at the right location, 
reducing construction costs, increasing operations and maintenance efficiency, and reducing 
financing costs for buyers and developers (McKinsey, 2014). The Fund proposed in this thesis, 
as further developed in Chapter 7 adopts these levers.  The constrained capital situation in 
Ireland emphasises the importance of the first of these levers in using public sector owned land 
to reduce the cost of housing.  The proposed Fund, as an anticipated bulk supplier of housing, 
is designed to reduce costs through innovative approaches to construction and to value 
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engineering (McKinsey’s second lever). These types of efficiencies can best be captured in 
high-volume projects of the type the Fund envisages. Taken with the land element, the 
proposed Fund could also mitigate the expense associated with public procurement procedures, 
by using best-practice private sector techniques to drive down cost. The third lever, increased 
efficiencies in operation and maintenance, also chimes perfectly with the proposed Fund as the 
operator will be a professional housing manager with key skills in low-income housing.  
Fourthly, the public-private structure of the proposed Fund with Government guarantee 
potentially has the capacity to drive down the cost of funding by reducing the risk to investors.    
4.7 Conclusion 
This chapter has illustrated that demand-side drivers in the Irish housing are strong underpinned 
by currently strong macroeconomic fundamentals and the demographic structure which is 
impacting on house price growth, rental levels and affordability. These trends have placed 
further significant challenges for the delivery of social/affordable housing. In this respect, the 
chapter has focused upon current supply constraints induced by the legacy of the recession and 
the efforts to increase housing supply to meet demand.  In respect of social housing the chapter 
assesses current and historic funding methods and points out that the Irish State has become 
capital constrained in relation to the funding of new social housing using traditional capital-
based direct provision mechanisms and has been moving over time to leasing private sector 
property and funding this on its current account.   
Whilst the AHB sector formerly received all its capital funding from the State and other public 
agencies, the sector is being forced to move to a revenue-based model by borrowing capital on 
balance sheet. Consequently, AHBs are being forced to think more like property companies 
and are having up-skill to operate in this new environment. The chapter concludes by 
suggesting a need for a new source of rental housing financing from institutions, in addition to 
the one-off landlord and which should provide significant additional rental housing, but which 
may conflict with the traditional charitable motivation of AHBs. Chapter 6 will argue that 
institutional equity funding offers the prospect of investment at scale and that such investment 
is well-suited to the development of a new long-term rental model in the residential sector to 
include social and affordable housing  
In advancing the underlying rationale of the thesis, this chapter has shown how path-dependent 
processes have shaped the institutional framework that brought matters to a juncture where 
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further policy change and new financial models are needed to induce more social housing 
supply. This “critical juncture” points clearly to a need to produce new stock that can cater for 
a growing cohort of long-term rental housing.  
The remainder of this thesis develops the argument for institutional equity investment in the 
social/affordable housing sectors. However, before exploring the proposed funding model in 
more detail, the next two chapters of the thesis consider the international experience and 
delivery models for social/affordable housing (Chapter 5) and the analyses investment criteria 
and characteristics essential to produce an institutional funding model for the development of 










CHAPTER 5: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON SOCIAL/AFFORDABLE 
HOUSING DELIVERY MODELS 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter examines the provision of housing for low-income households in six countries:  
Australia, England, France, Germany, the Netherlands, and Switzerland. These have been 
chosen to reflect the diversity of housing systems and their relevance to the subject matter in 
hand. The choice of exemplars was made on the basis that they offer a broad overview of social 
and affordable housing delivery systems in a developed world context.  The chapter explores 
the social housing systems in each of the six countries and in particular the relationships 
between other tenure types, and the level of institutional interest in residential investment. 
In considering the elements that might go to make up an institutionally funded vehicle for the 
delivery of social housing in Ireland, drawing upon international exemplars is important in 
informing best practice and in this context England, France, Germany, the Netherlands, and 
Switzerland provided useful points of comparison and contrast. Additionally, extensive work 
in Australia has been undertaken on attracting institutional investment into social and 
affordable housing. Given that the characteristics of the private rented sector, the non-profit 
housing sector, and the historical role of social housing in Australia all bear a striking 
comparison to Ireland, it was considered that Australia should also be included. Also, it is a 
country with a common-law tradition and an “Anglo-Saxon” political and cultural heritage that 
bears resemblance to Ireland in many respects. Hence the countries chosen are in various 
aspects instructive to the Irish situation. 
From a theoretical perspective, Kemeny and Lowe (1998) characterise comparative housing 
studies in three broad groups. The first is juxtapositional analysis where descriptions of 
different housing systems are placed alongside each other without attempting to develop any 
theory-level explanation for the difference between them. The second sees all housing systems 
as broadly similar, or at least driven by the same forces, leading to a convergence across 
housing systems. Convergence theorists typically adopt a Marxist political economy approach 
that sees housing systems as moving in one direction, usually towards a market-based solution. 
The third approach is a divergence which sees housing regimes more in the context of the 
cultural and historical environment in which they have developed. The historical institutionalist 
(Chapter 2) framework theorises that systems in each country evolve according to particular 
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political, economic and financial circumstances providing a further reason to examine 
social/affordable housing regimes in other countries. Analysing comparative housing systems 
in other countries permits an understanding of the dynamic relationships between the market 
and the welfare state, a critical determinant of the type of housing support system.  In this 
context, Chapter 5, a comparative perspective of social/affordable housing systems in six 
countries, addresses the fourth objective of the thesis in highlighting the extent to which private 
sector finance combined with institutional investment is being employed as a funding solution. 
5.2 Australia 
Approximately 67.2% of Australian households own their own home with or without a 
mortgage, 25.7% rent from private landlord, while just 3.6% are socially renting from a public 
housing authority. This represents a decline in public housing of about 35% in the past two 
decades. Unlike most European countries where some systems of housing support existed in 
the first half of the twentieth century, Australian “social” housing only emerged after the 
Second World War. Demographic pressures due to a rapidly expanding population and a 
collapse in housing production during the 1930s led to a need for additional accommodation. 
While some of the states of Australia had established bodies to address the housing shortage 
from the late 1930s, in 1943 the Commonwealth-State Housing Agreement (CSHA) led to 
long-term low-cost loans from the Federal Government to the states for the construction of 
low-income rental housing. Between 1945 and 1955, 100,000 units were constructed (almost 
5% of the total housing stock). The CSHA loans were on terms of about 3% over 53 years, and 
rents were set on the basis of these costs plus maintenance (Hayward, 1996). 
The longstanding Australian tenure pattern and policy preference is owner-occupation with 
private rental as the default option (Jacobs et al, 2010) with Government facilitating home 
ownership through a loans policy. For example, the Queensland Workers Homes Scheme in 
1919 provided cheap State loans to eligible households with just 5% deposit required 
(Hayward, 1996). State banks also developed schemes and lent to households to buy a home. 
The pre-war history of Australian “public” housing is a state-supported owner-occupation 
regime, rather than “social” rental housing in the European sense.  Historically, less emphasis 
was placed by the Australian Labour movement on housing than their European counterparts. 
Rather, wage policy was seen as the way to ensure good housing conditions through owner-
occupation. Measures for social housing were generally seen as a response to need and 
circumstances rather than as a general function of the Australian State or as any ideological 
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commitment to generalist housing provision. Hayward (1996) cites problems and failures in 
state-supported ownership schemes and the chronic slum housing problem in major cities as 
reasons for turning towards public rental housing in the early 1940s. In the decades that 
followed, policy swung between more or less support for owner-occupation and public housing 
according to the economic climate and inclination of the government at the time.  
The terms of the CSHA were amended in 1949 to permit the sale of dwellings, thus facilitating 
both a source of revenue for further housing development and furtherance of government policy 
in favour of owner-occupation. This meant rapid loss of public housing stock as almost 90,000 
units were sold between 1945 and 1969. Certainly the rate of sale generally exceed the rate of 
construction. Rent policy also changed in certain states in the 1960s away from the historic 
cost basis to a rent based approach on the type of dwelling and number of rooms, thus breaking 
the link with the cost of provision of the dwelling. Rents were also generally unrelated to 
income. Households whose circumstances had improved since being allocated their home were 
not penalised in rent terms for their increased income. The logic of this was to discourage the 
residualisation of public housing that occurred elsewhere when better-off households moved 
on. However, Hayward (1996) notes that public housing schemes were generally modest, 
poorly maintained, and with few amenities and services. 
It appears that while allocation policies varied from ballot systems to more nuanced needs-
based approaches, the fundamental approach to public housing in Australia was that it should 
be just adequate, and it was not seen as something that should become desirable tenure choice. 
In any event, Australian public housing is heavily residualised, as a result of circumstances and 
policy choices since the 1970s, with the shift from “public housing to welfare housing” 
complete by the mid-1980s (Jacobs et al, 2010). In the 1990s, there was a new emphasis put 
on “community housing” (Darcy, 1999). The Australian not-for-profit housing sector is 
relatively small, managing around 46,000 units, about an eighth of all Australian social housing 
in 2010. Gilmour and Milligan (2012) describe a sector that is very fragmented, made up of 
959 organisations, usually managing less than 50 units and with bank borrowing or property 
development capacity. However, a small cohort of 45 associations manages 63% of the stock, 
and has the capacity to grow using State supply-side supports. The NRAS (National Rental 
Affordability Scheme) scheme, introduced in 2008, was an AU$4 billion scheme to provide 
tax incentives and grants to private investors and not-for-profit bodies respectively for the 
provision of low-income housing. Housing funded under the NRAS had to let at rents at least 
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20% below the market for a period of 10 years, after which they can be rented at the market 
rate or sold (Blessing, 2015). The general thrust of State and Federal government policy is to 
make a shift to the not-for-profit sector as the primary supplier of low-income housing, through 
a range of mechanisms from zoning requirements to preferential treatment in demand-side 
subsidies (Gilmour and Milligan, 2012). This shift from a wholly public system of housing 
provision to an increasing role for non-state actors also encompasses change from a 
residualised housing sector to one which attempts to accommodate households on modest 
incomes – affordable housing. A sizeable body of research has also been undertaken in 
Australia as to how institutional investment can be drawn into rental housing (e.g. Berry, 2000; 
Milligan et al, 2013; Pawson and Milligan, 2013; Lawson et al, 2014; Milligan et al, 2015).  
Australia also has a system of demand-side subsidies (rent assistance) that enables low-income 
households to rent in the private sector.  However, the Australian private rented sector has 
remained loosely regulated. Tenancy law varies slightly between the various states, but 
generally provides for fixed-term tenancies and periodic tenancies (indefinite, but based on 
week-to-week or month-to-month terms). Rents are set at market rates and provided due notice 
is given can be raised at intervals depending on the nature of the tenancy. There is generally a 
right of appeal to a tribunal or magistrate if the increase is felt “unfair”. Notice periods also 
vary according to the form of tenancy, but a landlord may generally serve notice to a tenant to 
“leave without ground”. In this respect, the Australian private rented sector is less regulated 
than Ireland, but more so than the UK.  
The traditional role of the private rented sector was as a temporary housing solution for young 
households and as a transitional tenure but has grown in importance in recent years due to 
demographic, social and economic changes. Most investment is by small-scale investors (Hulse 
et al, 2012). Negative gearing is a significant factor in attracting investment to the sector, and 
has been controversial in Australia, especially in the context of rapidly escalating prices. Hulse 
et al observe that there is no incentive to invest in lower rent stock with the result that 
investment has gone to the higher end of the market with capital gain the key motivation for 
investors rather than yield.  
Path dependencies within the Australian housing regime appear to be weaker than those that 
pertain in some of the other countries under discussion here. The strongly residualised character 
of the social housing tenure is a result of a strong policy preference for owner-occupation and 
in common with the other liberal welfare regimes there were large scale disposals of public 
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housing to occupiers. Fitzpatrick and Pawson (2014) reviewing the changing role of social 
housing in Australia and the UK since the 1970s note the same residualizing process in both 
countries. Despite this, the relatively small scale and historic residual character of the tenure in 
Australia would appear to permit greater latitude in bringing about institutional change. 
Moreover, the relatively late development of the social housing sector in Australia and its 
historically residual role mean that it is less embedded than might be the case where the 
institutional framework is stronger.  
Blessing (2015) points out that whereas homeownership was by far the dominant tenure type 
for many decades, there was a 400% increase in house prices in the two decades previously 
which pushed owner-occupation out reach of many. Together with a dearth of affordable 
accommodation in the private sector, government began to actively seek solutions – especially 
institutional investment in affordable rental housing. Research by Milligan et al (2013), 
Milligan et al (2015) and Newell et al (2015) as to how to induce investment in housing from 
institutions concluded that the key factors in achieving that goal were to design the right 
product, achieve scale, achieve mixed tenure for investment purposes with a reasonable degree 
of diversity in the property portfolio. They also stress the policy environment as being critical 
to convincing institutions of the longevity and stability of the investment. Lastly, they suggest 
that active government support may be required to “pump prime” such institutional investment.   
5.3 England 
English social housing has always had certain key differences with the system in Ireland. 
Ireland had a higher degree of public subsidy and municipal involvement in housing in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth century. Post-independence in Ireland (Chapter 3), the systems 
diverged further, most particularly with the provision of mass public housing by English local 
authorities to the point where 31% of the housing stock was composed of housing of this nature 
in 1979, compared with a falling proportion of Irish households living in social housing from 
the early 1960s. By 2014, just over 17% of English households lived in social housing. 
However, England is particularly interesting because of the relatively rapid expansion of the 
housing association sector from 1979 to the present. At the beginning of that period 93% of 
social housing was owned by local authorities. By 2014, that number had fallen to 41% with 
housing associations (more properly described as registered social landlords) making up the 
balance (DCLG, 2015).  
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Policy since the 1980s has facilitated a reducing role for local authorities in housing ownership 
and management. This has come through large-scale transfers of housing stock from councils 
to housing associations, and the creation of large ALMOs (arm’s length management 
organisations) to manage local authority housing. This process of transfer was facilitated by 
tenant choice clauses in the Housing Act 1988. More than 1.3 million homes changed from the 
local authority sector to housing associations in the following 20 years (Pawson, 2006). With 
the ability to borrow and with substantial balance sheets based on transferred stock, the housing 
association sector grew rapidly, acquiring in the process much commercial acumen and 
expertise in finance and treasury functions which, together with a strong regulatory regime 
enabled it to develop capacity to access both bank debt and more latterly capital market 
funding. However, the sector has also diversified from its original core mission of providing 
low-income housing. Housing associations have moved into ancillary activities as diverse as 
wind-farms and leisure centres, while others have widened their housing remit into more 
commercial activities. Throughout this time, limited grant funding was available for social 
housing. In 2010, this was reduced by more than half to 14% and instead funding was 
channelled into a new class of “affordable” housing where providers could charge up to 80% 
of market rent. According to Blessing (2015), limited-term tenures in contrast to indefinite 
terms are vital to balance sheets of affordable housing schemes, and their viability depends on 
revenues secured from sales of mature stock. Crucially, housing associations can (with local 
authority agreement) convert social stock to affordable, but the ever-tightening government 
funding environment is making it imperative that housing associations make such conversions.  
The English exemplar is particularly interesting in that it represents a system that has been 
traditionally funded from government, but where now construction and development of social 
housing is mostly financed by the private sector. While this was originally for the most part 
bank finance, as the housing association sector has grown and matured, it has accessed capital 
markets in the form of bonds and private placements for further investment. Limited 
government capital grants are still available, but the long-term shift away from mass provision 
of secure “council” housing for traditional working-class households is continuing with a new 
increased emphasis on “affordable” housing where rents up to 80% of the market rate in the 
area can be charged. This obviously has profound implications for the nature of the households 
who are able to access such households in the first place, but also for the permanence and 
security offered by that accommodation.  
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While capital grant funding is at a much lower level, the loans are remunerated via demand-
side housing benefit payments totalled £24.6 billion (for the entire UK) in 2013–2014. More 
recently, caps on social rent increases are likely to further squeeze the housing association 
sector and promote diversification into affordable housing. Typically, social rents are around 
40–60% of market rents. Rent policy has been going through a period of great uncertainty with 
consequent knock-on effects for the ability of the sector to repay debt and to embark on further 
development projects. Rent convergence as between local authority and housing association 
tenancies was an objective of government policy from 2002–2015. This was achieved by the 
adoption of a formula rent based on incomes in the area and property values giving certainty 
to landlords regarding rent increases. In 2015 however, the government announced a 1% 
reduction in social rents for four years, meaning a 12% average reduction in rent and a £1.4 
billion saving, mostly in housing benefit (Wilson, 2015).  
From a situation where England had brought into being a relatively strong and enterprising 
social housing sector outside the formal government sphere, it would appear that recent policy 
changes could destabilise that sector and hamper future development efforts. Bringing 
institutional investment to the private rental market in general has been a goal of English 
housing policy (DCLG, 2012). One area where institutions have provided finance – albeit 
through debt – has been in social housing. The strong regulatory structure, together with the 
track record of the sector and government backing means that the sector has been attractive 
both to bank lenders and to capital markets. England’s private rented sector is one of the least 
regulated in Europe with relatively free bargaining power between landlord and tenant, free 
market rents, and little security of tenure. It is a sector that is growing in importance as fewer 
and fewer households find themselves able to access owner-occupation. In common with 
Ireland and Australia, private renting has traditionally been a transitional or residual tenure, 
with low levels of long-term, secure tenancy patterns. Some institutional investment has come 
in recently to the sector, but at a low level. In this context, Crook and Kemp (2000) and Jones 
(2007) examined the possibilities for institutional investment in rental housing through the 
respective prism of Housing Investment Trusts and more latterly REITs. There is also a 
plethora of reports from official sources and NGOs on the issue of funding large-scale rental 





The origins of social housing in France go back to the early twentieth century when 
philanthropic and workforce housing was provided privately. As observed by Lèvy Vroelant 
et al (2014), while the political and regulatory framework was put in place before WWII, it was 
in the post-war period that the stock really grew, with exponential growth from the late 1950s 
up to the early 1970s. In 1977, a long-term programme of reduction in supply-side subsidies in 
favour of demand-side measures began (Peppercorn and Taffin, undated). Political unrest in 
large urban housing estates in the early 1980s led to a revisiting of policy towards increased 
investment in housing. Broadly, France can be seen as part of the corporatist-statist group of 
welfare states identified by Esping-Andersen (1990). First, it offers a stratified type of housing 
support according to income, and second it acknowledges a “right” to housing. The path 
dependencies in the French system appear to be connected to its embedding in political 
discourse and action. Nonetheless, the macro-level trend is similar to the other countries under 
consideration in moving emphasis to demand-side supports and market facilitiation 
mechanisms rather than more statist and dirigiste solutions than in the past.  
Social housing in France is described as Habitation à Loyer Modéré (HLM) (literally 
moderated rent housing), and bodies supplying such housing are generally termed HLMs. The 
system is financed through a number of channels, the principal of which is a State savings 
scheme, the Livret A. Households can save through a tax-free account with a regulated interest 
rate. The funds are then lent onwards by the Caisse des Dépôts et Consignations (CDC) who 
pay a fee to banks for running the individual accounts and collecting the money. The CDC 
manages approximately €220 billion and lends around €6–12 billion annually. Approximately, 
three quarters of social housing is financed by these loans. Equity generally makes up a further 
10% and the balance is derived from central and local government grants at varying levels 
depending on the target cohort, and the employers’ housing fund (1% logement). Interest rates 
on Livret A deposits are currently at 0.75%, and loans are provided at between 20 basis points 
below this rate for dwellings for the poorest households up to 1.5% over the rate for 
intermediate renters. Cahill (2014) reports an average long-term interest rate of 3.35%.  Loans 
are provided over very long periods of 40 or even 50 years. In addition, a lower rate of 5% 
VAT applies on construction by social housing developers. On almost all schemes, there is a 
25- year exemption from property and land taxes – the exception being new-build intermediate 
rental schemes. Guarantees are generally available from local authorities for social housing, 
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but HLMs can also pay 2% to a guarantee scheme, the Caisse de Garantie du Logement Locatif 
Sociale (CGLLS). Some higher standard social housing and intermediate renting schemes are 
open to non HLM investors who can avail of cheaper loan finance and certain tax breaks in 
return for meeting conditions as to the level of rent and income of the tenants (Hoekstra, 2013). 
The HLMs themselves are non-profit bodies that vary in nature from public to private 
organisations but are in all cases required to reinvest surpluses into further social housing 
development, and have very limited ability to pay dividends.  French social housing is 
generalist in nature: it is aimed at very low to moderate income households under various 
schemes. Table 5.1 describes the income ceilings to qualify for social housing under each 
scheme and the maximum rent that may be charged. The upper levels of income and rent relate 
to central Paris with a banded system for the area around the capital, and for other regions in 
the country.  
Table 5.1 Income ceilings for social housing under different schemes in France (source 
Circulaire, Avis Loyers 2015 (French Housing Ministry Circular); www.service-public.fr; 
www.actionlogement.fr)  
 Rent support is tapered by income level under four schemes 
1-person 
household 












€4.56–€5.97 €5.14–€6.70 €7.71–€13.07 €8.74–16.82 
 
Thus, social housing in France encompasses a range of household types and incomes, from an 
intermediate tenure to accommodation for the very poorest households. The HLM sector 
accounts for around 4.5 million dwellings in France, approximately, 17% of the overall stock 
(Cahill, 2014). Despite this, approximately 35% of households in HLM accommodation were 
below the poverty line in 2011 (Pittini and Laina, 2012). Rents are linked to the original cost 
and financing of the dwelling, so the cheaper loans, long terms, and subsidies produce lower 
rents, but rents in new buildings will be higher. If tenants cannot pay the rent required, housing 
allowances are available at an average of €215 per month.  
The French system is unique in using the State savings Livret A as the main source of funding 
for social housing. In broad terms, it can be seen as a cost rental model where higher levels of 
State support go to produce housing for lower income households while also providing a 
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stratified system of support for middle earners down to poor households. At approximately 
17%, the proportion of the overall stock in social housing is relatively high, with only the 
Netherlands, Sweden, the UK and Denmark having a higher level. The system of low-income 
housing in France has the advantage of being off balance-sheet as most of the funding through 
Livret A is privately sourced through personal savings. The Livret A, as mentioned above, is a 
tax-free savings product offered to French households and administered by the CDC for onward 
lending to HLMs. Thus, France is less exposed to cyclical patterns of provision compared to 
other countries. Indeed, Lèvv-Vroelant et al (2014) observe that social housing played a 
counter-cyclical role in the recent financial crisis with rising levels of output off-setting the 
sharp dip in private sector construction activity.  
In France, there is an active debate about whether sales of stock in low demand areas could be 
used to provide new housing where there is a need reflecting different positions as to whether 
France should continue with its strong policy of generalist housing provision or move to a more 
residualised model to meet the needs of growing numbers of low-income households. Current 
HLM regulatory structures neither permit stock transfer to institutional investors nor enable 
such investors to attain the yield they would require (IPF, 2015). However, there are nascent 
signs of the potential for institutional investment in this sector. CDC, through one of its 
constituents, Société Nationale Immobiliére (SNI), manages around 275,000 social and 
intermediate rental dwellings, has established a fund with institutional investors to develop 
10,000 intermediate units at a net yield of 3.5% and an IRR of 7% on disposal of the units after 
20 years. The development model proposes mixed communities of approximately 75% 
intermediate and 25% social rented units. The development and construction risk is eliminated, 
as the Fund will only acquire units from developers who are selected on a competitive basis 
(IPF, 2015). This model closely mirrors the DADF concept which is the subject of this thesis.  
5.5 Germany 
The German system of low-income housing provision is unique in Europe. In contrast to most 
countries where housing is either directly provided by government agencies or by not-for-profit 
housing association type bodies, in Germany the divide between market and non-market 
housing is much narrower. Housing is devolved to the Länder, so there is no national system 
of provision. Accordingly, “social housing” in Germany refers to dwellings constructed under 
certain State-supported schemes.  
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Perhaps the most apt typology is that adopted by Droste and Knorr-Siedow (2014) where they 
describe de jure, de facto and virtual social housing. In this categorisation, de jure social 
housing encompasses units constructed under the various subsidy schemes that the State has 
operated from the second half of the twentieth century. These are generally temporary in nature 
and revert to the market when the subsidy period expires. De facto social housing is former de 
jure social housing operated by non-profit bodies, co-operatives or municipal housing 
companies who provide housing at below-market rents, while virtual social housing describes 
a housing allowance payment (wohngeldgesetz) to assist households to rent in the private rented 
market.  
In general, certain subsidies or cheap loans are available to landlords irrespective of their status 
(private, not-for-profit), and dwellings provided under these measures are deemed “social” 
housing. An important characteristic of this housing type is that it is temporary in nature. The 
concessions are accorded to the property for a period of time in return for certain rent limits 
and allocation provisions. However, on expiry of the subsidy period, typically 15 years 
(Cornelius and Rzeznik, 2014) but up to 30 years (Droste and Knorr-Siedow, 2014), the 
property reverts to normal market housing. However, Pittini and Laina (2012) report that many 
municipal housing companies will continue to operate the units as de facto social housing, 
social housing, generally operated by municipalities. This is estimated to make up around one 
million dwellings (Droste and Knorr-Siedow, 2014). There are also approximately a million 
households supported by a housing allowance payment to rent housing in the private rented 
market.  
Formal German social housing, therefore, appears as a very low percentage (3.4%) of the 
overall housing stock, and only 7.5% of the total rented stock (CECODHAS, 2013).1 That 
proportion is falling. In 2013, approximately 100,000 units exited the sector while only 30–
40,000 new units were produced (CECODHAS, 2013). Moreover, most of the activity in 
subsidised rental housing is coming from municipal housing companies rather than commercial 
companies (IPF, 2015). As returns from subsidised housing are below those from private 
renting, institutional investors have by and large eschewed the sector as either a direct or 
indirect investment (IPF, 2015). However, very substantial holdings of former public housing 
have been transferred to the private sector, facilitating the development of a large corporate-
                                                 




owned tranche of country’s rental housing.  Between 1999 and 2011, 917,000 units of public 
housing were sold by municipal or federal companies. Some of these were disposed of two 
investment groups with some conditions as to the protection of tenants (BBSR, 2012).  
The effects of this privatisation of public housing portfolios were profound. German 
institutional investors were not attracted to the social and low-profit housing with the result 
that it was private equity and international institutions who purchased the properties. This led 
to a sharply stratified approach by new purchasers who sold off the best of the property, holding 
and maintaining an additional middle tranche while the poorest quality was run down further 
and became residualised, and the former integrated nature of the estates was lost (Elsinga et al, 
2014).  
In terms of institutional investment, some caution is needed in German terms. Fitzsimons 
(2014) outlines institutional investors as municipal housing companies, cooperatives, private 
housing companies, public housing companies, church housing companies and “other” housing 
companies. REIT activity in German housing is at a very low level (Fitzsimons 2014); in fact 
German REITs are prohibited from holding existing residential real estate. However, there are 
some very large listed German landlord companies. Publicly listed apartment landlords hold 
portfolios worth around €155 billion (Financial Times, 2015). The market view of residential 
property appears to be as a very safe and stable investment. The availability of stock at scale 
has also proved attractive to large-scale investors who have been able to reduce transaction and 
management costs through acquisition of housing operators. Fitzsimons (2014) reports that as 
pension funds begin to pay out to their members, residential investment offers a good 
diversification pathway away from bonds, and accordingly are seeking to allocate more to the 
private rented sector. The stability and security of the income flows and capital growth are the 
key attractions.  
However, the German private rented sector is heavily regulated with strong protections for 
sitting tenants and a sophisticated rent control system. Thus, the private sector may not be as 
insecure and unaffordable as it might be in freer market systems. Private rent increases in 
Germany are based on local rents for similar dwellings, and an index of local rents, based on 
hedonic regression is produced (the mietspiegel). As the mietspiegel is based on the previous 
four years rent, the potential for sharp rises is somewhat mitigated, and there is a maximum of 
20% uplift in rent permitted in a three-year period. German rent increases for sitting tenants 
therefore are to a high degree insulated from sharp spikes in the market.  
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Within the definition of “institutional” investment in this thesis, we can include the larger 
German publicly listed companies who hold large volume of rental housing with one example 
being Vonovia and Deutsche Wohnen. Approximately 17% of German private rented stock is 
held by such investors. Approximately 60% is held by individual investors, though in holdings 
that are typically larger than would pertain in Ireland (at between six and 45 units) (Fitzpatrick, 
2014). However, such companies are not generally engaged in the development of subsidised 
(social) housing. 
In recognition of the long-term decline of social housing in Germany, some cities have 
introduced measures to bring about mixed social and private developments, for example the 
sub-market sale of land and mandating the construction of social housing as a condition of 
consent for high-rent units (Droste and Knorr-Siedow, 2014). An example provided by 
CECOHDAS (2013), outlines a public loan in respect of just under 25% of the cost of a project 
with equity and bank loans making up the balance. The public loan is interest free for 10 years 
and 2% from Years 11–16 when it reverts to market rates, but should by then be paid off.  
The German strategy of privatisation has proved problematic. Most significantly, it did not 
achieve the benefits of the reduced burden on the public sector, as rent increases and loss of de 
facto social housing resulted in rises in housing allowance payments (Elsinga et al, 2014).  
Importantly, it was de jure social housing that was most resistant to the strategies of the new 
owners – in other words the State “lock-in” of certain low-rent conditions was more successful 
than other strategies, though there has been ongoing controversy over the social obligations of 
the new owners. In tandem with the residualisation of some stock as a result of privatisation, 
there is now a general recognition of a long-term structural problem in supply (BBSR, 2012a) 
of low-income housing. Moreover, a longstanding equilibrium in German housing markets 
appears to have been undermined. 
“As German institutional investors showed limited interest in social or other 
low-profit housing, public sellers turned to international institutional 
investors, including pension funds and hedge funds. With a limited grasp of 
the historically established balance between prices and rent legislation, these 
investors considered German housing to be under-priced. They expected a 
move away from the traditional ‘hold and manage’ strategy (with annual 
returns of 4–6%) towards a speculative profit orientation, promising their 
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shareholders returns of 20% or more per annum” (Elsinga, Stephens, and 
Knorr-Siedow, 2014). 
5.6 The Netherlands 
Social housing makes up a greater proportion of the housing stock in the Netherlands than in 
any other European country. Housing associations own 32% of the total housing stock, while 
a further 9% is in the private rented sector (Elsinga and Wassenberg, 2014). The Dutch model 
is generalist in nature, and is mandated to provide housing for a wide section of the population. 
The founding Housing Act of 1901 and subsequent amendments obliges housing associations, 
to provide for households who are unable to find appropriate housing.  Originating in the latter 
half of the nineteenth century the housing association movement had access to government 
loans and subsidies that enabled it to build up its stock. A core reason for the development of 
such a large housing sector was a strong government commitment to public housing. Post-
second world war reconstruction gave fresh impetus to construction activity in the housing 
sector (Boelhouwer, 2003; Elsinga and Wassenberg, 2014).  
A White Paper in 1989 (“Nota Heerma”) signalled a shift in policy towards greater autonomy 
for the social housing sector. This initiative also circumscribed more closely the groups eligible 
for social housing, and began to break down the generalist nature of Dutch social housing. This 
signalled significant shifts in the regulatory and financial environment for social housing.  In 
the years since 1989, the Dutch housing associations effectively became almost entirely 
financially independent of government for capital and new development purposes. The last 
vestige of government support for the sector is a backstop provision on housing association 
loans via the waarborgsfonds sociale woningbouw guarantee fund (WSW). This fund operates 
through a contribution from the sector in the first instance, which means the housing 
associations are mutually guaranteed.  
In 1995, the Dutch Government cancelled the sector’s debt but also removed subsidies to the 
sector. This was termed the “grossing and balancing” exercise (brutering). Under this process 
– a transaction amounting to some €16 billion – all the debt owed to the state by the housing 
associations was set off against the subsidies the State would be liable to pay to the social 
housing sector. In this way, the social housing associations were made almost completely 
independent of the State (Aedes, 2013).  
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In 2010, the government introduced a tax on housing associations targeted at moving social 
rents towards market levels for those who could afford them, and facilitating housing allowance 
as the main affordability instrument. Additionally, Dutch housing associations were made to 
pay a further levy in 2013, following the disastrous failure of the large housing association, 
Vestia. The levy is paid to the central fonds volkshuisvesting (central social housing fund, CFV) 
which acts as regulator of the sector and as a further sector-funded guarantee for housing 
associations in distress. Accordingly, Dutch social housing is funded by a “triple-lock” 
guarantee system whereby the WSW, CFV and government ensure lenders’ funds, and 
accordingly produce good ratings and low cost of borrowing.  
Housing associations had also relied on sales of units as well as rental as a source of income. 
The generalist nature of the service provision and the relatively small size of the private rented 
sector meant that historically there has been no stigma attaching to social housing, nor has there 
been any spatial segregation.  
Dutch residential rents are regulated and determined by the quality of the dwelling rather than 
the income of the household (Elsinga and Wassenberg, 2014). However, the long-term strategy 
of Government is to allow rents to rise towards market levels and to use housing allowances to 
improve affordability. The income limit to qualify for those allowances for a single-person 
household under 65 is €28,000 (CECOHDAS, 2013). A new levy on housing associations has 
been facilitated by permitting larger rent increases, meaning that rents in housing association 
dwellings are being pushed up with a view to getting closer to market rates.  
A full picture of the Dutch housing sector is not complete without a consideration of the effect 
of EU State Aid Rules. In 2005, Dutch private sector housing companies expressed concern to 
the EU Commission that housing associations were unfairly competing with them in expanding 
commercial house-building using State aid. State support for social housing is of course 
permitted by the EU as a service of general economic interest (SGEI) (European Commission, 
2009). However, it must not impede competition with the commercial sector. The Commission 
and the Dutch government agreed in 2009 to a new settlement whereby “social” housing was 
to be targeted at an income threshold of €33,000 maximum. Thus, the system could be said to 
have moved from a generalist to a targeted one. This also meant that housing association stock 
had to be divided into SGEI and non-SGEI stock. Housing associations are now obliged to 
offer 90% of their stock to applicants within a specified the income threshold (€34,085) (as of 
2017). The housing association sector has been under ongoing political pressure due to its 
116 
 
perceived scale and wealth, governance issues and that some households on higher incomes 
were availing of low rents. The thrust of reform has been to level the playing field with the 
private sector and to move away from the historic pattern of generalist provision.  
In tandem with these measures which have had the effect of enhancing the attractiveness of 
investment in private rental, the Government has also moved to create temporary tenancies 
which are more facilitative of the private sector. The Global Financial Crisis also had profound 
effects on mortgage availability in the Netherlands, further augmenting investment potential in 
the private rented sector. Changes to rules are also likely to see a growth in the number of 
properties given over to deregulated rents, and to the possibility of stock transfers to 
commercial actors (IFP, 2015). The strong creditworthiness of the sector has obviously made 
it attractive to lenders, and WSW report a small reduction in bank lending in 2013 with an 
increase in institutional funding (from 1.2% to 7.9%). The search for yield has forced 
institutional investors to look into new areas of which social housing presents one opportunity. 
For example, the Dutch Government in 2014 approved the disposal of a part of a portfolio of a 
failing housing association. Vestia, to a German private fund (Patrizia) with substantial 
institutional investors. Vestia, a very large housing association with over 80,000 units in its 
portfolio, found itself in deep financial trouble due to over-exposure to derivatives in a failed 
interest rate hedge strategy. As a result, the entity was forced to sell 5,500 units of its stock, 
which was was purchased by Patrizia.  
The funding environment for non-SGEI stock is more uncertain, as the guarantee element is 
not present, and the attraction of the sector comes from its relative security, stability and, by 
implication, its insulation from market risks. Institutional investment in rental housing has a 
long history in the Netherlands, comprising about 50% of institutional property portfolios. 
About 40% of the private rented sector proper is owned by institutional investors, largely 
targeted at higher income groups and the elderly. Bearing in mind that housing associations are 
actively involved in market housing, and routinely sell and trade stock both individually and in 
bulk, it is possible that more integrated systems of provision between housing associations and 
private funders will emerge as new models are developed for private and social stock, and 
whether for SGEI stock, the loan guarantee structures remain in place.  
As with other examples in this chapter and indeed with many housing systems around the 
world, Dutch social housing is in a state of flux, and while the general direction of travel 
appears to be towards a system more closely aligned with the market, and with increasing use 
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of wholly privately provided housing, it is difficult to discern what will emerge. In common 
with other European countries, property values were adversely affected by the Global Financial 
Crisis and mortgage lending has been tightened significantly. The interest of large German 
institutionally backed funds in the Vestia/Patrizia case points to a way forward for housing 
associations wishing to raise capital for further investment and development. However, it 
would appear likely that the more rewarding opportunities for such investment are likely to lie 
with upper or middle-income rental housing (IPF, 2015) rather than the traditional social 
housing that the sector has been built on.  
5.7 Switzerland 
Little international research has been undertaken into Swiss housing policy, and social housing 
in particular. It has been included in this brief survey of six countries because of the very high 
rate of institutional investment in rental housing, and because many of the factors that would 
appear conducive to institutional holding of social housing assets are present in the Swiss 
housing regulatory framework. In housing terms, Switzerland has the highest proportion of 
households renting from private landlords in Europe, and one of the highest in the world at 
more than 60% of the population Conversely, home-ownership rates are among the lowest in 
the developed world, as long-standing government policy has never sought to encourage the 
tenure by means of tax or other policy means. Lending practices have been stringent with a 
20% deposit required and debt service costs capped at 30% of income. This meant that Swiss 
residential property did not experience the sharp fluctuations in price that were experienced in 
other advanced economies like the US, UK and Ireland. Also, among the reasons cited for low 
rates of owner-occupation in Switzerland are the high quality of rental property and high levels 
of tenant protection. As the non-profit housing is not residualised, and barriers to entry for 
middle-income households are low, the non-profit sector is attractive (Bourassa et al, 2010). 
Indeed, institutional investors own 28% of the Swiss rental market, with 10% owned by 
pension funds. (Bourassa et al, 2010) and housing is the most important institutional real estate 
asset class at 52% of institutional property holdings.   
Social housing has largely been provided by indirect means through cheap loans, subsidies, 
and latterly via bond aggregation. The sector makes makes up about 7.5% of the total housing 
stock. Of this, more than half, 57% is owned by housing co-operatives, with the balance owned 
by other non-profit entities including municipal housing companies. There are approximately 
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1,500 non-profit housing bodies in Switzerland with most holding fewer than 100 dwellings, 
but with the larger entities managing up to 15,000 (Lawson, 2009). 
Low-income housing has generally been provided on a cost-rental basis with fluctuating levels 
of State and local government support. In common with most other European countries, 
industrialisation, urbanisation and the consequent poor housing conditions in the mid- to late-
nineteenth century led to efforts to improve the situation and provide housing for poorer 
households. However, there is little tradition of direct government financial support for such 
housing. Generally, early efforts emerged from trade unions and large enterprises providing 
co-operative housing, often assisted by municipal pension fund investment and indirect 
support. As Switzerland was not as adversely affected by either world wars, the massive 
building programmes that characterised post-war reconstruction efforts in Britain, the 
Netherlands and elsewhere were not mirrored in Switzerland. However, the high cost of 
construction after the second World War led to direct State grants to render new development 
viable. Various methods of assistance for the construction of social housing have been 
deployed in Switzerland since then, largely based on interest subsidies, cheap loans, and grants 
for time-limited cost rental housing.  
Under Art. 108 of the Swiss Constitution, the “activities of developers and organisations 
involved in the construction of public utility housing” are to be encouraged by the Federal 
government. Additionally, it is obliged to “take particular account of the interests of families, 
elderly persons, persons on low incomes and persons with disability”. There is also a specific 
Constitutional duty to legislate against unfair rents and other “abuses in tenancy matters”.  The 
Swiss social housing system is founded in a Housing Act of 2003 (the Federal Act for the 
promotion of Affordable Housing wohnraumförderungsgesetz (WFG)). This statute provides 
the legal underpinning for State support for non-profit housing, which as mentioned above is 
generally provided by co-operatives and other housing association type bodies. Support is 
provided through a working capital fund, a bond aggregator, and mortgage guarantee scheme.  
The working capital fund (fonds de roulement) is run by the non-profit housing sector. Loans 
are advanced at least 1.5% below commercial rates for the residual financing of housing 
projects. Further finance is advanced by banks with the benefit of a guarantee of up to 90% of 
loans, backed by a State guarantee fund. A further source of finance is a co-operative bond 
issuer (Emissionzentrale für gemeinnützige wohnbauträger). These bonds are also State-
guaranteed. For housing funded through these mechanisms, there are no specific stipulations 
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as to tenants. It is the sector that is regulated in terms of its non-profit mandate, its obligation 
to provide low-cost housing, and not to distribute any surplus. However, in practice, many non-
profit housing bodies, do impose maximum income limits or other conditions on tenants. There 
are requirements as to tenants in dwellings funded under an earlier law, where State subsidies 
were available for dwellings for low-income households.  
While there is no federal housing allowance or welfare payment, the Swiss cantons are obliged 
to provide social assistance and the general welfare payment system is taken to include housing 
costs. Wehrmüller (2014) reports than 12 of the 26 cantons offered further means-tested 
housing benefits in 2012. Furthermore, many sub-federal governments (cantons or cities) run 
housing support programmes, ranging from providing land to directly held housing. Geneva, 
for example owns 5,300 apartments for low income families with the rent determined according 
to income, while approximately a quarter of the housing stock in Zurich is owned by the 
municipality or a co-operative (Bourassa and Hoesli, 2006).  
Rents in Switzerland are unregulated, though tenants may challenge “unfair” rent increases.  
Of the six European countries examined in this Chapter, Switzerland has the lowest proportion 
of market renters experiencing a housing cost overburden, while for those renting free or at a 
reduced price, it is roughly in line with France, the UK and the Netherlands, though 
significantly higher than Ireland and lower than Germany (Eurostat, 2016a). As support for 
low-income housing is only available to non-profit bodies, and as the basis of the rent is 
generally cost-rental, there is little incentive for profit entities to become involved in this sector.  
Switzerland therefore represents an interesting case, where despite a well-developed and 
deeply rooted private rental markets and a generalist social housing tradition, there is a sharp 
bifurcation between the social and market rented sector in terms of the funders and investors 
and has continued with existing policy goals rather than attempting disruptive change that has 
characterised approaches to the delivery of social/affordable housing in other countries.  
5.8 Cross-country Comparisons, Private Sector Finance  
Following the individual country profiles (Sections 5.2 to 5.7) this section briefly summaries 
some key cross-cutting themes emerging from the country specific discussions relating to the 
role of private investment in the financing of social/affordable housing.  
The Australian and English cases illustrate Anglophone, common-law countries with much in 
common historically and culturally with Ireland. Both countries have liberal but small private 
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rented sectors, a high proportion of owner-occupiers, and both have in recent years aspired to 
bring institutional investment into rental housing. Despite these similarities, there are also 
widely divergent patterns of social housing, with Australia having a much smaller and latterly 
developed sector. The Australian private rented sector is less regulated than Ireland, but more 
so than the UK. Most investment is by small-scale investors and negative gearing is a 
significant factor in attracting investment to the sector however this has been controversial in 
the context of rapidly escalating house prices with capital gain a key motivation for investors.  
England’s private rented sector is one of the least regulated in Europe with relatively free 
bargaining power between landlord and tenant, free market rents, and little security of tenure. 
It is a sector that is growing in importance as fewer and fewer households find themselves able 
to access owner-occupation. Since the late 1980s, England has transformed its social housing 
system through the rapid development of a housing association sector that has developed 
sophisticated financial and treasury functions to the point where it can access capital market 
funding relatively easily. This pathway of transitioning from municipal provision to a not-for-
profit sector with the capacity to provide a large proportion of the social housing required has 
been pursued in Ireland, though much later and far less disruptively than in England. Bringing 
institutional investment to the private rental market in general has been a goal of English 
housing policy.  The strong regulatory structure, together with the track record of the sector 
and government backing means that the sector has been attractive both to bank lenders and to 
capital markets.  
The French system illustrates a heavily statist approach that nonetheless produces a sustainable 
and cheap method of housing delivery, through means that are not strictly “institutional” 
finance but which bear many of its characteristics. The “Livret A” public savings account is a 
unique and relatively successful means of funding housing provision whereby savers can avail 
of good interest rates and tax advantages, and the deposits are used to fund social housing. 
Unlike all of the other countries examined here, there is little private sector involvement in 
French social housing.  
In Germany, there is a highly developed and heavily regulated rental system in which the 
social/private divide is blurred, and where private finance and State supports work relatively 
harmoniously to provide housing. In Germany also, there is a relatively high level of 
121 
 
institutional investment in residential housing, though a low level of interest from such 
investors in social or low-income housing.  
The Netherlands and Switzerland have some of the highest levels of institutional investment in 
residential property in the world, but with very small allocations to social housing. In the 
Netherlands, while institutions have availed of disposals of social housing stock, investment 
has generally come indirectly via bonds. Dutch social housing is in a state of flux, and while 
the general direction of travel appears to be towards a system more closely aligned with the 
market, and with increasing use of wholly privately provided housing. The interest of large 
German institutionally backed funds points to a way forward for housing associations in the 
Netherlands wishing to raise capital for further investment and development.  
5.9 Conclusion 
The countries cited in this chapter represent a diverse selection of housing systems with varying 
traditions of housing and tenure types. In all but France and Switzerland, radical reforms have 
been attempted in the last 20 or 30 years with different levels of success. In general, the trend 
is away from State provision towards more private sector involvement in the funding of social 
housing. Of course, in all cases, this generally represents a shift from public capital expenditure 
on housing to revenue payments of one kind or another. The overall extent of the shift is harder 
to quantify due to different regimes operating across federal states like Germany, Switzerland 
and Australia and although variable between countries, for example England where change has 
been more profound and in the case of France much slower the Chapter illustrates that the same 
global forces of capitalism and the neoliberalising impulses appear across all jurisdictions, 
though particular responses are local and specific.  
In terms of institutional finance, no country can report a significant equity holding or pattern 
or investment in new social or affordable housing. In England and the Netherlands, relatively 
sophisticated housing association sectors can gain access to capital market funding through 
bond issues and other debt instruments (private placements) to develop and acquire new stock. 
In both Germany and the Netherlands, institutional-type entities have availed of stock transfer 
from public authorities or distressed portfolios, but in both cases, it appears that this is in 
anticipation of reversion to market rents or capital growth.  
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High levels of institutional investment in the private rented sector in Switzerland, the 
Netherlands and Germany appear to be driven by strong traditions of renting, highly regulated 
rental regimes and relatively high barriers to home ownership. In Australia, England, and 
Ireland where owner-occupation has been the traditionally dominant tenure, and where policy 
has encouraged home-ownership, institutional investment has been largely absent, or at best 
tentative. While there is a general growth in renting in these countries, it is far from certain 
whether this is a secular trend or whether it is a function of tight supply, low confidence, and 
constrained credit conditions.  
This chapter having examined international examples of social/affordable housing illustrates a 
growing trend towards greater involvement of the private sector funding.  Chapter six advances 
the thinking through the analysis of the investment performance of residential property as an 
















CHAPTER  6: INVESTMENT PERFORMANCE OF RESIDENTIAL PROPERTY 
6.1 Introduction 
As articulated at various stages throughout this thesis, in Ireland and also internationally, the 
trend is away from direct state provision of social housing towards more private sector 
participation. This represents a shift from public capital expenditure on social housing to a 
revenue-support approach utilising the private sector by direct or indirect payments. The 
underlying hypothesis that is implicit to this thesis is that Irish social and affordable housing 
should be amenable to institutional investment. This will require demonstrating to investors 
that the proposition can meet their expectations in terms risk-return, yield and liquidity.  
As any such investment in social and affordable housing will form part of a wider portfolio for 
institutions, the chapter initially examines theories of how institutional asset mix is determined. 
The chapter examines the performance of international and Irish property as an asset class, 
compares the performance of residential as against commercial property and considers the 
investment characteristics of residential property. Specifically, the chapter seeks to address the 
fifth objective of the thesis namely to explore the characteristics and investment performance 
of residential property as income-producing asset class.  The chapter includes two surveys of 
Irish institutional property investment managers. The first establishes that apart from a small 
number of new REIT investors, institutional investment in residential rental property is 
virtually non-existent. The second discerns from seven of the largest Irish pension funds their 
attitude to possible investment in the sector and investing in a fund holding State-supported 
housing.  
 
The chapter is structured as follows.  Section 6.2 considers the theoretical basis for property 
investment. Section 6.3 provides an analysis of residential property investment performance 
using international evidence and Section 6.4 extends the discussion to include an assessment 
of the investment performance of the Irish residential sector. Section 6.5 focuses on 
institutional perspectives concerning the investment potential of social/affordable housing in 
Ireland.  Section 6.6 presents key conclusions on the analysis stemming from this chapter and 




6.2 Theoretical basis for property investment 
Typically, property as an asset class along with equities and bonds is a key component of 
institutional investment portfolios but has distinctive risk and return characteristics that are 
considered to bring diversification benefits (Ball et al, 1998).  Investments in direct or indirect 
real estate have been shown to provide return enhancements and risk diversification benefits to 
investors’ portfolios. The weight of research has focused in the main upon commercial property 
(Baum, 2009) within institutional portfolios with more limited contribution on residential 
property.  However, the theoretical underpinning regarding investment performance of both 
sectors is essentially based on the same principles stemming from Modern Portfolio Theory 
(MPT) and the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM).   
According to MPT, total risk depends on two factors: the risk (variance) of the individual assets 
in the portfolio and the co-variance of each of the assets (the way each asset behaves relative 
to another). Thus assets that have a low correlation or negative correlation yield diversification 
benefits when combining the assets in a portfolio. In this context, Markowitz proposed a 
“portfolio perspective” to investing where portfolio selection is based on overall risk-reward 
characteristics rather than simply compiling a portfolio of securities with individually attractive 
risk-reward characteristics.  MPT is based on the assumption that investors are risk-averse and 
seek to maximise returns with portfolios constructed on the basis of risk appetite and 
positioning on the efficient frontier.  
One of the key assumptions of MPT is that markets are perfectly efficient. However, the crux 
of the problem is that financial markets are not informationally efficient. In other words, an 
investor cannot consistently achieve excess returns over the average market return on a risk-
adjusted basis, given the information available at the time. According to the Efficient Market 
Hypothesis (EMH) (Fama, 1972) there are three forms of the EMH:  weak, semi-strong and 
strong. The three forms are defined with respect to the available information that is reflected 
in market prices. If investors could trade on information that was not already priced into the 
market price, then they could earn excess risk-adjusted returns arising from information 
asymmetry.  
The Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), developed independently by a number of high 
profile economists (for example Tryenor and Sharpe) builds on the foundations established by 
MPT and was designed to provide a theoretical framework for the pricing of assets. CAPM 
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introduces the concept of a risk-free asset and proposes the Security Market Line which allows 
for the reduction of risk by adding or borrowing at the risk-free rate. As with MPT, CAPM 
describes the relationship between expected return and risk. CAPM decomposes risk into 
systematic risk (non-diversifiable) and unsystematic risk (diversifiable). Under the 
assumptions of CAPM, the investor holds a well-diversified portfolio such that unsystematic 
risk is eliminated and that which remains is systematic risk measured by the β (beta) of the 
stock(s). CAPM asserts that the required rate of return on a risky asset is a function of the risk-
free rate, the expected excess return of the market over the risk free rate and the sensitivity of 
the stock to the market as measured by beta (risk). In other words, the higher the beta, the 
higher the expected return as an investor will require additional compensation for holding a 
riskier asset. 
Given the complexity and specific characteristics of property namely heterogeneity, fixed 
location, unit value, borrowing, long-term nature of the holding, management, the market cycle 
and supply, depreciation, price determination and illiquidity (Hoesli and MacGregor, 2000) 
and the nuances of MPT and CAPM an institutional investor  may seek to diversity exposure 
through direct and/or indirect  investment such as shares or units in a quoted Company (REIT, 
Property Unit Trust, unlisted fund/vehicle or derivative). However, as articulated earlier in this 
section the focus has been on commercial real estate and the benefits of investing into the 
residential sector and including housing in institutional portfolios has been generally under-
researched.  In this context, one of the leading papers that considers housing investment in an 
institutional portfolio is that advanced by Montezuma (2004) who is of the opinion that the 
extent to which housing markets and capital markets are causally related has significant 
implications for effective portfolio diversification strategies.   
In particular, Montezuma identified that investors have the opportunity to exploit differences 
in risk-adjusted returns across respective asset classes including residential property and argued 
that institutional investors start to consider housing as part of their portfolios depending upon 
the degree of integration between housing markets and capital markets once this exceeds a 
minimum level for the particular country in question. Montezuma noted that housing markets 
diverge from capital markets in a number of significant ways arising from government 
intervention, illiquid and heterogeneous investments, expensive information and complex 
pricing processes.  These attributes were seen as making it impossible to have an accurate 
housing market value and hence diminish the attractiveness of residential property in a 
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portfolio. Thus Montezuma considers that securitised residential assets present several 
advantages for investors compared to direct investment and that a consequence of institutional 
investment in the rented residential sector will be the development of new products/vehicles 
and better market efficiency arising from the availability of systematic information about 
housing markets. Furthermore, the paper suggests that institutional allocation can be best 
considered in an asset-liability context as the mean-variance model advocated by Markowitz 
ignores the presence of liabilities in the decision-making process.  It is also argued that the 
market must be of a sufficient critical size to deliver diversification benefits, a factor that is 
currently inhibiting institutional investment in the private rental sector. The latter is also 
constrained by the ability to demonstrate that housing will improve risk-adjusted returns above 
that already possible through investment into the retail, office and industrial sectors of the 
property market. Nevertheless, Montezuma (2004) concludes that residential property does 
offer an alternative to institutional investors who are looking to hedge against changes in bonds 
and equities and that low correlation between residential and commercial property may provide 
added diversification benefits to portfolios. 
Giannotti and Mattarocci (2008) also voice criticism of the Markowitz model in simplifying 
selection of real estate investments from a portfolio perspective, weaknesses that partly stem 
from the model itself but which are also partly attributable to the characteristics of property 
and the peculiarities of the real estate market. The authors argue that tenant, exogenous, 
endogenous and financial risks can impact differently on the risk-return profile of single assets 
or whether within a larger mixed-asset portfolio. Specific constraints of the mean-variance 
model were seen to stem from differences between real estate and financial markets, the 
distribution of real estate returns with the assumption that they conform with a normal 
distribution challenged, and the application of property indices based on either a low number 
of heterogeneous transactions or appraisal/valuation based with a smoothing of returns series. 
Similarly, it was argued that the efficient frontier model is highly sensitive to expected returns 
errors and any change in input data may alter the composition of the portfolio or the risk /return 
ratio.  
The literature reviewed in this section serves to show the complexity faced by potential 
investment in the residential sector per se, problems which become more compounded when 
applied to the affordable/social housing sector.  It is apparent that the underlying theoretical 
base has weaknesses and when coupled with the peculiarities of property and a relatively thin 
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level of information making the case for enhanced institutional investment in sector is difficult. 
Nevertheless, there are examples in the literature showing that residential property can 
contribute to portfolio returns. For example, Goetzmann and Ibbotson (1990) found that the 
total return (income and capital appreciation) of US housing markets outperformed bonds but 
underperformed equities, Newell and Kamineni (2007) showed that in India on a risk-return 
basis that Mumbai residential was amongst the best performing real estate sectors in mixed-
asset portfolios and that diversification benefits have been evident for office, retail and 
residential real estate.   
The next two sections of this chapter using returns data for the residential sector derived from 
a number of sources, particularly MSCI/IPD, analyses firstly at an international level (Section 
6.3) and secondly from an Irish context (Section 6.4) whether acceptable investment returns 
are possible from residential property. 
6.3 Comparison of Returns in the Residential Sector with All Property Types 
For affordable/social housing to be investable, the risk/return characteristics of the sector need 
to be comparable with investment benchmarks in other asset classes and potentially superior 
than that achieved for other property types. Unfortunately, there is a major data constraint 
regarding such evidence with the best data on the sector at an international level being that 
available for the wider residential sector from MSCI/IPD. Furthermore, this provision is limited 
to a number of countries with annual time series data available from the early 2000s. Hence in 
analysing the performance of residential property against all property (the commercial property 
sector) this thesis explores 15 Year annualised return series from 2002 to 2016 inclusive 
reflecting long-term performance to match the characteristics of the housing sector.  
Importantly, the time series selected captures the property market boom of the early to mid-
2000s, the impact of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) and the subsequent recovery period.  
The countries selected are designed to overlap with the international examples used in Chapter 
5 with the exception of Australia, which is excluded due to the absence of a residential total 
returns time series by MSCI for that country, but including a number of additional countries 
namely Canada, the US, Denmark, Finland and Sweden giving a total of ten countries.  Total 
return data are used rather than property indices for this stage of the analysis and total return is 
also broken down into its component parts (capital growth and income). 
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Comparative analysis of residential property against all property shows an inconsistent pattern 
across the ten countries considered but significantly in the case of six countries there is 
evidence of out-performance by the former (Figure 6.1).  Of particular importance is that of 
the UK, given the historical ties between the UK and Ireland (Chapter 3), the similarity of 
institutional structures, ownership rights and the operation of the property market. For the 15 
Year annualised return, residential property (10.6%) is significantly greater than that for all 
property (8.4%) underwriting the potential for housing to be a viable asset class or sub-class 
within the investment universe.  In the Nordic countries, Sweden (10.1% residential, 8.0% all 
property), Finland (8.4% residential, 6.4% all property) and Denmark (9.4% residential, 7.4% 
all property) similar differentials are apparent with on average residential property out-
performing all property by circa 2%. Germany has a similar pattern with 15 Year annualised 
returns for residential (6.3%) outperforming all property (4.1%).  For Switzerland the 
difference between the respective returns for residential property (6.2%) and all property 
(6.1%) is nominal and not statistically significant. Of the four countries showing a higher 15 
Year annualised performance for all property, that for the Netherlands is marginal (6.1% 
compared with 6.2%) and only slightly greater for France (8.2 compared with 8.9%). For the 
two North American examples, the US showed the same performance returns as France (8.2% 
residential, 8.9% all property) while Canada has the greatest under-performance by residential 
(9.4%) compared to 10.6% for all property. 
Figure 6 .1 Comparison of 15-Year annualised total return residential versus total return all 
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Total return evidence from selected international countries strongly suggests that residential 
property can either outperform or equal that for all property and hence provide a realistic 
investment opportunity for institutional investors. On a risk adjusted basis, while the relative 
position of countries change somewhat a broadly similar picture is apparent. The return per 
unit of risk for residential property is greatest for Switzerland (5.1) and Finland (4.9) although 
the former lags the return per unit of risk for all property (7.6) while for the latter the return per 
unit of risk for all property is lower (3.3).  Overall, for five of the selected countries – Canada, 
Finland, Germany, Sweden and UK residential property has a better return per unit of risk than 
all property and a sixth, France shows the same return/risk profile for both residential and all 
property (Table 6.1).   
Table 6.1 Total return, risk and return per unit of risk, residential property and all property 
selected countries, 15-year annualised figures 

















Canada 9.4 4.2 2.2 10.6 5.4 1.9 
Denmark 9.4 10.7 0.9 7.4 4.6 1.6 
Finland 8.4 1.7 4.9 6.4 1.9 3.3 
France 8.2 5.6 1.5 8.9 6.2 1.5 
Germany 6.3 2.8 2.3 4.1 2.3 1.8 
NL 6.1 4.8 1.3 6.2 4.1 1.5 
Sweden  10.1 4.8 2.1 8.0 5.9 1.4 
Switzerland 6.2 1.2 5.1 6.1 0.8 7.6 
UK 10.6 7.0 1.5 8.4 10.6 0.8 
US 8.2 10.9 0.8 8.9 9.7 0.9 
 
Total returns of residential property are characterised by considerable volatility over the 15-
year period, mostly associated with the boom period pre 2007 and the consequences of the 
GFC in 2007-2009 (Figure 6.2). The effects of the latter are particularly apparent in the US 
with sharp negative returns for consecutive years culminating in 2009 (return -21.2%) but 
rebounding sharply in 2010. Curiously, the Danish market is characterised by high volatility 
with very strong positive annual total return of 38.1% in 2005 dropping into negative territory 
in 2008. In the post GFC period, total returns, although varying across the countries, are much 





Figure 6.2   Total return annualised residential property, selected countries 
 
These volatility figures reflected in the high levels of risk, measured by the standard deviation 
of the return series, are apparent in a number of countries noticeably the US (10.9) Denmark 
(10.7) and to a lesser extent the UK market (Table 6.1). The lowest levels of absolute risk are 
apparent for Switzerland (1.2) and Finland (1.7). In comparison in the all property sector, the 
UK (10.6) and the US (9.7) have the highest risk levels 10.6 and 9.7 respectively again 
capturing the impact of the GFC on the property market in these countries. For the UK, 
seemingly much higher risk was apparent for all property than residential during this period. 
Overall, five countries have lower values of absolute risk for residential versus all property 
again reflecting the potential investment appeal of this sector of the market.   
Disaggregating total return into its components of capital growth and income return shows a 
considerable divergence between the selected countries regarding which is the dominant 
element in driving performance (Table 6.2).  The expectation that capital growth is the key 
driver is only apparent to any significant extent in the UK, Sweden and Denmark and to a lesser 
degree for France. In the other countries, income return is the driver of performance.   This is 
particularly the case in both the North American countries but also in Switzerland, Finland, 
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Table 6.2 Total return, capital growth and income return 15-year averages (2002-2016), 
selected countries 
Country  Total return % Capital growth % Income return % 
Canada 9.4 3.4 5.8 
Denmark 9.4 5.7 3.4 
Finland 8.4 2.7 5.5 
France 8.2 4.5 3.5 
Germany 6.3 2.0 4.2 
NL 6.1 1.8 4.2 
Sweden  10.1 6.1 3.7 
Switzerland 6.2 1.6 4.6 
UK 10.6 7.0 3.3 
US 8.2 2.8 5.3 
 
Seemingly there is no clear pattern in the relationship between countries and the respective 
components of total return (Figure 6.3) though it is apparent that where total return is high as 
in the case of the UK, Sweden and Denmark, capital growth likewise is high and exceeds 
income return. Likewise, those countries with lower total returns such as Germany, the 
Netherlands and Switzerland are also characterised by low rates of capital growth over the 15 
year return series. However, this is a generalised picture to which Canada, the US and Finland 
in particular do not conform.  
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The analysis of capital growth patterns over the 15-year time horizon highlights much greater 
volatility and cyclical effects, notably the negative impact of the GFC on capital returns. 
Significantly in the case of the UK, Denmark and Sweden countries in which capital growth 
was shown to be the key driver of total return strong levels of volatility are apparent, notably 
for Demark where capital growth was skewed by the 2005 figure of 33.7% and falling rapidly 
to negative capital growth of 9.2% in 2008. Similarly, the UK although experiencing more 
modest capital growth on the up-cycle of 14.9% in 2006 showed a negative capital growth of 
14.7% in 2008.  The most dramatic negative capital growth occurred in the US with the 2009 
figure of -25.4%, clearly this high level of volatility is impacting upon the capital growth 
contribution to total return.  
Figure 6.4 Capital growth residential property 2002-2016, selected countries 
 
Income return, in accordance with theory and expectations, across all countries is much less 
volatile reflecting the security of income streams from lease agreements. However, over the 
time period all countries are displaying a general downward trend in income return from 
residential properties. In the case of Canada this element has declined from 7.3% in 2002 to 
4.3% in 2016 and for Switzerland from 5.2% to 3.9%. The UK displays a more variable picture 
though starts and finishes the time series with a 3.2% income return.  The US displays the 
greatest volatility in income returns ranging from 7.1% in 2002, declining to 4.2% in 2008 and 
although recovering to 5.9% in 2011, by 2016 the income return had reduced to 4.4%.  Thus, 
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growth is nevertheless indicating a downward shift but tending to flat-line from circa 2012 to 
2016 which is well illustrated by the UK example.   
Figure 6.5 Income return residential property 2002-2016, selected countries 
 
The above analysis is based on 15-Year annualised returns to reflect the likelihood of a long-
term holding period for residential property. However, comparison with 10 Year, 5 Year and 3 
Year annualised figures shows varying performance of residential investments by country 
depending on the time-period and the varying impacts of the GFC on the respective economies 
(Table 6.3). Thus, over the 10-year period, performance returns dipped in several countries 
most notably the US, the UK, France and Denmark. Significantly a number of countries have 
shown strong growth in residential total returns over the 3-year (2014-2016) and 5-year (2012-
2016) time periods. In this context double digit returns are apparent for Sweden, Denmark and 
the Netherlands with Germany showing stronger 3- and 5-year returns (9.3%) compared to the 
15-year time horizon. A feature of this analysis is that a number of other countries have been 
highly consistent in terms of performance returns over the four time periods, for example 
Finland and Switzerland. In the case of the UK, despite the impact of the GFC, returns in the 
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Table 6.3 Annualised residential total return 15 Year, 10 Year, 5 Year and 3 Year, selected 
countries  
Country  15 Year %     10 Year % 5 Year % 3 Year %  
Canada 9.4 9.5 10.0 7.9 
Denmark 9.4 4.2 8.8 10.9 
Finland 8.4 8.9 8.3 8.2 
France 8.2 5.9 4.5 3.8 
Germany 6.3 7.5 9.3 9.3 
NL 6.1 4.5 6.1 10.0 
Sweden  10.1 8.6 9.7 11.5 
Switzerland 6.2 6.8 7.4 7.6 
UK 10.6 8.4 9.8 9.2 
US 8.2 5.4 9.3 8.7 
 
Property, as argued in the literature review section of chapter (Section 6.2), brings 
diversification benefits to institutional portfolios however the analysis shows that residential 
investment does not bring any further enhanced investment gains in this respect.  Correlations 
between residential investment returns and that for all property in each of the comparator 
countries are strongly positive (Table 6.4) in particular for the US (0.97), the Netherlands (0.94) 
and France (0.92). For the UK, a reasonably strong correlation (0.75) is apparent. Only Finland 
(correlation 0.45) had a low correlation suggesting the potential for further diversification from 
investing in residential relative to other property types for this country alone.  
Table 6.4 Correlation coefficients between residential and all property, selected countries 














Before leaving this section on investment, it is noteworthy that despite the low yields and the 
relatively low rates of rental growth report, the sum of €38 billion was invested in the 
residential sector in Europe (JLL, 2017).  
 Table 6.5 Quantum of Institutional Investment in Residential Rental Housing (JLL, 2017) 
Country Quantum of investment 
Germany €13.7bn  
Sweden  €7.8bn 
Denmark €3.5bn 
Holland €3bn 
Finland  €2.8bn 






Thus, a huge level of investment is going into European residential investment and for such 
investors the low-income returns is not a disincentive. 
By way of comparison, in the USA, $90.5bn of multifamily investment properties traded which 
was down slightly from $96.9bn in 2016 (REA, 2018). The growth and change in the volume 
of residential investment in the USA over the past 10 years is shown below. 
Table 6.6 Quantum of Institutional Investment in Residential Rental Housing, USA, 2007–2017 
(REA, 2017) 
Year Quantum of investment 
2007 $41.1bn 
2008 $20.1 bn 
2009 $6.6 bn 
2010 $19.5 bn 
2011 $32.9 bn 
2012 $42.8 bn 
2013 $49.4 bn 
2014 $66.7 bn 
2015 $88.2 bn 
2016 $96.9 bn 




An   interesting inputs from the same sources is that in the USA there was an almost an identical 
level of investment in offices as in residential with €93.4 billion of office transactions in 
2017. Access is not available to similar statistics for Europe. 
6.4 Irish Residential Investment Performance   
In contrast to the international examples, the evidence base for Ireland concerning the 
investment performance of residential property is appreciably weaker. Although MSCI/IPD 
have been producing a quarterly time-series for Ireland since 1998, this has focused almost 
entirely upon the traditional sectors of the commercial property market and to date has not yet 
produced a residential index for Ireland though some residential return data are available as 
referenced in this section. This is reflective of the relatively small percentage of institutional 
investment in the residential property sector in Ireland (less than 1%) whereas in Switzerland 
this amounts to 47% and in the Netherlands 46%.  In terms of other European countries 
considered in Section 6.3, residential property constitutes 18% of institutional portfolios in 
Finland, 12% in France, Germany and Sweden, 10% in Denmark and 4% in the UK (IPD, 
2014).   
The data deficit for Irish residential property means that the analysis in this section has had to 
draw largely upon information on yields, rather than total return, from agents’ reports and 
discussions with key actors in the sector. In this regard, it was the opinion that whilst most 
investors focus on the combined capital-income yield, others were interested in income only as 
the key performance indicator.  It was the opinion that with interest rates at their historic low 
levels since 2008, coupled with low bond yields and a low inflationary environment, lower-
yielding investments are more attractive than formerly, particularly if they have potential for 
growth in line with, or ahead of inflation. Property yields in stable markets have been slower 
to fall than bond yields however, in Ireland, yields across all property sectors have varied 
enormously. For example, in Dublin 1 (city centre north and docklands including IFSC) the net 
income yield is 5.9% and the gross initial yield is 8.2% whereas, in Limerick in the Southwest 
of Ireland the respective yields are 7.8% and 11.1%.    
Focussing specifically on the residential rental sector, a report by Goodbody (Lauder, 2017) 
using MSCI data shows an annualised 5 Year (2012-2017) total return of 15.6% compared to 
offices at 21%, retail at 15.5% and industrial at 15.4% (Table 6.6). However, in comparison 
with the international examples (Table 6.3), the 5 Year annualised returns for residential 
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property in Ireland seemingly appears to outperform the selected international examples in 
terms of total return. 
Table 6.7 Property performance indicators for Ireland (source Goodbody/MSCI) 
Property sector Annualised 5 year 
total return (%) 
Risk (sd) Return/risk 
All property 18.6 12.1 1.5 
Retail 15.5 11.6 1.3 
Office  21.0 13.1 1.6 
Industrial 15.4 6.9 2.2 
Residential  15.6 11.3 1.4 
 
This analysis indicates that in terms of total return the performance of residential property lags 
the office sector but is highly comparable to the retail and industrial sectors. Examining 
performance in index terms since 2011, the office sector clearly leads, retail and industrial 
property show a largely parallel performance, whilst residential property due to a decline in the 
index in 2012 and 2013 seemingly under-performs relative to the mainstream commercial 
property sectors (Figure 6.6).   
Fig 6.6 Index-based investment performance of the office, retail, industrial and residential 
sectors in Ireland, 2011-2017 
 
The data highlights the strong recovery of all property sectors in Ireland following severe 
negative returns in the aftermath of the GFC. Whilst the 5 Year return performance for 
residential property in Ireland suggest that good levels of risk-adjusted return are possible, the 
market has been subject to cyclicality. The latter is highlighted by sharply falling rents and 
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yields moving out in the depth of the recession (Figure 6.7) resulting in a fall in capital values 
and with demand returning in 2013, rents started rising, yields returned to pre-recession levels. 
Fig 6.7 Irish property yields and returns Q3 2011 to Q2 2017 (source Goodbody, CSO, Daft.ie) 
   
Whilst, the analysis for Ireland is indicative of high rates of total return, annualised over the 5-
year period, these have been matched by high levels of volatility in the returns series and high 
risk (Table 6.6). Hence, on a risk-adjusted basis, the interpretation is less favourable with 
residential property (1.4) significantly underperforming industrial property (2.2), slightly 
below offices (1.6) but above retail (1.3).  
Furthermore, comparison of the performance of the residential sector in Ireland against the 
selected international countries (Table 6.8) indicates that although 5 Year annualised total 
return for Ireland (15.6%) significantly exceeds all other countries, Canada being the closest 
(10%), the risk factor (11.3) in Irish residential equally outstrips all other countries.  The 
country with the next highest risk over the 5 year period is the Netherlands with a risk of 6.2. 
Hence, in terms of the risk-adjusted performance, Ireland (1.4 units of return per unit of risk) 
is next to bottom of the comparator countries. Whilst Finland (20.7) is an exception (20.7) over 
this five-year period, all other European countries have appreciably better risk-adjusted 
performance, for example Sweden (3.3), the UK (3.6), France (3.8) and Germany (6.2).  Thus 
it would appear that the high level of risk is a significant issue for institutional investment in 
the residential sector in Ireland and undoubtedly the risk factor will be greater for the 
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Table 6.8 Comparison of 5-Year annualised return, risk and return/risk for residential 
properties, Ireland and selected countries 
Country 5 Year annualised return (%) Risk (sd) Return/risk 
Ireland  15.6 11.3 1.4 
Canada  10.0 3.5 2.8 
Denmark  8.8 3.1 2.8 
Finland  8.3 0.4 20.7 
France  4.5 1.2 3.8 
Germany  9.3 1.5 6.2 
Netherlands  6.3 6.2 1.0 
Sweden  9.7 3.0 3.3 
Switzerland  7.4 0.9 7.9 
UK  9.8 2.8 3.6 
USA  9.3 1.7 5.4 
 
6.5 Social/Affordable Housing Investment: Institutional Perspectives 
The analysis presented in Sections 6.3 and 6.4, focusing on performance returns and risk both 
in an international and Irish context, largely captures the private rented sector rather than the 
investment potential of social/affordable housing. Thus this section shifts the focus towards 
views expressed by key players in the Irish residential market and with specific consideration 
given to investment in the social/affordable housing sector.  The first set of discussions set out 
to establish the perceptions of Irish institutional investors (excluding pension funds) to 
investment in residential property. Conducted with stake-holders at chief executive/director 
level, this round of interviews targeted eight leading institutional investors in Ireland and their 




Table 6.9 Summary of Irish Institutional Investor attitudes to residential property  
Irish Institutional Investor Survey: Attitudes to Residential Investment 
Institution Interviewee  Current 
residential 
holdings 
Comment  Social housing 
portfolio content  
Irish Life  Chief property 
officer  





Iput   CEO Nominal  No interest 












Chairman  Nil  Not 
interested 
in sector  
NA 









COO 1300 and growing We like 
the sector  
Only small 
fractional holding: 
2% or 3% max 
Friends 
First  





Head of Property 
Investment  




These interviews confirmed that residential holdings are only fractional with a very low level 
of interest in the sector. This is highlighted by 50% of the top institutions/vehicles not interested 
in residential investment and, a further company, Irish Life, had previously exited from 
residential investments meaning that only three of the eight institutions are actively interested 
in this sector, all of which are REIT structures and relatively new players in the investment 
property market in Ireland.  For example, IRES REIT, a specialist in residential rental property 
floated in April 2014, raised over €350m on the stock market and since has been actively 
acquiring rental homes, and currently has a portfolio of approximately 2,400 units in Dublin 
(IRES, 2018). IRES REIT reported a gross yield on its assets of 6.6% at end 2016 with property 
management costs of 78.8% implying a net yield of 5.2%. A recent portfolio transaction by 
IRES REIT reported an acquisition of a portfolio of 700 units at a gross yield of 5.1% but it is 
believed that the portfolio was significantly reversionary and increases in rental income could 
be expected.  An interesting aspect of the acquisitions by the IRES REIT is the sharp difference 
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in the gross yields secured for the transactions in 2014 compared to those in 2016 (Table 6.10). 
These differences are primarily attributable to location and nature of the asset in terms of 
property characteristics. The average price paid in the first three deals was €309,000 whereas 
the last three averaged €218,000.  
Table 6.10 IRES REIT transactions 2014-2016 
Date Location  Number  Gross yield  Unit price € 
Oct 2014 Various suburbs  761 5.20% 360,151  
April 2014 Marker CBD  84 5.07 231,548  
April 2015 Rockbrook  270 5.20% 335,556  
May 2015 Inchicore 92 7.50% 211,413  
Jan 2016 Tallaght  442 7.40% 187,783  
April 2016 City sq. Dublin 2 23 7.50% 256,522  
 
Two other REITS, Hibernia and Kennedy Wilson, have also become involved in the sector, 
owning about 2,000 units between them. Hibernia REIT plc holds a residential portfolio of 309 
units. At end March 2017, Hibernia’s residential portfolio was worth €116m and comprised 
309 units. The net passing rent on these was €5.2m which implies a net initial yield of 4.6%. 
Kennedy Wilson report a weighted average yield of 5% on their diverse portfolio of residential 
assets in Ireland. NAMA also established a specialist residential investment vehicle, similar in 
many characteristics to an institutional investment vehicle, which holds about 2,000 units 
leased as social housing to AHBs.  
The second survey focused specifically on pension funds in Ireland to ascertain the views and 
attitudes of this sector regarding an investment offer based on social and affordable housing. 
The interviews were conducted with trustees or in-house investment managers of seven of the 
largest Irish pension funds. Typically, these were defined benefit funds, though some are now 
hybrid schemes. The approach adopted was based on a series of questions designed to produce 
a semi-structured interview format permitting respondents to further elaborate. The interviews 
were conducted in partnership by the researcher and an experienced adviser to the pensions 
industry who had a high degree of familiarity with the funds and their requirements. This 
provided the respondents with an interlocutor who understood their business and its concerns. 
The interviewer was instructed as to the purpose of the survey, and the significance of each of 
the survey questions. The questions were aimed to validate and assess the relative importance 
of issues identified in the literature and to elicit an understanding of the requirements of 
putative investors in the Fund model. There were other benefits to using a third party to conduct 
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the interviews. First, as the interviewer emphasised that he was not a promoter or advocate for 
the idea of investing in social and affordable housing, respondents could speak candidly. 
Second, the industry is naturally cautious and conservative, and would be most unwilling to 
engage in a “sales pitch” environment without a clear offer. Assurances of confidentiality and 
anonymity were made to all respondents.  
Specifically, the interview process allowed respondents to elaborate on their views and follow-
up questions were used to facilitate an understanding of the rationale for their responses. This 
format also permitted respondents to focus on aspects of interest to their respective funds, rather 
than insisting on undue concentration on points that were of more marginal interest to 
respondents. The premise of the interviews was that if an opportunity to invest in social and 
affordable housing arose, what considerations and requirements of pension funds in this 
context.   A short one-page summary of the DADF offer was included with the request to 
participate. Interviews lasted around 60–90 minutes. The questions were centred on the 
following issues:  
• Type of investment instrument (fund/vehicle Structure, liquidity and investment 
return); 
• State involvement (whether by way of guarantee/underwrite/Step-in 
arrangement); 
• Pension Authority approval for risk reserve purposes;  
• ISIF involvement; 
• Any other considerations. 
As to the type of instrument that might be used to channel funding into the proposition, there 
was a unanimous view that a long dated, index-linked bond instrument would have attraction.  
In particular, linkage to Irish inflation which is not otherwise available, would be attractive 
even if this linkage is “dirty” and may be subject to lags. 
Fund A pointed to the successful UK model for “Secure Income Assets”, real estate or 
infrastructure projects which provide contractual long-term and inflation-linked income 
streams supported by high quality counterparties and with strong asset backing. These have 
been very successful and some Irish funds and the investment advisory community are familiar 
with them. Fund A also pointed to the potential for an amortising bond which would release 
capital for the investors over time. The property in this instance could revert to the local 
authority at the end of the lease but the lender is increasingly collateralised as the (long) lease 
progresses. Two of the interviewees pointed to the attraction of regular annual income both in 
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meeting their requirements for cash flows and for providing an element of liquidity. Fund B 
suggested a bond with an equity kicker.  
There was no explicit preference expressed for any specific vehicle type, whether for a limited 
company or alternative investment fund.  Two interviewees expressed a clear preference for a 
closed-end structure. Fund G saw a closed-end solution as facilitating exit. Fund A felt that a 
closed-end structure would accommodate a phased investment in the underlying assets by 
seeking commitments from investors which could then be drawn down as properties are 
developed. This could be an efficient way for investors to place their funds. 
Fund G said that they could see an attraction in successive tranches of fundraising with new 
sub-funds being launched after the first was up and running. Fund G also expressed concerns 
over a potentially long pipeline from initial commitment of monies to the Fund to the first 
receipt of interest/dividends by the investor. This fund would not be comfortable giving open-
ended or long term (more than one year) commitments to invest. Any such commitments given 
might have an expiry date. 
Contrary to expectations, liquidity was not a significant concern. Most funds believed that their 
highly-diversified portfolios with substantial exposure to liquid assets enabled them to include 
some proportion of illiquid assets in their strategies. One fund was a significant user of 
derivatives which releases capital, and was not therefore liquidity-constrained, and the fund 
was happy to hold illiquid assets provided it received the appropriate liquidity premium. Funds 
continuing to experience positive cash flows were less concerned about liquidity than other 
more mature funds. One fund was doubtful that there was much scope to add liquidity to a bond 
type instrument but nevertheless felt that liquidity was not a constraint provided it was 
compensated for and that the annual income provides an element of liquidity. Another 
respondent expressed the view that a collectivised vehicle over time would lend itself to adding 
liquidity. One respondent posited the view that a project of this nature could be attractive to 
European investors on a five-year view and this could provide an exit. 
All funds, except one, reacted favourably to the suggestion that expected returns were of the 
order of 4% + in real terms. A further fund considered that IPUT as a realistic comparator, 
currently providing an income yield of 4.2%, which is regarded as inflation protected though 
not inflation linked. The pension funds would expect DADF to provide a higher yield (in the 
range of 5–5.5% real) though they might accept lower yield if a substantial degree of 
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government underpinning of the DADF cash flows could be agreed. Fund A mentioned that 
the success of the UK model has pushed yields down to 3% real.  
Clearly a dividend paying, real return of 4%+ is attractive in the current low interest rate, low 
bond yield environment. Nevertheless, investors expect to be compensated for any risks they 
take and to receive a premium return when any of the ideal elements that they require from an 
investment are not fully present. Fund A summarised this very clearly: the ideal opportunity is 
a long-term, inflation linked, sovereign-backed project. This might currently return 3% real.  
Unsurprisingly, all interviewees agreed that the involvement of the State whether directly or 
via the local authorities would be a significant advantage both in smoothing the way for 
Pensions Authority approval for ranking the DADF bond for risk reserve purposes and indeed 
for lowering the expected return on the bond. One respondent observed that it would be 
important to make the cash flows appear as “government-esque” as possible. Apart from the 
Fund which because of its use of derivatives has no concerns over the minimum funding 
standard, all other respondents cited Pensions Authority approval as a significant attraction, 
though a number of funds were sceptical of the Authority’s willingness to make any such 
decisions. 
There was general agreement that ISIF involvement as a co-investor would be a significant 
advantage. There is a high regard amongst the pension funds for ISIF’s investment capabilities 
and resources. Whilst agreeing they would need to do their own due diligence on the proposal, 
respondents would take comfort from the fact that ISIF was also participating. One respondent 
observed that ISIF participation could deliver critical mass. However, all respondents were 
positive about the proposed DADF approach to the various operational and execution risks 
attaching to the project. Two funds pointed to political risk should the political climate change 
and to the reputational risk that could arise with any evictions of tenants or similar events that 
could transpire in the future. 
Operational risk and management of the project were raised as issues by four of the funds. One 
respondent considered that there is a high level of execution risk involved because of the 
number of players – tenants/AHBs/ local authorities/builders/DADF. Another observed that 
the funds would expect operational management to be effective but that there should not be 
“too many people in the middle”. Another respondent emphasised that in respect of 
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governance/costs/fees the offering to investors must be clear, clean and transparent. The clarity 
of the project was an attraction for Fund G. 
There is clearly a concern in the minds of respondents around the cost, in terms of time and 
resources, of due diligence. ISIF have a strong reputation in this area but funds are aware that 
this task cannot be contracted out to ISIF, but must be undertaken on their own behalf. Fund E 
was at pains to point out that due diligence is a long, laborious and costly process and opined 
that early investors do the groundwork for future investors and should be compensated for this 
in the terms they receive. This is reflected in earlier comments regarding the long timeline 
between concept and completion.  
6.6 Conclusion 
This chapter initially illustrates that investment theory based around MPT and CAPM applies 
equally to residential property and commercial property held as an income producing assets, 
although the literature predominantly focuses on the latter with few studies analysing 
investment returns in housing. Hence this research adds to the relatively limited literature on 
the investment available in the housing sector.   
The analysis shows that in a representative selection of countries, investment into residential 
property has performed well and in many cases better than commercial property in terms of 
both total return and the risk-adjusted return. It is apparent that for many countries, the income 
component of total return was of greater importance than capital growth, though over the 15-
year time horizon considered, income returns have been tending downwards in the sector and 
flat-lining from circa 2012-2016.  Capital growth was much more volatile but also showing a 
tendency to stabilise in recent years. The analysis indicated that investment in residential 
property produced no further, additional diversification benefits beyond that expected for the 
property sector as a whole.  
For Ireland, using a weaker evidence base, high levels of return were observed for residential 
property, though lagging behind offices. High rates of volatility in housing were also apparent, 
possibly reflecting the lack of a significant institutional investment market in this sector in 
Ireland and resulting in greatly reduced risk-adjusted returns. On this basis, Irish residential 
property performs poorly relative to the set of comparator international countries. Furthermore, 
the surveys of institutions within Ireland showed mixed perceptions of residential property as 
an investment asset though Irish pension funds expressed an interest in investing in the 
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residential sector. However, it was apparent that State underwriting of income was desired for 
any investment in social housing.  
Specifically, the chapter has established the investment context within which the possible 
establishment in Ireland of a fund to enable institutional equity investment in properties will 
have to operate in. An evaluation of the Issues concerning the established of a residential 





CHAPTER 7: ASSEMBLING THE FUND MODEL 
 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter begins to apply what has been learned in the research to date concerning the 
objectives of this thesis. Using a range of methods, the chapter tests the hypothesis that was 
put forward in Chapter 1 and begins to build a functional model for a Fund that can provide 
social and affordable housing. The hypothesis was that a Fund can be created using institutional 
finance to provide housing for low- and moderate-income households. The principle is that the 
Fund extends a long lease to an Approved Housing Body (AHB) on FRI terms for a period of 
25 years. The rent is based on the cost of developing the units, not the market price. The AHB 
then sublets approximately 25% of the units to social tenants using existing State supports. The 
balance are let at affordable rents, below the market level to key worker households. The 
Government provides a step-in or other similar form of guarantee arrangement, whereby they 
will underwrite the lease in the event of failure of the AHB. This gives confidence to the 
investors to back the proposition, and secures the funding at a yield below typical property 
levels. While the thrust of this research is that institutional finance can be brought to bear to 
fund social and affordable housing, thus producing a reliable, low-yielding investment and a 
long-term sustainable and stable source of housing supply, it is also submitted that housing 
systems are deeply path-dependent meaning that the potential for radical and disruptive change 
is limited. Housing systems are embedded in institutional frameworks that bring the market, 
government, political and a range of other social and economic constructs together. This 
analysis is required to understand the components of a model that is conducive to investment 
by financial institutions.  
The aftermath of the global financial crisis left Ireland in the deepest financial crisis that it had 
experienced in its history. Drastic reductions in public spending were required, and 
consequently there was greatly restricted capacity to fund housing from capital resources. 
Government policy had been on a long-term trajectory towards revenue-funding of social 
housing, but the post-GFC environment required a complete rethink of housing policy, and it 
is in this context of a need for new methods of provision that this model arose. The purpose of 
this chapter to assemble a model that responds to each of the requirements of investors, 
government and end user tenants. Accordingly, it should be seen as an idealised structure that 
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can then be used to test and explore each of the elements of the institutional framework and the 
path dependencies of the Irish housing system, especially social housing.  
Barriers to institutional investment in housing generally are greatly magnified when it comes 
to social housing where perceptual problems around management, maintenance, and concerns 
around future values combine with even lower yields than general market housing, and lack of 
any precedents for such investment. This thesis argues however, that the long-term, steady 
returns with modest uplift in rents that social and affordable housing can produce should be 
well-suited to institutional investors. It sets out to develop a model that can produce these 
characteristics, in particular to pension funds. A further attraction of social housing should be 
the government backing of the system through revenue payments. However, if pension funds 
are to be drawn to a new asset class, it is necessary that the returns are better than sovereign 
bonds.  By way of guarantee or backstop, government can address a number of the barriers to 
investment by providing an additional degree of confidence to investors and should such 
backing by government be available, the yield expected should be lower than would pertain if 
the offer was market-based.  
This chapter specifically explores how an instrument that meets the needs of pension funds and 
regulators might also meet Irish government imperatives to produce investment in social and 
affordable housing. The theoretical underpinning of the work is tested in a real-world 
environment and the model is refined to address market circumstances and in establishing an 
entity to provide housing for low-income households, the development of a Fund fulfils the 
final objective of the thesis.  
7.2 The Fund Model 
The Fund model postulated is as follows: 
• A Fund is created from institutional sources to develop social and affordable 
housing; 
• Investment in the Fund is eligible for “permissible asset” status for risk reserve 
purposes under Irish pension fund regulations; 
• The developments are leased to an Approved Housing Body for 25 years at a rent 
based on 5.5% of the cost of producing them, i.e. at a rent of between 60–75% of 
the market rent (the cost rent); 
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• The rent will be reviewed in line with the CPI rental index every four years (or the 
CPI index), thus its relationship to market rents(inflation) is maintained – 
remaining at a fixed proportion of that market rent (or linked to inflation); 
• The AHB lets approximately a quarter of the units to social housing applicants and 
receives the existing government support arrangements in respect of these, e.g. 
80–92% of market rent plus the differential rent paid by the tenant; 
 
The balance of the units: 
• let to eligible “key worker” households who pay a rent between the cost rent and 
the market; 
• A tripartite agreement is put in place between the Fund, the local authority and the 
AHB that if the AHB fails, the local authority will step in, and  
• make good on the term of the lease; 
• replace the AHB manager; 
• The AHB can exercise three options at the end of the lease: 
• Hand back the development with vacant possession; 
• Renew the lease on identical terms; 
• Purchase the development on terms agreed at the outset of the lease. 
The purpose of the proposed Fund is to provide social and affordable rental housing at the 
lowest possible rents on a sustainable basis. The concept is based on the premise that the 
housing is made available at the cost of production, rather than the market rent or price. It is 
estimated that this can result in rents at least 20% below market and that those costs would be 
minimised by the techniques described below. It is a further premise that the properties must 
be mixed tenure of social and discounted market (affordable) rents. This achieves three vital 
objectives. First, it facilitates the development of projects at scale, thus enabling institutional-
level investment, economies in design, construction, and delivery. Second, it overcomes the 
long-standing problem of delivery of social-only housing at scale which is problematic for the 
sustainability of communities, and can lead to segregated or stigmatised communities. Third, 
this model enables the creation of an intermediate tenure of affordable housing in the urban 
areas where affordability is most likely to be problematic for key worker households.  
The putative tenure mix proposed for the model is 25% social and 75% market housing to meet 
government policy objectives. However, this will be tailored to the circumstances of each 
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location and project. The key criterion is that the mix of tenants must contribute to the long-
term sustainability and value of the property which is the underlying security of the investors. 
The cash flow from the property will be made up from a blend of rental schemes. Social 
tenancies will be supported by payments from State schemes such as Housing Assistance 
Payments. The differential rent charged to the tenants will go to the AHB operator and 
affordable tenants would pay a discounted market rent.  
The success of the model depends on achieving maximum savings and efficiencies in every 
facet including low-cost, long-term funding; state support in the form of guarantees and land; 
effective management and risk mitigation; and effective and efficient procurement. These 
encompass the McKinsey Principles (McKinsey, 2014) as to the key drivers of affordable rents 
(Chapter 4).  
Securing finance for a project such as this presents some additional complications over and 
above simple market transactions due to the lower yields, novelty, perception and political 
risks. The first challenge is to find investors that will commit significant long-term equity type 
funding at rates which are at the low end of the real estate yield spectrum. The Pension Funds 
survey in Chapter 6 indicated that eight of the larger Irish defined-benefit pension schemes 
were willing to invest in a suitable fund given the correct structures and terms. It is clear that 
the yield and general investment profile of the proposed investment are not attractive to 
traditional property funds. However, the particular characteristics of the proposition are ideally 
suited to a defined-benefit pension fund which requires a low risk profile, and the kind of steady 
cashflows closely related to incomes in the wider economy that the Fund offers. Accordingly, 
those pension funds became the specific target investor for the DADF. In tandem with this, the 
Ireland Strategic Investment Fund (ISIF) was identified as a partner. ISIF is an Irish sovereign 
fund established with the mandate of investing on a commercial basis in projects that support 
economic activity and employment in Ireland. With €7.9 billion under management and a 
strong reputation for excellence in due diligence, ISIF bring not alone capital to the Fund but 
also credibility and assurance for other investors in what remains a novel and untried market.  
ISIF has a long investment time horizon and therefore can act as a permanent source of long-
term capital. It has flexibility up and down the capital structure and can meet changing capital 
needs and gaps in the marketplace. The fund’s “double bottom line” approach to investing 
requires all transactions to generate both risk adjusted commercial returns and economic 
impact. Indications from ISIF (in meetings between the author and ISIF managing director) are 
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that the provision of social and affordable housing fits well with the ISIF mandate and that the 
yields and returns contemplated would be acceptable. However, ISIF will only invest up to 
49%, and require the balance to come from other investment partners. This marries well with 
the pension funds where both parties gain a strong co-investor. A formal proposal for 
investment in the DADF was made to the ISIF board in May 2016.  
In designing the investment product, the focus is to tailor an instrument to the needs of the 
pension funds and ISIF that also had to meet the objectives of the Fund in producing social and 
affordable housing. The return needs to be above sovereign bond yields and Irish Government 
supports will reduce the risk. However, to produce housing at low cost, the yield also needs to 
be relatively low. Yields from commercial property and especially other large-scale residential 
investment opportunities also have a bearing. IRES REIT, which is the only purely residential 
investment vehicle reported a gross yield at end 2016 of 6.6% which would give net yield of 
c.5% to 5.5%. Hibernia REIT reported that its acquisition of Dundrum View, a luxury block, 
was on a net basis of 4.7%. With a 1.25% provision for management and a 4.25% coupon on 
the loan notes, the figure of 5.5% of all-in costs was arrived at as the cost-based rent to AHB 
operators of Fund projects. This figure reflects the return that the pension funds require, the 
cost of operating the fund, and what the market will tolerate bearing in mind competition now 
or in the future.   
A further issue that emerged from discussions with pension experts was the regulatory status 
of an instrument issued to the pension funds which related to the annual actuarial valuation test 
for solvency of each individual fund. Under pension fund regulations holdings in shares, 
property and other such “risky” assets are subject to a 10% discount against their market value 
in the preparation of solvency tests. In other words, a property valued at say €1 million in the 
open market must be valued in the regulatory solvency test at only €900,000. However, 
holdings in State-backed bonds are not subject to this discount. Accordingly, the hypothesis 
was formed that if a Fund could be created that would issue bonds approved by the Pensions 
Regulator with a State guarantee, the indexed returns would be sufficient at about 4–4.5% to 
give the pension funds the desired investment characteristics, viz. an acceptable yield, a 
prescribed asset for regulatory purposes and with the security of government backing. 
However, the instrument would be a debt instrument and not a property or equity holding.  
From the viewpoint of flexibility in the day-to-day operation of the Fund, the most desirable 
form of investment by the pension fund would be by simple equity subscription. However, for 
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the purposes in hand, such a form of investment has distinct drawbacks. First, in an unlisted 
entity, it brings liquidity issues. Second, pension fund exposure to real estate is at a very low 
level (typically around 4%). If the DADF proposition were viewed by pension funds as simply 
another property investment, then any allocation would have to come from this very small 
portion of the funds available. Equity would obviously be treated differently from a bond by 
the funds and by the Regulator and Fund actuaries. While it is more complex and multi-faceted, 
a suitably structured loan note or bond better meets the exigencies of the circumstances, as it 
can be structured in such a way as to meet the requirements of the investor and the regulator, 
while producing the same net effect to the Fund.  
The Regulator was positive about the suitability of the investment for pension funds indicating 
a willingness to consider a properly worded amendment to the pension regulations, but pointed 
out that framing such an amendment would be difficult. It was also clear that a decision to 
amend the regulations lay with the Minister for Social Protection, not the regulator. Solicitors, 
A&L Goodbody were engaged to advise on how a regulatory change could be brought about 
that would comprehend the bond for social and affordable housing purposes, but would not be 
so broad as to encompass investments that would devalue the purpose of the prescribed asset 
concept. If such an amendment could be formulated, it could be submitted to the Minister for 
consideration.  
Also, it was clear from engagement with the pensions industry that it was important their 
investment advisors and actuaries understood and supported the investment concept. The 
process of presenting it to these advisors could not be set in motion until there was clarity as to 
the Fund model and legal structure, the precise terms of the bond to be issued to the pension 
funds, and the nature of the State support that would underpin the investment.  
All entities dealing in such large sums of money in a highly sophisticated commercial and 
regulatory environment require a robust and carefully chosen legal structure. The Fund under 
discussion would be entering into agreements with private, voluntary and public sector actors. 
It would also operate in a deeply contested political and policy space, where the involvement 
of private finance in the provision of low-income housing is not fully accepted. The Fund will 
operate over a very long time horizon, and accordingly would need to be flexible and capable 
of change. Property is a relatively illiquid asset, whereas pension funds and other investors will 
require liquidity.  
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Advice from legal, pension and fund advisors was that the vehicle could best be established as 
a normal Irish private limited company (using the new Designated Activity Company (DAC)) 
which would then avail of the section 110 tax status under the Taxes Consolidation Act 1997. 
A DAC company is a new structure introduced under the Companies Act 2014. The 
significance of this structure for the Fund purposes is that permits debentures to be listed on a 
debt market, and its activities are confined to specific activities. An s.110 company is an Irish 
special purpose vehicle that is restricted to managing and holding “qualifying assets”. If the 
company availed of s.110 status (and the conditions would not be onerous for this type of 
structure), then it would be entitled to deduct all bond interest payments from its income to 
minimise its taxable profit and to pay profit participating interest to its investors without any 
re-characterisation of the interest as a distribution.  
Any notes issued by the company could then be listed on the Irish Stock Exchange to allow 
payments to be made to non-resident investors without any Irish withholding tax. This would 
involve the preparation of a prospectus-like document for the notes which would give further 
comfort to investors as to the terms of the notes. The company would not be regulated by the 
Central Bank of Ireland, albeit that the s.110 company structure is very widely used and is 
understood and recognised in the investor market, and the prospectus document would be 
approved, listed and regulated by the ISE. It should be noted that a s.110 company would not 
be able to hold the property assets itself and so a subsidiary would need to be established to 
hold the assets (with funding being provided by the parent through a bond or loan). However, 
even with such a double company structure, the absence of a Central Bank authorisation 
requirement would mean that this option should be a cheaper alternative to the fund option and 
could be completed in a far shorter timeframe. 
Importantly, in the instant case, the company would be owned by a not-for-profit/charitable 
entity. This would avoid having to issue equity/shares to investors (which could trigger 
prospectus rules and other legal issues) and would hopefully ensure that the funding vehicle is 
managed on an impartial/not-for-profit basis, to the ultimate benefit of the key workers/tenants. 
In considering the merits and drawbacks, an alternative option is the ICAV (Irish Collective 
Asset Management Vehicle) which is a form of Qualifying Investor Alternative Investment 
Fund (QIAIF). Essentially it is a standard investment vehicle for collective investment schemes 
– such a fund is regulated by the Irish Central Bank and is primarily intended to hold financial 
assets. Although stamp duty and VAT continue to apply as per standard property transactions, 
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all income and capital gains are tax free (gross roll-up). The treatment for taxation of investors 
differs between resident and non-Irish residents. In the latter instance no withholding taxes 
apply on income distributions or redemption payments made and investors are exempt from 
tax on sale of shares in the QIAIF. The platform is capable of holding assets on a collective or 
individual, ring-fenced basis and can facilitate various forms of individual, company and 
syndicated ownership structures (with or without debt and collateralised obligations) through 
the various sub-fund mechanisms. 
Some important differences to note compared against the s.110 structure are: 
 
• An ICAV structure is far more expensive to establish and maintain with an initial 
base cost of c. €300,000 per annum;  
• The ICAVs primary attraction – significant tax efficiency – is largely replicated 
by the s.110 route - save for CGT and stamp duty; 
• In the event that the Minister/Pension Board approves a social and affordable 
housing based prescribed asset, it is highly likely that it will need to involve the 
bond approach. No prescribed asset has ever been based on another instrument 
and ICAVs cannot issue bonds;  
• ICAVs and their associated AIFMs are heavily regulated bodies with significant 
ongoing obligations to the Irish Central Bank in terms of reporting, administration, 
depository and so forth.  Pension funds are unlikely to have major concerns about 
the s.110 company engaging with a non-regulated management company as 
opposed to an AIFM and the notes will be listed through the ISE and therefore 
regulated in another format in any event;  
• Investments are not as liquid when applying the loan note/ICAV approach.  
Essentially while bonds can become a tradable market over time – like any other 
bond – the loan notes would only be redeemable under specific circumstances 
including either through sale of the note to a third party or sale of the underlying 
security and redemption of the loan; 
• ICAVs have become a recognised ownership vehicle for large-scale property 
investment but are primarily intended for financial instruments not real estate and 
therefore may be subject to future revision.   
At the Fund level, a specialist external asset management company will be appointed on a fee 
basis until the Fund reaches the point where self-administration is viable. This mechanism of 
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a fund-management entity was used by the three Irish REITs, and is therefore familiar to the 
investment industry in Ireland.  
7.3 Government Support and Guarantee 
The proposed DADF housing model cannot work without State support which potentially could 
come in several different forms. For example, a form of income guarantee is required to secure 
funding from investors in a new asset class where yields are not especially high, and where 
there are perceptual risks (whether real or perceived). There is currently no form of 
intermediate tenure between social housing and the private market. This tenure facilitates the 
development of social housing in balanced schemes along with social housing. Government 
has committed to introducing a pilot affordable rental scheme, but pulled back from one model, 
before indicating that the issue would be put to an expert group on cost rental (speech by 
Bairbre NicAongusa. Assistant Secretary, DHPCLG to the Housing Practitioners Conference, 
May 2017). Also, the model requires the existing government leasing arrangements for social 
housing (the payment and availability agreement)  
A secondary tier of supports is required if the benefits of the Fund model are to be optimised 
to the benefit of consumers (government, AHBs and end users). If the cost-based rents are to 
be significantly cheaper than market rates, then State land, at little or no cost needs to be made 
available. Further, the change to the pensions regulations referred to above can greatly ease the 
passage of pension fund investment into social and affordable housing.  
The pension fund survey (Chapter 6) suggests that some form of government guarantee over 
the rental income from social and affordable housing is required to draw institutional funding 
into the sector. While the guarantee is essential to secure the funding at scale, it can also ensure 
that it is made available at a cheaper rate than might be the case for market-based housing or 
commercial real estate investment.  The guarantee also ensures that the units remain in use as 
social and affordable accommodation, and can enable the State to set the criteria for access.  
Guarantees can come in a variety of forms. Internationally (UK and the Netherlands), it is more 
common for borrowings to be guaranteed, thus reducing the cost of funding rather than income 
guarantees. In an Irish context, the need is for new funders and suppliers of low-income 
housing. There is enough capital available to the existing voluntary social housing providers to 
absorb their capacity for new development. Local authority borrowing has direct balance sheet 
implications and is the subject of strict ceilings at present. Accordingly, the need is to find fresh 
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sources of capital and development potential from the private sector. This need is particularly 
acute given spiralling rents (Lyons, 2016), and contracting supply in the face of rising demand 
(Housing Agency, 2015). The form of guarantee sought in the instant case is a step-in 
agreement where the State (probably via a local authority) agrees to take on the lease in the 
event of failure of the operator AHB. The investors’ income would be assured while a new 
operator was put in place, and the scheme put back in good financial order. Alternatively, the 
development would have to be handed back in good order with vacant possession after five 
years. An alternative form of government-implied guarantee would be a direct lease from the 
Fund to the local authority either alone or as a party to the lease with an AHB.  
The principle of State guarantees for social housing borrowing is well established in other 
countries as noted in Chapter 5. However, the concept of government guarantees of private 
sector activity is problematic in Ireland. The banking guarantee of 2009 is widely seen as 
pivotal moment in the country’s economic collapse. Aside from the perceptual effects of the 
crash however, the constrained fiscal and economic environment that still pertains has placed 
strict limits on the capacity of the State’s balance sheet to take on new liabilities. Accordingly, 
it is clear from interaction with public officials that the concept of any form of guarantee by 
the Irish Government is viewed with extreme caution, if not scepticism. While the Social 
Housing Strategy (DECLG, 2014) aspires to extensive private sector provision of social 
housing, both through direct HAP leasing and through established AHB and local authority 
channels, the Government is not sufficiently seized of the requirements to deliver that 
aspiration at the scale required. The Strategy seeks to meet most of the social housing need 
through simple market-based mechanisms, but references to “off-balance-sheet” mechanisms, 
cost rental, and maximising use of State land for social housing purposes are not accompanied 
by sufficient action points or policy details to ascertain how the State envisages this housing 
will be delivered.  
The subject of government guarantees to secure private finance for social housing was 
comprehensively dealt with in a report from the European Investment Bank (EIB): 
“Given the novelty of the Irish social housing market with respect to the use 
of private finance, and the risks around limited and developing regulation, it 
is likely that a government backed guarantee is required to enable large 
investors, such as the EIB, to provide long term fixed rate attractive financing 
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and to further develop the market (particularly for larger institutional 
investors).” (EIB, 2014, p.23) 
In March 2015, the government established the Social Housing Proposals Clearing House 
Group (DECLG, 2015) to examine private sector proposals for investment in social housing. 
Ostensibly, the purpose of the exercise was to screen proposals, to provide a preliminary 
assessment and to channel promoters to the appropriate public sector agency. However, in its 
final communication (letter to author of 8 December 2015, p.2), the Group stated: 
“In the course of its work, the group has considered the potential of a number 
of models proposed to provide an off balance sheet funding source. Being 
able to access funds in a manner that is off balance sheet or neutral from a 
General Government Balance sheet perspective is considered to be an 
essential prerequisite in progressing proposals for new funding models”. 
The State’s position therefore seems to be that all new methods of social housing delivery 
involving the private sector must be off-balance-sheet. It is accepted that existing methods such 
as borrowings of the State-owned Housing Finance Agency are fully on the balance sheet. The 
question as to how private finance can be brought into social housing without balance sheet 
implications remains unanswered. The Clearing House engagement with the DADF is 
described more fully below, but while the process was inconclusive, it appears that the task of 
sourcing private sector finance has been delegated to the NDFA which will face the same 
challenge.  
At its root, the problem appears to be one of scale. The Irish Government actively sources and 
uses private sector tenancies either as a form of social housing support or via rent supplement. 
The availability agreement mechanism for social housing sourced from the private rental 
market has guarantee-like characteristics, as it is an undertaking from the State to pay the rent. 
In the case of NARPS, the NAMA special purpose vehicle established to deliver social housing, 
a continuation agreement, provided by the local authority as an underwriting of an AHB lease 
is precisely the instrument that could provide the State-implicit guarantee to give comfort to 
institutional investors.  
Significant additional housing cannot not be provided in an urban environment without 
significant developable land in the required locations with key issues being the price, 
availability and suitability for the provision of affordable housing. The Irish planning system 
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identifies, zones and services land required to carry out new development by third parties. It is 
left entirely to the market to bring that land forward for development. The State and local 
authorities can legally acquire land and hold it in anticipation of development and government 
agencies acquire land over time to carry out their statutory functions. However, government 
agencies in general have not been good at recycling surplus property assets, resulting in land 
held at nil or low book cost, but with a lot of development potential. Much of this land, and 
other local authority holdings is likely to be suitable for housing development. This includes 
land held by the Housing Agency under the Land Aggregation Scheme (housing land brought 
into central government control from local authorities at the onset of the economic crisis). 
Critically, this land needs to be seen as a base for the development of a housing resource. If it 
is used simply to produce local authority housing or if it is disposed of at market value, a real 
opportunity to create new models of housing delivery and a more sustainable and diverse public 
housing system could be lost.  
The Department of Housing Planning, Community and Local Government has prepared and 
published an inventory of surplus land held or controlled by the state that is suitable for 
housing. A number of pathfinder sites have been identified to test the market for joint ventures 
between the private, voluntary and public sectors for mixed tenure development of private and 
social housing with some references to an undefined affordable or cost rental tenure (DHPCLG, 
2017). An illustration of how land could be used innovatively for housing would be by 
disposing of land on the principle of using the land value to produce cost-based rents (NESC, 
2014). In other words, the bidding criteria are on the basis of the number and quality of units 
and – crucially – the rents that will be charged. For example, a plot of land suitable for social 
and affordable housing is put on the market; investors, AHBs and builders form consortia to 
bid; bidders submit designs, specifications and a proposed initial rent for the completed units; 
the assessment criteria are the quality of the housing and the rent charged to the occupiers for 
a 25-year period. Part of the terms of the offer would be the promise of 
Availability/Continuation Agreements for the completed housing.  
The closer land is to shovel ready, the more investor risk can be mitigated and the cheaper the 
rents will be. Obviously, the success of such a model depends on maximising efficiencies in 
procurement, so the precise mechanism would need to be carefully calibrated, but – even to the 
point of having relevant consents (planning permission/Part 8) in place – the State can optimise 
use of land, and achieve better value from the market by lowering risk, and thus reducing cost. 
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By way of precedent, when the International Financial Services Centre (IFSC) was being 
developed in Dublin on State-controlled land, the title of the underlying land was not 
transferred to developers/investors until the conditions relating to the proposed development 
had been fulfilled – in particular building in the format agreed. When successfully built, the 
title given was a 200-year renewable lease at a nominal rent but with rights to acquire the 
freehold over time. A similar structure could be applied for land provided for cost-based rental 
housing. The lease terms would cover the obligation to charge cost based rents, rent indexation, 
insuring and repairing terms, and renewal rights. However, the terms of such leases must not 
be such so as to undermine the intrinsic value of the investment.  
Regarding development levies, the State has a choice as to whether to charge levies for such 
developments and pay for them through the rents, or to waive them and see the reduction 
reflected in the rents. Using a standard development appraisal, the cost-based rent that would 
be charged for a two-bedroom apartment on the basis of a free site, zero levies, no developer’s 
profit and high-volume efficient construction is presented in Table 7.1. The rent is highly 
sensitive to costs. Where construction cost is minimised at €150k per unit it is possible to lease 
at a rent that is almost 30% below the market, but if construction cost is higher, or any further 
outlay is incurred the rent goes up significantly (Column 1, Table 7.1).  As illustrated (Column 
2) if construction cost increases by €25k to €175k per unit (which is probably the going rate 
for small schemes without economies of scale) that the rent discount is almost eliminated. 
Using the same base calculation and where the provision of apartments are left to fully market 










Table 7.1  Development Appraisal: Construction costs minimised  
Construction cost of new unit including site 
infrastructure  
  
150,000  175,000  200,000  
Construction  Fees  5% 
 
7,500  8,750  10,000  
Finance on construction (months) (rate) 5 5% 3,125  3,646  4,167  
Levies and Charges  Nil  
    
Site cost on basis of (cost per acre) Nil  
    
Other fees , stamp duty, legal, compliance   5% 
 
7,875  9,188  10,500  
Total outlay  
  
168,500  196,583  224,667  
Fund set up costs  
  
5,055  5,898  6,740  
Vat at 13.5% on cost 13.5% 
 
22,748  26,539  30,330  
TOTAL  
  
196,303  229,020  261,737        
Net rental to DAD fund % 5.5% 10,797  12,596  14,396  
ADD margin For AHB to operate and manage 
building   
20% 
 
€2,159  €2,519  €2,879  
Total annual rent charged to tenant  
  
€12,956  €15,115  €17,275  
Rent charged to  occupier - per month  
  
1,080  1,260  1,440  
Open market rental value = say Tallaght  
  
1,350  1,350  1,350  
Discount per month  
  
270  90  -90 
or %  
  
20% 7% -7% 
 
Table 7.2 Development appraisal fully let to market forces 
Take One New 75M 2 bed apartment in a scheme of 100 units - no free site, paying levies and developers 
profit.    
€ € € 
      
Construction cost of new unit including site 
infrastructure  
  
150,000  175,000  200,000  
Construction  Fees  5% 
 
7,500  8,750  10,000  
Finance on construction (months) (rate) 5 5
% 
3,125  3,646  4,167  
Levies and Charges  
  
10,000  10,000  10,000  
Site cost on basis of (cost per acre) 
  
20,000  30,000  40,000  




7,875  9,188  10,500  
Total outlay  
  
198,500  236,583  274,667  
Fund set up costs  
  
5,955  7,098  8,240  
Developers Profit at 15% 15% 
 
29,775  35,488  41,200  
Vat at 13.5% on cost 13.5% 
 
26,798  31,939  37,080  
TOTAL  
  
261,028  311,107  361,187        
Net rental to DAD fund % 6.5% 
 
16,967  20,222  23,477  
ADD margin For AHB to operate and manage building   20% 
 
€3,393  €4,044  €4,695  
Total annual rent charged to tenant  
  
€20,360  €24,266  €28,173  
Rent charged to  occupier - per month  
  
1,697  2,022  2,348  
Open market rental value = say Tallaght  
  
1,350  1,350  1,350  
Discount per month  
  
- 347  -672  -998 
or %  
  
-26% -50% -74% 
 
In the first example (Table 7.1) the developer’s profit is removed through provision of “free” 
land with appropriate development consents. Further risk to the investor is removed by rents 
assured under availability agreement structures. More savings can be achieved if economies of 
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scale in construction cost and time can be achieved by building in volume; that requires tenure 
mix to render the developments viable – both economically and socially. The rents show a 
discount to market of 20%. 
The appraisal shown in Table 7.2 indicates that if the full market price for land is charged, 
levies paid, a normal developer’s profit of 15% applies and net market yields of 6.5% (non-
prime locations), then the rents required to justify such development would be substantially 
above prevailing market levels (€1,350 per month) and getting towards €2,000 per month. In 
this scenario (Table 7.2), developer’s profit at 15% must be absorbed and the yield is 1.5% 
higher – with consequences for rents.  
The essence of the matter is that the State can use the market in a different way to reduce cost 
to itself and to achieve its objectives. But exposure to the market on its own terms leaves the 
State at risk of greater uncertainty and higher long-run costs. 
7.4 Management  
The report by McKinsey (2014) identifies operations and maintenance as one of the means of 
improving housing affordability. Improving energy efficiency is one part of this process. 
However, more important for the present purposes is “reducing maintenance costs and 
improving asset management”. Professional and efficient management requires scale and a 
long-term view of the business of managing the housing projects.  
The Irish private rented sector is characterised by a relatively high degree of tenant mobility 
with mean tenancy length at just over two years (Housing Agency/PRTB, 2014). High turnover 
of tenancies leads to increased management and maintenance costs due to additional vacancy 
and letting costs, and higher than necessary reinstatement or refurbishment expenditure. An 
institutional investor in rental housing is principally interested in steady and even cashflow, 
rather than jerky and uncertain rents. While the impermanency latent in the system may suit 
small-scale investors speculating on capital growth, it is of no particular benefit to longer term 
players. Larger management organisations working with relatively standardised units in large 
concentrations can avail of a range of scale efficiencies in proximity (on-site management), 
procurement and purchasing. Experienced operators with a high degree of familiarity with the 
physical fabric should be able to optimise the performance of buildings, while larger 
organisations should carry less overhead per unit managed than smaller operations. The largest 
Irish approved housing bodies manage approximately 5,000 units.  
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Housing management in Ireland tends to be sharply bifurcated between private and social 
housing operators. While some blurring of these lines has occurred in recent years, property 
management generally falls between private entities self-managing or subcontracting, and local 
authorities and AHBs dealing with social housing. Most private housing management is 
concerned with apartment complexes comprised of owner-occupiers and buy-to-let investors. 
These management structures have been created of necessity to deal with management of 
communal areas and the external physical fabric of the buildings. The legislative code for most 
of this activity is the Multi-Unit Developments Act 2011, a statute solely concerned with 
owner-occupiers and with the service charge, sinking fund and governance of such schemes. 
This is the Irish parallel of condominium legislation that pertains elsewhere in the world.  
The emergence of larger-scale investors in residential property in recent years has led to the 
retention of these same housing management companies who have the experience and expertise 
in dealing with large residential complexes. Some of these new investors provide their own 
management. The principal focus of such management is rent collection, maintenance and 
ensuring the smooth running of the developments. Social housing management typically brings 
more challenges. The residualised nature of the tenure, the highly segregated natures of many 
local authority estates, and the frequent lack of economic capacity in many cases, makes 
management a much more complex matter. Kenna (2011) observes: 
“The management of local authority housing involves a mixture of law, 
policy and practice. Indeed in many ways the law only provides a minimalist 
framework and sanction of last resort, while a plethora of policies and 
institutional norms shape the decisions taken in this area. Since local 
authority housing is a residualised tenure, many of the critical issues of 
health, poverty, social exclusion and crime interact with housing policy and 
practice”.  
Since the early 1990s, there has been a conscious shift in policy to focus on more strategic and 
management issues in social housing rather than simply the bulk provision of accommodation 
(Department of Environment, 1991). Since then, there has been an aversion to development of 
large social housing developments, and an increased role for non-State actors such as housing 
associations in the provision of housing. Management has also become a focus of housing 
policy and the shortcomings of earlier decades have been the subject of government remedial 
action (Norris, 2003; O’Connell, 1999). Norris and Redmond (2005) report that attitudes to 
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management changed radically from the mid-1980s and that greater focus has been brought to  
management of the housing stock. 
All local authorities in Ireland have housing departments which manage their housing stock 
and the response to social housing needs in their functional area. However, there is a wide 
disparity in the performance of local authorities. In 2014, re-letting times for units range from 
10.17 weeks in Laois to 56.39 weeks in Roscommon. Re-let costs are as low as €1,267 in Cavan 
and as high as €35,000 in Cork City with an average of almost €10,000. While allowance must 
be made for varying housing stock, circumstances, age and condition, such disparities are likely 
to reflect widely divergent management practices. Median maintenance costs are €758 per 
annum while the outliers are found at €256.40 in Carlow and €4,075.28 in Westmeath. Vacancy 
rates range between 0.4% and 8% (NOAC, 2015).  
The long-term policy response has been to alter the role of local authorities from being the sole 
provider of social housing, to being an “enabler” or central agency for housing provision from 
local authority stock, AHB accommodation, and units leased from the private sector via a 
succession of schemes (from RAS to HAP). AHB management is evaluated on a self-selecting 
basis by their representative association, the Irish Council for Social Housing (ICSH). In 2014, 
49 housing associations participated in the annual survey. That reported an average period of 
13.4 weeks to re-let units, compared to 31.78 weeks in local authority stock. Extreme caution 
needs to be applied to these comparisons, due to methodological and other variable factors. In 
its own right, the AHB sector appears to reflect efficient management practices, subject to the 
caveats above. Rents collected represent 99.9% of those due. Arrears in 2015 were 5.1% of 
rent receivable. Repairs and maintenance costs range from €393 per unit affected for response 
repairs through to €555 per unit affected for cyclical maintenance (ICSH, 2015).  
There is no systemic data available about private residential management, and in any case 
comparisons are extremely problematic between local authority, voluntary and private stock. 
Circumstances such as lengths of tenure, service charges, rent levels and many other factors 
are so varied that comparison needs to be very selective and cautious. Typically, private 
management costs range from 1% of rents collected to a maximum of 20% for difficult or 
management intensive properties. In the case of Irish local authorities, it would appear from 
some of the NOAC (2015) figures, that the rents in some cases may not cover the cost of 
maintaining the dwellings.  
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Good housing management requires two mutually reinforcing strands: property management 
and asset management. The former requires an operational management tool that deals with 
rent collection, allocations, estates, repairs, tenant enquiries and contractors. The latter – asset 
management – is a strategic planning tool to protect, enhance and grow the value of the asset, 
driven by tenant feedback issues and stock condition issues. For a private landlord the value of 
property is in its potential for wealth generation: the rental growth and capital appreciation of 
the asset. For a social landlord, either a local authority or an AHB, the long-term value of the 
property is its utility value in providing housing for a household. Its asset value is secondary. 
However, good management is crucial to both, as a well-managed asset will be of benefit to 
both investor landlords and end users. AHBs are in a good position to act as operators of DADF 
developments. They have a more complete skillset in residential property management than 
conventional commercial entities. They are used to dealing with the particular needs of low-
income households. The larger AHBs are well governed, adequately resourced, sufficiently 
commercially aware, and progressive in outlook to take on commitments of this nature.  
Scale is fundamental to the DADF concept, as institutional funding is only available in volume, 
and the cost-based model requires maximal efficiencies in construction and delivery of units. 
Tenure mix is also crucial to the success of the model in terms of securing the investment, but 
also with regard to management. Pension fund investors made it clear that they would not invest 
in what they saw as traditional social housing. This is largely for perceptual and reputational 
reasons (social housing appears synonymous with “sink” estates like the failed 1960s Ballymun 
scheme and other severely challenged large-scale housing developments). Investing in such 
properties is not a tenable proposition for pension fund trustees. While DADF does not exclude 
private renting tenants, it does exclude owner-occupiers.  
The question of whether neighbourhood effects are of any especial benefit to poorer households 
is highly contested. Cheshire (2007) argues that creating communities of mixed income and 
social background does not necessarily improve outcomes in terms of poverty and exclusion, 
and that unless strong poverty-mitigation measures are put in place in addition to mixed 
housing, outcomes will not improve. Established Irish housing policy is to “counteract undue 
segregation in housing between persons of different social backgrounds” (Planning and 
Development Act 2000, s.94(3)(c); Housing (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2009, ss. 15, 79). 
The logic of aspiring to more spatially integrated housing is that mono-tenure estates are more 
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likely to replicate patterns of poverty and disadvantage, and reduce potential for improved life 
chances and attainment for poorer households.  
In the face of this ambivalence on mixed tenure, a paper by Lawton (2015, see Appendix 2) 
was commissioned as part of the research process. Lawton concluded that   
“The fostering of a successful socially mixed development is premised on the 
promotion of interaction between different actors at various phases of the 
development …. As is outlined in this paper, there is a significant increase in 
the level of attention towards management of housing developments. While 
this paper has focused particularly on housing associations, there is also 
increased potential for interactions between these bodies and privately 
oriented services management teams. However, given their understanding of 
the diversity of needs of social housing tenants, housing associations can play 
a central role in the long-term success of a socially mixed housing 
development. Bringing the different elements together presents significant 
challenges for a successful housing development. However, drawing upon 
experiences from other places, and experiences garnered from the Irish 
context, it is feasible to develop an integrated model of housing with a long-
term viability.”  
For these reasons, DADF developments will be tenure mixed. “Social” tenants will pay the 
relevant differential rent, which will be supplemented by government payment and availability 
agreements. “Affordable” tenants will pay an economic rent which will be abated from the 
market rent through the land and guarantee State subsidy. By agreement with the State, the 
model could accommodate market tenants. The underlying property investment is supported 
by the principles of tenure mix and strong management. Successful developments will grow 
their value both in economic and social terms.  
The ideal situation for setting up DADF is to have a ready supply of completed, unoccupied 
building available to purchase which would eliminate time lags and reduce the associated 
development and procurement risk. Whilst the opportunity to buy completed apartments blocks 
remains a possibility, much of the stock left over from the market downturn has now been 
completed and sold, and the rapidly recovering economy has led to rising capital values. If the 
fund model is to work, it has to procure new housing schemes. This involves acquiring land 
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and commissioning construction. Pension fund investors will not themselves take development 
or construction risks and will expect the fund to deploy substantive risk mitigation techniques. 
Accordingly, the procurement process need to be very carefully structured to achieve this. 
In property development the stage of greatest risk is in bringing land into development, 
ensuring that land is serviced, and the appropriate regulatory consents are in place. This is 
essentially a land speculation risk – anticipating that the money spent on the site can be 
recovered through development. The principal cost factor here is time where delays in 
infrastructure delivery, or unforeseen planning delays lead to additional cost. “Shovel-ready” 
land where consents are already in place can remove this risk. In the instant case, all land risk 
costs can be removed if the State disposed of land with the benefit of development rights 
(planning permission or Part 8). Construction risk can be mitigated by contract, careful 
planning and design, and detailed investigation. For a higher level of reward, a builder will be 
prepared to assume all construction-related risks under a “turnkey” contract. The Fund model 
involves partnering with experienced and well established builder-developers with a track 
record in turnkey fixed-price delivery, who will work with the Fund to ensure efficient delivery.  
7.5 Construction 
The cost, quality, and predictability of the construction procurement and delivery process is of 
key importance to the effective operation of the proposed Fund. At the outset of this study, and 
when formulating the hypothesis, an initial study was commissioned to establish approximately 
how much it would cost to deliver a notional 100-unit apartment development on a perfectly 
regular notional one-acre site. This was a collaborative effort between the researcher, an 
architect, and a large established building contractor (Sisk). The model project produced two 
four-storey apartment blocks, one with surface parking, the other underground car storage. The 
blocks were produced to the Department of Environment, Heritage and Local Government 
2007 standards, which it should be noted were less exacting that the Dublin City Council 
standards in force at the time of the study in 2015. The estimated cost per unit was €150,000 
assuming no land cost or levies for a non-basement block. This produced a cost-based rent at 
5.5% of €8,250 p.a. To this needs to be added 20% for management and operation costs, 
resulting in a monthly rent to the tenant of €825. 
 Subsequently in early 2016, a further, more detailed study was undertaken to examine what 
efficiencies in construction were possible using different construction approaches and also 
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having regard to the changes in design standards which came into force in early 2016. A multi-
disciplinary team involving the researcher, together with construction professionals, architects, 
and quantity surveyors worked to a brief of determining the most efficient way of delivering 
1,000 apartment units per year, maximising scale economies, optimising design, and availing 
of the most efficient construction techniques.  This study took an in-depth approach and looked 
at different delivery mechanisms ranging from conventional construction to system building 
and various modular approaches including the use of steel and timber frames. A six-storey 
model building with eight units per floor (total 48 apartments of varying size) was designed by 
the architect working closely with the construction experts and the researcher as being the 
optimum building from a user, management, property and construction perspective. A key 
finding was that significant economies of scale could best be achieved by taking the approach 
of repeating construction of the same block type multiple times using conventional construction 
which would achieve significant discounts through the experience curve effect, volume 
purchasing discounts, delivery reliability and good quality control. The cost per typical two-
bed unit ranged from €165,000 using a one off approach, to €145,000 per unit on a mass 
produced basis. The assumptions were zero land costs, no development levies, and working in 
optimal shovel-ready site conditions. Car parking requirements would have a significant impact 
on apartment unit cost. The first study had examined an underground parking option which 
concluded that this would add €25,000–€50,000 per unit. Due to the prohibitive cost, for the 
in-depth second study, it was assumed that all car parking would be at grade and at a ratio of 
one space per unit.  
7.6 Conclusion 
The model constructed is schematically represented in Figure 7.1. 




Each element of the model is designed to respond to the needs of the various actors to create a 
robust structure. The requirements of institutional investors are met principally by the 
confidence bestowed through the State-backed income flows and the professional management 
and sector expertise of the AHB operator. The tenants get the benefit of a high-quality manager 
and an investor landlord whose principal motive is income rather than capital growth. Thus, 
tenancies are inherently more stable and conducive to long duration. An institutional investor 
will also take an aggregated view of rents rather than the closer scrutiny an individual might 
take with the consequent potential for volatility. The principle is to create a virtuous circle 
(Figure 7.2) where each element strengthens the overall structure. 










Theoretically, as mentioned at the outset of the chapter, it is recognised that the model is an 
idealised investment that utilises some existing institutional structures, while requiring 
adaptations to others, but also requires some novelty that will challenge the government and 
administrative institutional framework. The purpose of the thesis is also to draw investment 
institutions into new territory. As the model is tested and brought up against many of these 
institutions, it is expected that it will be reshaped and altered as it is brought towards reality. 
This exercise therefore explores the path dependencies and the nature of the mechanisms of 
institutional change.  In concluding the thesis, the next chapter assesses the overall contribution 
of the DADF model, draws together the need for interaction between government, the private 
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sector and institutions within the theoretical context of path dependency and historical 
institutionalism. 
CHAPTER 8: FROM THEORY TO REALITY 
8.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter, a model was developed that responded to the identified needs of 
government, investment, and tenant stakeholders in terms of delivering a stable platform for 
the supply of social and affordable housing. The theoretical foundation is that housing systems 
are inherently path-dependent constructs and that change is both slow and disruptive. This 
chapter analyses the development of the model through various stages of government and 
stakeholder engagement in an attempt implement the fund concept. The chapter also seeks to 
demonstrate the policy impact this research on the future delivery of social/affordable housing 
drawing down institutional funding. Hence, building upon Chapter 7 this chapter also addresses 
the final objective of the thesis on the potential for new funding vehicles. 
8.2 Institutions in a Housing Policy Context  
As discussed in Chapter 2, path dependency relies heavily on the concept of critical junctures 
(Bengtsson, 2008; Bengtsson and Ruonovaara, 2010; Cappocia, 2015; Mahoney, 2000): 
periods of change among longer patterns of stability. It is submitted that Irish housing is coming 
to the latter end of a long critical juncture that has seen a shift from wholly State provision to 
reliance on the non-profit and private sectors for supply. To recap the process by which this 
process of privatisation took place under the influence of new public management techniques 
and more general neoliberalising trends (Kenna, 2011; Boyle and Humphreys, 2001; Keogan, 
2003), the role of local government was recast from that of a supplier of housing into a more 
facilitative and regulatory role. Housing management by local authorities was the focus of two 
critical reports in the mid and late 1990s (Housing Management Group, 1996, 1998) which 
strongly influenced the view that their role as provider, allocator and operator of housing 
needed to be revised. Targets to increase housing output from the voluntary sector where 
standards were seen to be better were introduced. The private rented sector which had 
languished as a heavily residualised and unregulated tenure received belated recognition of its 
importance with the report of the Commission on the Private Rented Sector (2001). The lack 
of social housing availability in the face of rising demand eventually forced the State to turn to 
the private rented sector. In 2004, a new hybrid tenancy (Rental Accommodation Scheme 
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(RAS)) was introduced where private sector tenancies were wholly supported within the local 
authority housing system.  
The onset of the economic downturn in 2008 had particularly dramatic accelerative effects on 
private sector involvement in social housing. First, there was a precipitous drop in capital 
spending across all housing programmes. Second, the State took the opportunity to avail of low 
rents as a result of the property crash to meet the shortfall through the introduction of long-
term leasing of private properties for social housing. A year later in 2009, the law was changed 
to state that supported tenancies in the private sector were a form of social housing support. In 
2013, the Housing Assistance Payment was introduced which was a wholly private tenancy 
with only a local government agreement to pay a certain level of rent. Thus, the change from 
social housing options residing solely on public sector properties was complete. In terms of 
supply, the Social Housing Strategy 2014 and Rebuilding Ireland (2016) – two significant 
policy statements – both relied on private sector provision to meet the overwhelming majority 
of social housing need (notwithstanding increased capital for traditional programmes). This 
gradual transformation of social housing is coming towards a conclusion where the missing 
part of the jigsaw is supply. While various references in policy documents and ministerial 
statements have alluded to institutional finance, no significant measure or response to elicit this 
has been adumbrated.  
It is at this latter stage of the critical juncture that the present work is situated. In January 2015, 
three months after the publication of the Social Housing Strategy, the researcher made a formal 
submission to the Minister for Environment, Community and Local Government setting out 
the concept of an institutionally funded social and affordable housing delivery vehicle on the 
model set out in this research. In particular, the Fund proposed to government that it would 
purchase a fully complete 507-unit development and make it available for social and affordable 
housing on the Fund model. Details of the funding and proposed tenant mix were supplied, but 
no decision was forthcoming, and the development was sold into private ownership later in 
2015.  
There have repeated revisions and increases in capital allocations to social housing on 
established funding mechanisms. As the shortage deepened, political pressure was applied, and 
the availability of capital from the government increased. Thus government reverted to 
traditional methods of social housing provision as resources allowed. It is almost axiomatic 
that in this response, the system would be path dependent: faced with an urgent need, policy-
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makers simply increase output using established mechanisms. There is no particularly valuable 
insight on institutions that can be gleaned from carrying on as before where that is an option. 
However, what is of interest is the institutional response to new approaches to housing 
provision: in the crisis, how did government respond?  The overall public sector response to 
the supply of social housing from the private sector through the deep recession from 2008 was 
fourfold.  
First, from 2009, the largest single source of social housing supply was units sourced from the 
private sector via leasing programmes. This was derived solely from the long-term policy 
direction towards revenue-funded supply programmes that was outlined above. Institutionally, 
then this was fully embedded in the formal state apparatus via law, regulations and 
administrative structures. Long-term leasing has a clear lineage back to pre-crisis policy, and 
may be seen as the most “path-dependent” of the solutions that emerged. Most of the 
discussion, legislation and administrative structures were in place and were then adapted to 
meet the exigencies of the time. 
Second, the government committed to €300 million to develop three “bundles” of Public 
Private Partnership (PPP) projects for social housing on a design, build, finance and maintain 
(DBFM) model that the State had used for building schools. The target was to deliver 
approximately 1,500 units through this method. The PPP system, though elaborate, slow and 
expensive (typically costing 8–12%) was a tried and tested model by the Irish public sector. 
Having been tested by the relevant statistical authorities, its balance sheet treatment for 
government purposes was favourable, and all of the mechanisms and structures were in place. 
Accordingly, this must be seen as a conservative and heavily path-dependent response to the 
crisis. Despite its relatively high cost, and slow rate of delivery, the model was pursued and 
advocated by government. Thus, the PPPs were announced were on 14 October 2014. On 13 
October 2015, the location of the first bundle of sites was announced, and the contract notice 
was published on 12 May 2017. It is difficult to state when the housing might be delivered.     
Third, under pressure to contribute a “social dividend” from the political system, NAMA 
established a vehicle (National Asset Residential Property Services (NARPS)) to deliver social 
housing via long-term leasing to Approved Housing Bodies. This vehicle strongly resembles 
the Fund model in its use of existing leasing systems and the utilisation of the AHB sector as 
managers. NARPS had a portfolio of 1,168 properties at end June 2017 (NAMA, 2017) all with 
State-backed leases. In contrast with leasing, NARPS came into existence through commercial 
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decision by NAMA and informal policy networks throughout the public sector. Lowe (2004) 
cites Lindblom’s 1959 essay of policy as “muddling through” – that policy comes about as a 
process of gradual change and accretion rather than any pre-packaged arrangements, and this 
possibility must be allowed here. Certainly, the NARPS entity was not pre-ordained by any 
statute or envisaged (except in the loosest terms) by any public policy. However, it was a 
product of institutional pressures, and the eventual form of the entity in its similarity to the 
Fund model is of particular interest. Again, the NARPS structure mirrored existing 
arrangements for long-term leasing – in particular the Payment and Availability Agreement 
(PAA). However, NARPS marks a significant shift in institutional arrangements. It is currently 
an entity under the auspices of NAMA, but that agency has a limited lifespan and a mandate to 
divest itself of assets to recover value for the State. NARPS therefore stands out as a prime 
investment opportunity when it is disposed of. It has precisely the characteristics identified in 
this thesis as a product for institutional investment –  real estate backed by solid government 
covenants, income producing, low risk, and indexed.  
The fourth response was the Social Housing Proposals Clearing House Group. In March 2015, 
the Government established the Clearing House process to place on a formal footing all 
engagements with private sector actors with proposals to invest in social and affordable housing 
(DECLG, 2015). The Clearing House Group was composed of senior officials from the 
Departments of Environment, Finance, Public and Expenditure and Reform, and also included 
the Housing Agency, and representatives of local government. Submissions were invited from 
interested parties, and a formal meeting and presentation between the Fund and the Clearing 
House Group took place on 17 April 2015. One week later, the Group sent a detailed set of 
queries was sent to the Fund, and these were formally answered. Some more minor queries 
were made in September 2016. On 8 December 2015, the Clearing House Group formally 
responded to all parties who had made submissions to say its work was complete. The Group 
noted that no new model presented could produce social housing on an off balance-sheet basis, 
but elements of some proposals could offer a way forward and in particular recommended that 
some changes could be made to existing payment and availability agreement structures to 
further facilitate new sources of finance. The Clearing House Group recommendations were 
accepted by the Minister, and the National Development Finance Agency were appointed as 
financial advisors to the Department in developing and implementing the recommendations. 




In contrast with both the leasing programme and NARPS, the Clearing House process was 
wholly ad hoc with no basis in policy documents or in legislation. It was a response to an 
upswing in interest from the private sector in social housing provision in the aftermath of the 
publication of the Social Housing Strategy, and designed to provide “a structured, formal 
process of engagement with proposers of social housing/investment delivery proposals … 
rather than individual Departments continuing to meet with these persons on an ad hoc basis” 
(DECLG, 2015, p.1). While it is too early to fully evaluate the worth of the Clearing House 
process, it undoubtedly had a chilling effect on progress of social housing delivery by the 
private sector from 2015 to time of writing (mid 2017). By directing all engagement with the 
public sector regarding housing to the Clearing House, the potential for iterative and more 
specific and targeted multi-agency approaches was closed off. For example, no dialogue was 
possible with officials outside the process. Prior to the establishment of the Clearing House, 
meetings with the Directors of Services for Housing in the four Dublin local authorities had 
taken place, and channels of communication were open. However, it was clear that councils 
would need central government support or approval for innovations or partnerships involving 
the private sector, and the Clearing House process essentially precluded these. In such a dense 
institutional framework of government departments, state agencies, and local authorities and 
with such a loose mandate in terms of outcome, together with the lack of clear leadership and 
deep path dependencies both within the member institutions and between them, clear 
conclusions would always be difficult to achieve.  
As part of the research this thesis, the author published a paper in 2015 identifying a core 
problem in Irish housing policy in that it was diffused across too many departments and 
agencies (Nowlan, 2015). The lack of an overall strategy and a co-ordinating authority for 
housing leads to lack of coherence in policy-making. Housing policy lies with the Department 
of Housing, Planning, Community and Local Government. However, many of the policy 
instruments, particularly those relating to finance and taxation reside in the Finance 
Departments of the Irish government. There are also a multiplicity of autonomous and quasi-
autonomous agencies advising policy-makers. While DHPCLG has a policy objective of 
achieving private sector involvement in social housing, the Departments of Finance and Public 
Expenditure and Reform are charged with guarding the national purse strings. Culturally, they 
are averse to additional spending or to exposing the Exchequer to additional risk. The 
Programme of Assistance between Ireland and the “Troika” (the European Commission, 
European Central Bank, and International Monetary Fund) had placed severe constraints on 
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Ireland’s ability to take on additional financial commitments. The environment in which the 
Clearing House Process worked also included the Housing Agency who advise the government 
on housing policy and the National Economic and Social Council (NESC) who had presented 
a very strong report in favour of a cost-rental model for Irish housing provision in 2014. NAMA 
also participated and provided the Chair, as did representatives of the local government sector.  
In assessing the Clearing House recommendations, it is clear that State balance sheet 
considerations were paramount in the group’s deliberations. This points to dominance by the 
Finance Departments in the consideration of options. In North’s terms the bargaining strength 
of actors was the key deciding factor. The tenor of the Clearing House recommendations 
suggests that the relative merits of each proposal appear to have been largely measured on their 
balance sheet impact – and not any other housing policy consideration. Thus the key influencer 
for housing policy was in fact broader matters of economic policy. While this is intuitively 
true, it demonstrates the character of institutions in a housing policy context.  
8.3 New Bancroft Affordable Rental Case Study  
As noted, among the recommendations of the Clearing House Group was that there should be 
an affordable rental scheme. The lack of an intermediate tenure between the market and social 
housing was identified by the researcher as one of the biggest lacunae in Irish housing. 
Achieving tenure mix in developments was also identified as vital to securing investment at 
scale. Government had committed to an affordable rental pilot scheme in Budget 2015, 
providing funding of €10 million per annum. In March 2016, the National Development 
Finance Agency (NDFA) who had been appointed as advisers to the government with regard 
to the Clearing House recommendations contacted the Fund promoters for a preliminary 
meeting which took place on 15 March. Subsequently, a draft proposal was received from the 
NDFA for comment, and this was returned with detailed notes and observations on 6 April 
2016.  
This period also saw a general election (26 February) and a protracted period of 10 weeks 
before a new government was put in place in early May. The strong indication from the new 
Government was that it would continue with the programme of the last Government in 
delivering social housing, and the new Programme for Government repeats the commitment to 
introducing an affordable rental model that was made in 2015 (Government of Ireland, 2016). 
In February 2016, an opportunity was identified to purchase 130 apartments for the Fund at 
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New Bancroft in Tallaght, southwest Dublin. The units were well located and nearing 
completion having been recommenced after a long pause due to the economic downturn. While 
details of the NDFA draft pilot scheme are confidential, the kernel of it was a 30% subsidy 
would be payable to landlords in respect of “affordable” tenancies. It was decided to test the 
concept and explore whether the New Bancroft property could be acquired and deployed as an 
affordable housing scheme.  
The Fund would acquire the property and grant a long lease to an AHB on a cost-based rent. 
The AHB would collect the tenant rent (c.70% of market) and the government subsidy (30%). 
The rent they would pay the Fund would be on FRI terms, net of operating costs. With an 
asking price of €31 million, the cost-based rent at a 5% yield to the Fund represented a figure 
of approximately 77.5% of the market rent. Sourcing an AHB to take a lease was instructive 
as to the nature of the sector and the future client base of a future fund. First, there were only 
six AHBs of sufficient scale to take on a commitment of the size of New Bancroft. Second, 
some of these were averse to taking a lease as they felt that acquisition of stock was more 
lucrative and a long-term better business model. However, one was willing to take the lease on 
the terms offered, and to operate the development on the basis of a 100% affordable rental 
project.  
The question of initial investors who would finance the project was problematic. The returns 
were relatively low, especially given the novelty of the idea and location in a non-prime part 
of the city. A number of high-net-worth individuals were sourced who would act as angel or 
impact investors. These accepted the lower yield in recognition of the value of the potential of 
the overall Fund project. While New Bancroft stood alone as an investment, it would not have 
been possible to secure funding in the absence of the wider Fund concept. Thus an exit was 
offered to investors that if the Fund did not grow into the larger entity envisaged, the project 
would be sold and they would be paid out. The Ireland Strategic Investment Fund crucially 
also invested almost half of the equity and to improve returns, leverage was taken on at 
approximately 50%.  
Investors also agreed to absorb a high set-up cost in recognition that New Bancroft would carry 
higher advisory fees than a typical transaction its size as structures were put in place that could 
carry the larger Fund entity. The corporate structure was also elaborate in recognition of tax 
efficiency and involved the incorporation of four companies. Figure 8.1 shows the structure as 
designed by KPMG. The fourth company incorporated was an asset manager who would 
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manage the Fund for a fee. That company is outside the structure shown below, and is the day-
to-day operator of the Fund.  
Figure 8.1 DADF Structure (per KPMG, 2016) 
 
 
The principle of the New Bancroft project was that the model would essentially prove the 
DADF idea as originally conceived with the replacement of the land subsidy and step-in 
agreement with the cash subsidy. The purpose of the venture was to put in place a proof-of-
concept model that could be tested and shown to work for future investors. The project would 
also seed the Fund and provide some cashflow to operationalise the Fund further.  
Thus, with terms agreed with the vendor, funds committed and indicative support from the 
Government up to now, the entire basis for the project was withdrawn. With no affordable 
housing subsidy, there was no margin for the AHB, and it appeared the project would have to 
be abandoned. As the subsidy scheme had no public existence, it was a creation of the Housing 
Department and the NDFA in confidential draft as an output of the Clearing House Group, 
there was no official document or policy to rescind. It appears from informal channels of 
communication that the plan fell foul of the Department of Public Expenditure and Reform 
despite being promoted by the Housing Ministry. As the Departments of Finance and Public 
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Expenditure and Reform control the purse strings, they effectively are more “senior” to “line” 
Departments. This is not startlingly new, though it brings it into stark relief. What is perhaps 
more interesting is that funding for this pilot had been earmarked over 12 months earlier from 
non-revenue sources (the sale of a State utility) and was limited in both time and quantum. 
Accordingly, it should not have impacted on State current account. The scheme was therefore 
dropped for policy and political reasons outside the formal housing policy sphere.  
Appraisals of New Bancroft indicated that the project was an attractive standalone investment. 
Accordingly, it had been demonstrated to investors that in the event of the wider Fund concept 
not progressing, the New Bancroft project could be traded at a reasonable market return as an 
exit strategy. However, it was decided to recast the New Bancroft pilot as a mixed-tenure 
scheme of market renters, social housing leased to the local authority, and crucially a cohort of 
HAP tenants who would act as a proxy for and affordable tenure. On close inspection of the 
HAP regulations, tenants could pay a top-up direct to the landlord. Eligibility for HAP extended 
to all households who qualified for social housing support, which extends well into the middle-
income range. Households earning net income of €35,000 could claim HAP. While they would 
struggle to pay rents in the market at this level, and while HAP would not cover all of their 
rents, they could afford to pay a top-up that would bring the total rent paid to the market level, 
and thus test out the HAP payment as a quasi-affordable housing scheme. 
The maximum monthly HAP payments for different household types in the South Dublin 
County Council area is shown in Table 8.1. By way of example, a single parent with a child 
earning €30,000 pa, would qualify for a HAP payment of €1,250 per month. As two-bedroomed 
unit in New Bancroft would cost €1,600 pm, the household would pay a top-up to the Fund of 
€350 per month and also 10% of their net income to the local authority in differential rent. Thus 
their overall housing cost would be around €550 or around 25–27.5% of their income. Overall, 







Table 8.1 Example of monthly HAP payment  

































South Dublin €430 €500 €660 €900 €1,250 €1,275 €1,300 
 
Under existing State schemes, units can be leased to the local authority at 92% of market rent 
under an availability agreement structure. This 8% discount reflects the lack of void periods 
and the State covenant. In New Bancroft, it was decided to operate the scheme on the basis of 
70% market tenants, 20% HAP tenants and the balance as socially leased units. The scheme 
would be directly managed by an agent of the Fund rather than by sub-lease to AHB. The 
income stream would therefore be approximately made up of a combination of tenant 
contributions and State payments. From an investment point of view, the long leases to a 
government surrogate (the local authority) are a better quality covenant than the HAP payments 
which travel with the household. Because the HAP payments and the leases to local authorities 
are all market based, even with the small discount from market in respect of the leased units, 
the effect on returns between the two models was slight.  
This was a critical juncture of a different type for the Fund project. At this point, the only 
indication from central Government that any below-market rental schemes other than social 
housing would be introduced was via State land projects. Such projects could not be delivered 
in less than 18 months and the likely period – with public procurement considerations – would 
be much longer.  A decision had to be made to proceed with or abandon New Bancroft. Using 
HAP tenancies as a form of affordable rental, thus giving part of the income a quasi-
government underwriting, it was decided to purchase New Bancroft on the terms already 
agreed with the developer. However, three important changes occurred to influence that 
decision. First, rental values had increased in the area thus giving a higher projected 
ungeared investment yield of 5.6%, up from just over 5%, secondly one of the Angel Investors 
was unable to complete, and was replaced by ISIF who agreed to increase their shareholding 
from just under 30% to just under 50% and thirdly the level of debt was increased from €16m 
to €17m. ISIF also required that 30% of tenancies were social tenancies. This did not pose an 
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issue having regard to the purpose and objectives of the fund. Approximately 25% of the overall 
rent roll is from Government payments.  
8.4 Conclusion 
At time of writing (mid 2017), New Bancroft is being tenanted on the 70/20/10 tenure mix as 
envisaged. A detailed investment memo is being prepared to raise additional funds to ISIF’s 
equity contribution, and a pipeline of new projects is being identified (see Appendix 1). It is 
apparent from the ISIF investment and the early interest from other institutions that investment 
can be elicited for low-income housing including social and affordable tenancies. Therefore, 
the core goal of bringing institutional investment into the sector has been achieved. Those 
aspects of the model that have not yet been brought into being – use of State land to reduce 
costs and cost-based rents; FRI leasing to AHBs; and use of step-ins and guarantees remain 
part of the debate.  
The next chapter of the thesis seeks to draw wider conclusions from the study with a particular 














CHAPTER 9:  CONCLUSIONS 
Individual chapters of this thesis have followed particular themes reinforcing the outcome of 
the objectives established in Chapter 1.  This chapter rather than specifically returning to each 
of these takes a more holistic perspective by drawing conclusions on the policy impact of the 
research and highlighting where new insights have been gleaned into aspects of Irish housing 
policy, policy-making and governance. As discussed in Chapter 2, the present work has very 
much positioned itself in a theory of the middle range. As such, the research has sought to 
examine observed phenomena and data and to extrapolate a theory of how housing systems 
evolve and develop. The goal has been to understand the dynamics of non-market housing and 
the institutional framework in which it operates. That has brought the present research into 
close contact with the networks of policy-makers, housing operators, the private construction 
industry, financiers and others. While the model advanced in this thesis has not yet been fully 
implemented, it appears nonetheless that the present work has permeated the institutional 
discourse and will continue to influence housing policy through to the end of the present critical 
juncture.  
Measuring policy impact is problematic from number of standpoints. First, there is a difficulty 
in identifying precisely where a policy originates. Policy in Ireland can be somewhat nebulous. 
While formal statements are common, they do not carry the scholarly rigour of attribution and 
acknowledgement. This means that tracing the ancestry of an individual policy item is not 
straightforward. Policy also takes time to implement. While the effect of some initiatives can 
be felt relatively quickly, others make take years to be felt. Lastly, policy is likely to be 
implemented patchily, that is to say greater enthusiasm for some aspects of policy is likely to 
be mirrored by slower progress on other elements.  
Like success, policy can have many fathers. Often this is the result of dense networks of 
interaction on a subject, which has certainly been the case with housing over the past few years, 
with innumerable conferences on the subject, and an unprecendented level of public and 
political interest. Inevitably, focus is brought to bear on particular policy areas as circumstances 
dictate and in examining the impact of this research on policy, it is necessary to look at the 
position in 2013 when the research began and the present. This has been a time of 
unprecedented tumult in social housing in particular. The rapid evaporation of the supply 
overhang in Dublin and the lack of new construction activity led rapidly to rising rents, falling 
affordability, and increasing levels of homelessness. Thus, neither the owner-occupier sector 
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nor the private rented sector offered safety valves to each other. The NESC report in 2014, 
Construction 2020, the Social Housing Strategy and Rebuilding Ireland meant that this research 
was taking place at time of intense activity in Irish housing policy.  
To measure the impact of this research, it is also important to catalogue the activities that were 
undertaken over the timespan of the research. These reflect a series of formal and informal 
engagements, both written and oral: 
1. A series of papers prepared by the author individually or in collaboration with 
relevant experts.  
2. A series of opinion pieces in national print media on housing topics; 
3. Delivery of papers at conferences; 
4. Attendance and contribution at conferences;  
5. Formal interaction with government via the Clearing House process; 
6. Ad hoc interaction with government and local authorities on individual issues and 
projects for example the Dublin City Council Housing Land Initiative; 
7. Ongoing interaction with NESC, the Housing Agency and housing researchers. 
8. Survey of pension fund managers; interviews with leading institutional investors.  
9. Engagement with ISIF, NAMA, the Pensions Authority and other stakeholders on 
the Fund model. 
Areas where this research has made a specific contribution to knowledge and which previously 
did not exist or were extremely marginal to the Irish housing policy discourse are detailed as 
follows.  
Affordable Housing 
As discussed in earlier chapters, Ireland’s housing policy for many decades was to support as 
many households as possible into home ownership, and to use the local authorities to provide 
housing at very low rents for those who were unable to purchase their own home. This became 
the social housing system, which, for the reasons outlined in Chapters 3 and 4, has become 
heavily residualised. Allocation on the basis of need has led to social housing being offered to 
the most disadvantaged and marginalised households. Decades of mass social housing 
provision led to dense concentrations of such housing, which in turn has led to entrenched 
patterns of poverty and deprivation. As owner-occupation was the State’s preferred tenure, 
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local authority stock was sold to tenants at deep discounts on favourable loan terms, leading to 
the more desirable developments becoming almost entirely privatised.  
Since the mid-1990s the general drift of policy was to reduce the level of subsidy available to 
owner-occupiers through, for example the abolition of the first-time buyer’s grant, and to 
progressively lessen the mortgage interest taxation relief. This culminated in the Housing 
Policy Statement of 2011 (DECLG, 2011) which committed the State to a tenure-neutral policy 
stance that explicitly acknowledged the risks to households and the economy associated with 
over-incentivised home ownership. Affordable housing in an Irish context referred to a series 
of schemes which provided access to home ownership on preferable terms to eligible 
households. Thus, planning gain was used to capture reduced land values to provide a 
proportion of new housing to purchasers at reduced prices.  
The differential rent system that links rents to incomes also has built-in maxima and other 
brakes that generally prevent social rents from approaching market levels. The rare exceptions 
occurred in areas where private rents are exceedingly low. As also discussed, the thresholds for 
access to social housing are relatively high, ranging from 85%–100% of median income in 
Dublin. Despite this, however, needs-based access schemes mean that most households offered 
social housing are extremely low-income cases or entirely welfare-dependant.  
This situation creates an affordability trap for middle-income households in areas of relatively 
high housing costs like Dublin and Cork. Such households are unable to access social housing 
and struggle to pay for appropriate housing in the market. In particular, as shown in Chapter 4, 
the Central Bank macro-prudential lending rules appear to be delaying or precluding a large 
cohort who would in previous times have bought a home, and confining them to renting. 
However, also in Chapter 4, the nature of the private rented sector in Ireland was shown not to 
be conducive to the kind of long-term stable rental environment that is required for the tenure 
to contribute positively to the overall housing environment. Thus, as highlighted the 
characteristics of institutions as residential landlords bring important benefits in creating a 
more stable rental option.  
While the idea of an intermediate tenure of affordable renting is by no means new, a healthy 
cross-fertilisation of ideas took place between this research and the NESC work into housing 
that led to an explicit identification of intermediate renting as an important part of solving Irish 
housing needs (NESC, 2014). Extensive dialogue and exchanges of view took place with 
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preparatory papers cited in the NESC report and staff working papers (NESC, 2014). Official 
recognition of the need for affordable renting came with the announcement of a €200 million 
affordable housing pilot scheme to be implemented by means of a €10 million annual 
commitment over 20 years, and further copper-fastened in the Social Housing Strategy 
(DECLG, 2014).  
The research undertaken for this thesis has further strengthened the public policy case for 
affordable renting and has identified the requirements of pension funds investing in social 
housing. Furthermore, the research highlights that large tracts of social-only housing are not 
desirable and that its heavily residualised state is likely to exacerbate and prolong patterns of 
poverty and disadvantage. This is important, as the deepening supply problem in social housing 
has led to calls for large-scale responses.  
This research has advanced the rationale for affordable renting on several fronts. In Chapter 5, 
it was demonstrated that internationally, some systems of housing provision for low-income 
households permit a tapered system of housing support that permits middle-income households 
to avail of housing, albeit at a lower level of subsidy than attaches to the very poorest 
households. The absence of such a system in Ireland, together with the long-term unwillingness 
of the State to provide such households with social housing is the cause of the endemically 
long waiting lists, and the perennial problem of a cohort of households who have struggled 
either to access homeownership or find secure private rental accommodation.  
The real innovation of this research has been to demonstrate that this intermediate tenure not 
only meets a need, but is also very amenable to produce institutional investment. In so doing, 
it also overcomes one the central problems in mass housing delivery – that of achieving 
delivery at scale and attaining a suitable tenure mix that can produce the sustainable 
communities are required for both public policy and sound investment reasons. Furthermore, 
the concept of an affordable rental tenure has now become a commonplace in Irish housing 
policy.  In this context, a contribution of this research has been to explicitly link affordable 
rental with the realities of securing institutional funding and mixed tenure.  
Contribution to policy 
This research has also highlighted important lacunae in Irish housing policy. The paper 
Housing Supply in Ireland: Perennial Problems and Sustainable Solutions (Nowlan, 2015), a 
by-product of research undertaken for this thesis, has proven highly influential since its 
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publication. The paper was explicitly acknowledged by Property Industry Ireland, the main 
industry representative group, as forming the inspiration for their Housing Manifesto (PII, 
2015).  As an outcome of the proposed Fund structure, DHPCLG recognised the need for 
larger-scale investment in social housing with the Department revising leasing arrangements 
to facilitate larger institutional private investors in the social housing market. (DHPCLG, 
2016b). Furthermore, recasting of the Department’s focus in 2016 to make housing the top 
priority was a central thrust of the researchers’ 2015 paper and similarities in the Government 
response point to the significance of Nowlan’s paper in being a factor in the institutional re-
arrangement and policy re-alignment that took place during 2016.  
The cost based rental model 
Whilst DADF’s primary goal was to identify a means of channelling institutional funding into 
social and affordable rental housing, it quickly evolved to include a cost- based rental model. 
Cost rents have of course been a well-understood concept in housing policy debate (Kemeny, 
1995). The NESC (2014) report strongly advocated a cost-rental sector as a response to the 
housing shortage. Of course, maturation effects take a very long time to be felt, and their full 
impact on housing systems would take a generation to develop. NESC also called for an 
affordable rental sector based on a formulation they termed “supply side supports with 
conditionality”. The DADF cost-based rents are a variant of the pure Kemeny cost-rental 
model. With the rents based on the cost of providing the dwelling, there is no maturation – but 
the State subsidy in the form of land and/or guarantees enables a form of permanently below-
market rents to be created. Cost-rental remains a key (but non-specific) goal of Government 
policy and land subsidy has also become the only extant source of affordable rents available 
within the existing policy framework. Research in this thesis has shown the profound impact 
that costs can have on rents and highlights that removing elements of costs are key to 
affordability. Indeed, in the current Programme for Government there is a clear commitment 
to a cost rental model.  
Investor Yield  
This research is the only analysis in Ireland of the level of yield that would be demanded by 
investors to fund social/affordable housing. The analysis in this thesis has shown that the net 
yield currently required for investors in the higher end of the market spectrum in the order of 
4.5% to 5.0% however it is in the lower end of the market that the yield spectrum moves out to 
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the 7% plus range. This can be seen by the more recent deals by IRES REIT in working class 
Dublin suburbs. The New Bancroft project is showing an in initial yield of over 5.5%. This has 
many more market characteristics and lower levels of government support than the original 
model. However, it was possible to fund New Bancroft at the same returns with the 30% 
government subsidy scheme that was originally mooted.  
The source of funds for the initial phase of DADF is targeted not at the real estate asset class 
but rather at creating a bond surrogate that would show yields a little below property but with 
indexation and security that would compensate for the lower return. The feedback from the 
survey of pension funds showed support to invest in a bond-type instrument that would yield  
around 4% indexed to inflation or rents which had a partial government underwrite.  With all 
of these factors in place, the research shows that pension funds would invest for terms of up to 
25 years. Significantly, pension funds indicated that they would not invest in purely social 
housing but would consider a project for key workers that had limited social housing and 
formed sustainable communities where property values could be maintained. Hence an 
important contribution stemming from this research is that pension funds will support the Fund 
if all their preconditions are met at a net yield of 4% to 4.5%. To this figure must be added the 
operating cost of the Fund, the industry norm for such cost is 1% to 1.5% of annual funds under 
management. Accordingly, the necessary investor yield on funds advanced by the Fund will 
have to be in the order of 5.25% to 5.5% which is more or less where New Bancroft secured 
its funding, but as noted above, with a much greater market exposure.  
The Role of Land 
One of the key principles of this research is that deploying State land to produce permanently 
low rents is one of the simplest and most direct ways to produce an affordable rental tenure. 
This idea has been taken up by the State, but in ambiguous terms though one of the key 
initiatives in Rebuilding Ireland was the use of State land for mixed tenure housing. Despite 
this vagueness with regard to the end mix of tenures within the development, it appears the 
public sector wishes to see proposals coming forward for affordable rental. Indeed, in early 
2017, South Dublin County Council and Dublin City Council put forward four sites in their 
ownership for mixed tenure developments. The Fund has joined one consortium that will 




Regulation and Investment 
Perhaps one of the most important insights gleaned from this research is that increased 
regulation of the rental sector can make it more conducive to institutional investors. While 
commercial property has a well-established legal underpinning, residential property remains 
underdeveloped and with a weak regulatory structure. Thus strengthening the institution of 
rental housing (in the institutionalist sense) would improve the potential for new funding 
sources. This is somewhat counterintuitive where traditionally regulation would be seen as a 
barrier to investment. There is no doubt that with relatively small measures and changes to 
existing support structures that substantial funding can be channelled into housing, and it would 
be a strong recommendation that government urgently undertake the work to bring this to bear.  
Housing Research Capability 
A final issue that this research has exposed is the absence of any well-resourced holistic 
housing research capability within the State. With the exception of NESC, whose housing focus 
is sporadic, there is no research that is considering the housing market in a holistic manner. In 
particular, work on social housing tends to be the preserve of universities and the NGO sector, 
with a strong bias towards social science. As such these do not consider the wider issues of 
housing, finance and the interface between tenures. In contrast, the private rental and owner-
occupier markets are the focus of extensive research by government agencies (RTB, ESRI, 
Central Bank) and private sector actors (industry bodies, financial institutions), but these do 
not focus on affordability or social housing needs, focusing instead on an economics-centred 
approach.  
Some examples of the adverse effects of this is the lacuna in data and investment patterns in 
the rental market, where estate agents are reporting widely divergent trends in the buy-to-let 
market. A contentious debate took place on apartment floor space standards without any 
significant academic research input or international benchmarking before the regulations were 
changed. Arguments over the cost of housing provision and viability are conducted without 
any agency to provide an authoritative, evidence-based answer. In a housing supply shortage 
of the type Ireland is experiencing, where together with the effects on individual families, the 
deficit in housing threatens economic recovery and growth, it should be an urgent matter of 




Final reflections  
Some 30 months after the publication of the Social Housing Strategy, it would appear that 
progress on actions relating to private sector involvement in social housing and the affordable 
housing pilot that was announced in October 2015 has been negligible apart from the proposed 
conventional PPPs (DECLG, 2016). Other than this, most of the focus of government activity 
appears to be on the deployment of increasing amounts of capital for local authority and AHB 
development and acquisition projects. Residential development activity in the general market 
is making a very slow recovery, and property values in many locations remain close to, or 
below replacement cost, meaning that there will be a very slow trickle-down effect to lower 
income households. Meanwhile, supply pressures in the rental market have become acute, 
leading to systematic accommodation shortages in Dublin. The inevitable market recovery can 
only take place with the aid of higher rents which will increase affordability problems for low 
and moderate income-earners, and the State will have to pay a large portion of these rents if its 
ambition is to house 75,000 households in the private sector via HAP. Moreover, given the 
long time lag between supply response and delivery, the likelihood is that these effects will be 
magnified by any delay.  
The announcement in June 2017 of a review of Rebuilding Ireland barely a year after it was 
first published offers the possibility of a step change in methods of housing delivery that could 
place Irish housing on a more sustainable and stable footing. This, however, will be the fourth 
such attempt in three years to develop a strategy. This research has shown that the possibility 
exists to find abundant and relatively cheap capital for social and affordable housing from the 
private sector. It has also shown that institutional change is required, and illustrated the 
character of the Irish housing system and its path dependencies. The solutions offered herein 
are by no means the complete answer to the severe deficit in housing supply that the country 
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‘The Potential of Mixed Tenure Urban Development in Ireland’ 
Dr. Philip Lawton 
 
A significant amount of recent urban research has focused upon the scale of the neighbourhood 
and the forms of social interaction that take place within it. Often summarized as 
‘neighbourhood effects’, much of this literature has sought to examine the connections between 
the neighbourhood in which people live and their life chances (Joseph et al., 2007; Blokland 
and Savage, 2008; Arthurson, 2010). While literature within the social sciences and urban 
planning has been somewhat critical of social mix, and particularly on its relative levels of 
success in mitigating the impacts of poverty, there remain important elements in the message 
being conveyed and, more particularly, in the potential role of social mix within future housing 
provision in Ireland. A key factor is therefore not so much that social mix should be rejected 
in favour of a form of segregation, but that the needs of the less well off, the poor and more 
vulnerable within society should be deemed of high importance within the provision of 
housing. This has implications for social mix policies and the manner in which they are 
implemented. Moreover, it needs to be recognized that within social housing provision there 
are degrees of necessity that shift significantly. This is dependent upon a number of variables 
that can at times be overlapping. For example, the needs of a socially deprived estate (see 
Redmond and Hearne, 2013) will vary significantly from those of newly provided social 
housing within a newly developed suburban location (NESC, Forthcoming, 2015). Moreover, 
within the provision of social housing, there are varying degrees of need, that range between 
factors such as health, age, disabilities, and social groupings. Planning a newly developed 
socially mixed development therefore offers potential for the promotion of a socially inclusive 
model of housing that can take into account these different needs, that may vary depending 
upon the particularities of the location and other variables. The manner in which such factors 
are engaged with is thus dependent upon a number of factors, including design, development 





From a broader perspective, a significant element of current urban experience on a global scale 
is marked by segregation. Much of this is driven by, and reinforced through disparities in 
wealth. Increasingly, there is a tendency for the wealthier in society to isolate themselves from 
other members of society. This, as has been extensively documented within urban studies 
literature has lead to a tendency to reinforce particular fears about engagement with people of 
different social backgrounds. As is summarized by Atkinson (2008, p.42): “Gated 
communities, affluent enclaves, common interest communities and many new suburbs reveal 
not only concentration and spatial separation but also a broader set of social fears, desires for 
status, common value, and identities.” The dangers of segregation are thus highlighted in the 
increase of the wealthier in society isolating themselves and disaffiliating themselves from the 
rest of society (Ibid). From a policy perspective, it becomes important to promote and support 
cities and towns that are socially inclusive and balanced. The promotion of socially mixed 
neighbourhoods is one factor in the promotion of such. Here, there is potential for both 
government intervention and the intervention of the private sector over prolonged periods of 
time. 
 
The implementation of socially mixed urban developments is highly complex and involving a 
myriad of different factors. For one, much as it is problematic that the wealthy have often 
chosen to withdraw from the public realm of the city (Atkinson, 2008), the promotion of a 
return to the city is itself not without its social challenges. Indeed, a significant amount of work 
has demonstrated the extent to which ‘social mix’ can result in the gradual if not rapid 
displacement of lower wage and poor people in the city (Bridge et al, 2014). Thus, the 
promotion of social mix is context specific. However, when the opportunity is presented to 
provide for housing that is of mixed tenure, and that does not involved the displacement of 
particular groups, it holds out the potential to ensure a less segregated urban reality. The aim 
of this paper is to briefly examine the potential of social mix to engender a more inclusive 
urban environment.  
Social Mix: Potentials and Critiques 
A central argument within ‘social mix’ is that mono-tenure estates have negative influences 
upon people’s educational attainment and thus their life chances. Moreover, it is also argued 
that within such settings, expectations can be reduced, thus impacting upon people’s attainment 
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of employment and other factors, such as education (Wilson, 1987). Thus, when brought 
together, the social isolation of poverty serves to be reproduced over time. In emphasizing the 
role of spatial segregation, Redmond and Russell (2008, p.170) argue: “Clearly the issue of 
spatial isolation or segregation is important as it is argued that, in essence, it is worse to be in 
poverty in an area of concentrated poverty than being in poverty elsewhere”. Through 
interventions that serve to limit the isolation of poverty, social mix is perceived to eliminate at 
least one of its more negative elements and halt a spiral of decline. However, a significant 
amount of research has questioned the extent to which the mixing of different social groups 
actually generates positive outcomes for poorer groups – the very groups that such policies are 
aimed at. If anything, the recent research within urban studies on social mix cautions about the 
high expectations of neighbourhood mixing. It either implicitly or explicitly points to the need 
to consider a range of other factors, including family structures, relative wealth, and 
employment opportunities in terms of life opportunity (van Kempen and Wissink, 2014). 
Questions arise as to the extent to which tenure mix actually improves employment chances of 
the poor. Directly connected to this, arguments have arisen as to the extent to which mixing 
actually takes place within socially mixed neighbourhoods. For example, Butler and Robson 
(2001) argue that those living in socially mixed neighbourhoods live largely separate lives with 
little interaction taking place between different groups. This has been repeatedly argued within 
social mix literature, with questions arising over the benefits accruing to particular populations. 
For example, drawing on the example of employment trajectories, Pinkster (2014) has argued 
that a greater level of understanding is needed in understanding the potential role of the 
neighbourhood in influencing employment opportunities. Indeed, disaggregating wider 
opportunities from the neighbourhood scale becomes a significant challenge. The expectations 
of what can be achieved through social mix should therefore be metered in the context of wider 
societal factors beyond the scale of the urban block or neighbourhood. 
Never-the-less, in as much as social mix can mitigate against some of the worst elements of 
segregation, it holds potential for societal change. Indeed, while there may well emerge wider 
societal benefit from social mixing, one of the more positive elements to be expected from an 
environment that promotes social mix is the manner in which engenders interactions between 
different social groups on an everyday level. This may entail short encounters between different 
people from different backgrounds, or the establishment of more long-term forms of 
interaction. For example, in discussing the importance of feelings of belonging in society, 
Blokland and Nast (2014, p.1145) highlight “…the importance of fluid, brief, incidental 
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encounters.” As they continue, a sense of belonging in a neighbourhood revolves around the 
creation of a form of ‘comfort zone’. Here, they highlight the importance of being able to 
interact with those whom we are familiar with and strangers within urban space as engendering 
a feeling of belonging. Such a treatise brings us back to need to resist urges towards segregation 
within the contemporary city, with the positive roles of integration at the level of the 
neighbourhood being highlighted through the promotion of social mix. Social mixing therefore 
can be seen as allowing the possibility of promoting a form of ‘urbanity’ where different groups 
and individuals are able to live with people different from themselves (Fainstein, 2005). While 
it is important to have an understanding of some of the pitfalls of promoting socially mixed 
housing, it also provides the potential of allowing for the evolution of a more socially inclusive 
urban environment. Here, the potential for interaction between different social groups within 
the neighbourhood and the creation of trust thus becomes of key importance.  
What can be learned from from the above in terms of the implementation of social mix policies? 
First, it is important to maintain an awareness of the limitations of social mix policies when 
viewed in the context of the wider social factors. For the purposes of this paper, however, it is 
perhaps of greater significance to gain an understanding of the potentials of social mix. This 
includes gaining an insight in to the particular needs of a locality, both in terms of the city-
regional scale and the neighbourhood scale. It is to this broad area that the paper now turns.  
 
Potentials of Social Mix for Social Inclusion and Societal Trust 
Given the experience of recent decades, Ireland currently stands on the cusp of a significant 
change in approach to the provision of housing. Of particular note for the purposes of this paper 
is the extent to which the promotion of a greater focus upon social housing begins a process of 
normalizing an alternative relationship to housing that is not dominated by owner occupancy. 
This, as is alluded to by Livingstone et al., (2013) can engender a more positive relationship to 
alternative forms of housing, including social housing, than exist at present. In drawing upon 
the examples of the Netherlands, Sweden and Germany, they posit that the correlation between 
social housing as a particular form of tenure and a specific social group – the poor – is less 
firmly embedded than in countries such as Britain. As such, a greater focus on the provision of 
social housing as provided within the context of market-led housing can, in the long-term, 
engender a more positive overall attitude towards such housing provision, with potential 
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impacts in terms of lessening stigmatization and promoting the provision of social housing as 
a more integral element of wider housing provision. In as much as recent government policy, 
such as the Social Housing Strategy 2020 has identified a need for social housing to be provided 
for a significant cohort of population, we are at a point where such provision will no longer be 
merely targeted at a residualized population group (see Norris, 2014), but will be more widely 
available to a larger cohort of the population. 
The potential to promote tenure mix also allows the possibility of addressing factors often left 
to market forces, such as displacement of poorer populations. The inclusion of different forms 
of social housing within market-led housing development goes some way to mitigating against 
negative externalities, such as, for example the potential for different groups to be excluded or 
displaced to parts of the city based on affordability. The paper now turns to the more micro-
level elements of approaching social mix, including design, layout and day to day management 
practices. 
Approaching Social Mix: Design, Layout and Management 
Much of the discussion around the implementation of social mix has surrounded the relative 
level of mix between different tenures. Within the literature, tenure is often used as a synonym 
for different social groups, with social housing becoming representative of the poorer in 
society. As such, it is premised that, at least to a certain extent, the mixing of different tenures 
will achieve a certain level of mix between different social groups. It is also perceived that 
design and layout play a key role in the success or otherwise of such locations. For example, 
much work emanating from best practice guidelines in the U.K. has advocated the promotion 
of ‘pepper-potting’ as an approach that integrates different social groups through the mixing of 
tenures throughout an apartment development or within a group of houses at the neighbourhood 
level (Jupp, 1999; Lawton, 2013). It is deemed that such an approach achieves a certain level 
of integration and interaction and avoids stigmatization (Bailey et al., 2006; McKee et al., 
2013). Indeed, the scale of mixing is an important element within the layout and design of 
socially mixed developments. Work by Lawton (2013), which focused upon Amsterdam, has 
demonstrated a shift away from pepper-potting and an emerging trend of more micro-scale 
segregation at the level of the urban block. This raises questions about the fundamental nature 
of social mix policies; i.e., the desire amongst policy makers for different groups to at least 




The point here is not to say that there are hard or fast rules about the scale at which mixing 
should take place. However, it is of key importance that undue segregation does not become 
manifest through the implementation of design. Discussions of the ‘poor door’ approach in the 
UK in recent years have also highlighted this tendency. Thus, much best practice would 
advocate the promotion of social mix that is ‘tenure blind’ (McKee et al., 2013). Here, the 
emphasis is placed on ensuring that through both the internal and external finishing, the 
appearance of housing is the same for both market oriented and social housing. Some examples 
from the Netherlands, where a mixture of different tenures is provided for with the same high 
quality design is illustrative of this tendency. This is indicated in the inserted text box, which 
draws upon the example of the Eastern Docks in Amsterdam. The rational for such an approach 







Eastern Docks, Amsterdam 
Eastern Docks, Amsterdam, which was developed in the context of a post-industrial 
port between the mid 1990s and 2000’s, is used here as an illustration of distribution 
of social housing across a neighbourhood. The coloured sections of map indicate areas 
under management of housing associations. Images give indication of quality of build 
and ‘tenure blind’ approach, whereby social housing is of same quality and build as 
owner occupied and market rental housing. The Eastern Docks also provides mix 
between own-door terraced housing and higher density apartments (All Images by 
Author, 2012; map source: Atlas Sociale Woningbouw: Amsterdam Social Housing 
Atlas, 2007) 
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In an Irish context, over the last number of years since the economic downturn, social housing 
provision has been predominantly has predominantly taken the form of retro-fitting already 
existing developments. Thus, the approach taken within newly built stock allows for a much 
greater level of pre-build thought to go into a socially mixed development. Here, the interaction 
between social needs, design and management become of key importance.  
As is discussed within the work of McKee et al (2013), it is important to provide a range of 
housing types within socially mixed neighbourhoods. This includes own-door duplexes, houses 
and apartments. The key factor within such approaches it that housing within a location can 
serve the needs of individuals and families over a prolonged period of time. Already existing 
typologies from both Ireland, such as the Dublin Docklands, and abroad (e.g., Amsterdam and 
Vienna) can serve to give pointers to such. As is illustrated in the example of the Eastern Docks, 
an urban block can provide for both own-door housing and apartments within the same 
development or location. Furthermore, with due regard to the respective tenants, it is possible 
that such approaches allow for swapping between different tenants over time. This may entail 
bringing together the needs of someone who is looking to downscale and the needs of someone 
with an expanding family. The advantages of such an approach are that it allows for different 
groups to stay within their neighbourhood but to adjust their housing as their personal needs 
change. 
The promotion of high quality day-to-day management within socially mixed developments is 
of key significance in achieving long-term viability. Beginning in the late 1990s, and as 
predicted by researchers such as Priemus et al. (1999) there has been an increased awareness 
of the role of housing associations and related bodies in the upkeep of social housing. This has 
included an increasing professionalization of the sector, and a greater alignment with market 
actors. In an Irish context, the increased role of housing associations and their attention towards 
upkeep has been highlighted by recent work by NESC (Forthcoming, 2015) and work by Norris 
(2014). In particular, the NESC discuss the nuances around both pepper-potting and clustering 
of social housing within a particular development. As they highlight, challenges of clustering 
pertain predominantly to issues over upkeep. While historically social housing was often 
deemed to be of poor condition due to insufficient maintenance, the emergence of housing 
associations has contributed significantly to a shift in day-to-day management and duty of care. 
One of the key elements to emerge from this research is the importance of the context of the 
particular location. For example, within locations where there is an existing community 
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structure, the development should be cognizant of the needs of those already living in the area. 
Thus, as was highlighted in the case of the docklands, providing clustered housing was seen as 
of huge benefit to the community in terms of maintaining community bonds. For management, 
the clustering of housing allows for a greater ease of care in terms of everyday upkeep, 
including cleaning and general repairs. In other contexts, the pepper-potting approach can be 
implemented. This, however, entails more challenges in terms of up-keep and management. 
For example, there are often particular needs within social housing in terms of upkeep. This, 
as will be alluded to in the next section, can be somewhat mitigated against through integrated 
approaches to management. It should also be noted that it is possible to promote both clustering 
and pepper-potting within the same development. This approach would recognize that there are 
different needs within the overall development of social housing. For example, social housing 
can provide for residents with special needs that can be thought through at the design phase 
and supported through day to day management. This is a common feature of the experience of 
housing associations. It is recognizing these needs that becomes paramount when making 
decisions around questions of design and day to day management.  
 
Key Elements in Approach ‘On the Ground’ 
The development of socially mixed housing can, when carried out with a number of factors in 
mind can provide a successful and socially inclusive approach to housing. By way of 
conclusion, the following are pointers that should be born in mind when pursing a socially 
mixed development. I have aimed to give some pointers, but it is important that all of the 
different elements are brought together so as to ensure a fully integrated model.  
1:  The inclusion of non-market housing within a housing development must ensure that it 
resists any undue segregation. This begins with the process of design. Here, it becomes 
essential that architects and designers engage with the needs of the tenants. While it may 
be difficult to engage directly with people who do not yet live within the neighbourhood, 
experiences can be drawn upon from other similar developments. Clarion Quay and 
Hanover Quay in Dublin’s Docklands could perhaps point to some useful insights in this 
regard. As such, a developer should take these factors into mind when selecting 
architects. If a design team is already selected, the developer should promote the 




2:  Putting in place a housing association who will be responsible for the day to day running 
of the social housing part of a development is of key importance in terms of the 
implementation of socially mixed housing. Recent experiences indicate that the inclusion 
of such bodies prior to the design phase would be of significant merit in terms of deciding 
upon a good quality of finish and practical elements of overall design and development. 
As with point 1 above, it would be of significant benefit if the housing association were 
able to communicate with the design team at the design phase of the project. 
3:  Once finished, the needs of all residents must be central to decision-making. Thus, it is 
necessary to establish a board where all tenants have a say in the day-to-day running of 
a development. The promotion of integration between different tenants, the developer, 
management and the housing association is of significant importance in the management 
of housing. This is of particular importance within apartment developments. Possibilities 
of integrating the management of different tenures of housing should also be looked at. 
The housing association would be able to give professional advice in this regard. It is 
posited that if successful, this would be able to garner a significant amount of interaction 
between different groups within a development. This is currently not provided for 
through legislation in Ireland. It would, however, be feasible to promote a new and more 




This short paper has attempted to outline some of the potentials and pitfalls in the promotion 
of socially mixed urban developments. While the paper outlined some of the more critical 
approaches to social mix policies, it also pointed towards some potentials in the development 
of and day to day operations of a socially mixed neighbourhood or development. The fostering 
of a successful socially mixed development is premised on the promotion of interaction 
between different actors at various phases of the development. In this regard, it is essential that 
interaction occurs between different actors at the pre-development, development and post-
development phase. Of particular importance here is the day to day management element. As 
is outlined in this paper, there is a significant increase in the level of attention towards 
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management of housing developments. While this paper has focused particularly on housing 
associations, there is also increased potential for interactions between these bodies and 
privately oriented services management teams. However, given their understanding of the 
diversity of needs of social housing tenants, housing associations can play a central role in the 
long-term success of a socially mixed housing development. Bringing the different elements 
together presents significant challenges for a successful housing development. However, 
drawing upon experiences from other places, and experiences garnered from the Irish context, 
it is feasible to develop an integrated model of housing with a long-term viability.  
References 
Arthurson, K. (2010) Operationalising Social-mix: Spatial Scale, Lifestyle and 
Stigma as Mediating Points in Resident Interaction, Urban Policy and Research, 28 (1), pp. 49-
63. 
Atkinson, R. (2008) The Flowing Enclave and the Misanthropy of Networked Affluence, in 
Blokland, T.V. & Savage, M. (Eds). Networked Urbanism. Social Capital in the City 
(Hampshire, Ashgate Publishing Limited). 
Bailey, N., Haworth, A, Manzi, T, Paranagamage,  
P, and Roberts, M. (2006) Creating and Sustaining Mixed Income Communities: A Good 
Practice Guide. Coventry/York: Chartered Institute of Housing and Joseph Rowntree 
Foundation. 
Blokland, T.V. & Savage, M. (2008). Networked Urbanism. Social Capital in the 
City.(Hampshire, Ashgate Publishing Limited). 
Blokland, T., and Nast, J. (2014) From Public Familiarity to Comfort Zone: The Relevance of 
Absent Ties for Belonging in Berlin’s Mixed Neighbourhoods, International Journal of Urban 
and Regional Research, 38 (4) pp1142-59. 
Bridge et al 2014 
Butler, T., and G. Robson. 2001. “Social Capital, Gentrification and Neighbourhood Change 





Department of Environment, Community and Local Government (2014) Social Housing 
Strategy 2020: Support, Supply and Reform, Stationary Office, Dublin. 
Fainstein, S.S. (2005) Cities and Diversity: Should We Want It? Can We Plan For It?, Urban 
Affairs Review, 41, (1), pp. 31-9 
Joseph, M.L., Chaskin, R.J., and Webber, H.S., (2007) The Theoretical Basis for Addressing 
Poverty Through Mixed-Income Development, Urban Affairs Review, 42, pp. 369-409 
Jupp, B. (1999) Living Together: Community Life on Mixed Tenure Estates (London, Demos). 
Lawton, P. (2013) Understanding Urban Practitioners Perspectives on Social-Mix Policies in 
Amsterdam: The Importance of Design and Social Space, The Journal of Urban Design, 
Volume 18, (1), pp 98-118 
Livingstone, Mark Livingston, M., Kearns, A. & Bailey, N (2013) Delivering Mixed 
Communities: The Relationship between Housing Tenure Mix and Social Mix in England's 
Neighbourhoods, Housing Studies, 28 (7) pp 1056-1080 
 
McKee, M., Bond, L., Kearns, A., Sautkina, E., and Weeks, G. (2013) Policy-Maker and 
Practitioner Perspectives on Mixed Tenure Communities: a Qualitative Study, GoWell, 
Glasgow 
National Economic and Social Council (NESC) (forthcoming) Socially Integrated Housing and 
Sustainable Communities: Case-Studies from Dublin, NESC Research Series, Paper Number 
7, NESC, Dublin 
Norris, M. (2014) Social Housing, Disadvantage and Neighbourhood Liveability: Ten Years 
of Change in Social Housing Neighbourhoods, Routledge, London. 
Pinkster, F.M. (2014) Neighbourhood Effects as Indirect Effects: Evidence from a Dutch Case 
Study on the Significance of Neighbourhood for Employment Trajectories, International 
Journal of Urban and Regional Research. DOI: 10.111/l.1468-2427.2012.01197.x. 




Redmond. D. and Hearne, R. (2013) Starting Afresh: Housing Associations, Stock Transfer 
and Regeneration. Cluid Housing Association, Dublin 
Redmond, D. and Russell, P. (2008) 'Social Housing Regeneration and the Creation of 
Sustainable Communities in Dublin '. Local Economy, 23 (3): 168-179. 
Wilson, J. W., (1987).The Truly Disadvantaged: the Inner City, the Underclass and Public 
Policy Chicago, University of Chicago Press: Chicago 
 
 
